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Abstract 
This study aims to investigate the impacts on the South African economy of higher 
government expenditure, capital flow reversal and regulatory changes introducing 
a higher required leverage ratio for banks. The research framework differs from 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium Models as they lack consistent 
representation of institutional balance sheets and financial sector behaviour.    
 
An alternative model which is micro founded and stock and flow consistent in the 
tradition of Backus et al. (1980) is constructed and calibrated for South Africa. It 
provides for a richer representation of institutional balance sheets than existing 
models. The financial sector’s behaviour in this framework draws on the recent 
theoretical models of Borio and Zhu (2012) and Woodford (2010), which highlight 
the relationship between bank capital, risk taking behaviour of the financial sector, 
lending spreads and economic activity. The financial accelerator mechanism 
operates through the balance sheets of all institutions in the economy.  
 
Solving for the effects of a fiscal shock, the model generates a government 
expenditure multiplier larger than two in severe recessionary conditions. Although 
low levels of domestic savings limit the sources of funding to support the fiscal 
expansion, foreign saving inflows relax the savings constraint, increase liquidity in 
the market and support the fiscal expansion.   
 
The results from a capital flow reversal shock to the model indicate larger impacts 
than previous studies. We find that even in the absence of large foreign currency 
denominated liabilities, a reversal in capital flows can affect the domestic economy 
through its impact on domestic liquidity, on the risk-taking behaviour of the 
financial sector and on the demand for assets. The negative effect can be 
exacerbated if the shock changes the expectation formation process of agents in the 
economy. 
 
The introduction of a higher leverage ratio for banks is likely to generate negative 
economic impacts in the short-run that depend on the banks’ choice of adjustment 
5 
 
strategy. The negative GDP effect is the greatest if the financial sector reduces 
leverage through a reduction in the value of its assets (for example, recall of loans) 
rather than the issue of new equity. The regulatory shock leads to the financial 
sector changing its perceptions of risk, which reduces the size of the money 
multiplier and increases lending spreads. 
 
The results indicate the importance of incorporating stock and flow consistent 
financial sector dynamics in studying macroeconomic shocks. Our results also 
highlight the importance of the financial sector in transmitting policy interventions 
and the role of policy in changing the behaviour of the financial sector. Thus, one 
of our key policy conclusions is that the old model of fiscal and monetary policy 
coordination is outdated. Effective policy coordination must include 
macroprudential policy and understanding of the risk behaviour of all institutions 
in the economy. 
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Chapter 1 Introduction 
1.1 Motivation 
The financial crisis of 2008 questioned our understanding of the role of the financial 
sector in affecting real economic activity and the effectiveness of monetary and 
fiscal interventions under conditions of severe economic stress. In response to the 
crisis, policy makers increased government expenditure; reduced policy rates and 
increased the balance sheet operations of central banks, thus increasing global 
liquidity and capital flows; and moved to introduce stricter regulation of the 
financial sector through the BASEL III reforms. 
These developments have led to a significant increase in macroeconomic research 
aiming to understand: how the real economy and the financial sector interact; under 
what conditions monetary and fiscal interventions are effective; and the likely 
impact of higher capital requirements for the financial sector on short and long-term 
economic activity.      
There is consensus that the financial sector is important for economic activity and 
the cost of financial instability is high. Output losses, measured as deviation from 
trend GDP, are on average 20 per cent during the first four years (Laeven and 
Valencia 2008; Laeven and Valencia 2010). Recessions caused by financial crisis 
tend to be more severe and to be followed by weaker recoveries (Reinhart and 
Rogoff 2009). The economic literature indicates that the relationship between the 
real and the financial sectors is driven by the borrower balance sheet channel, the 
bank balance sheet channel, and the liquidity channel as identified by BCBS (2011).  
These channels on their own are not able to explain the financial dynamics 
experienced during the 2008 financial crisis. This has led to the development of 
theoretical models such as those developed by Borio and Zhu (2012) and Woodford 
(2010), which provide a major contribution to our understanding of how the 
financial sector affects the real economy.   
In the model developed by Woodford (2010), the lending spread is a function of the 
financial sector capital. Raising the level of capital is costly and leverage is limited 
by regulatory requirements. Shocks that impair the capital of the intermediary or 
higher leverage ratio regulatory requirements translate into higher lending spreads, 
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lower volumes of lending and economic activity.  Borio and Zhu (2012) also link 
capital of the financial sector to bank behaviour. In their framework, the behaviour 
is driven by the capital threshold effect and the capital framework effect. The 
capital threshold effect arises because breaching the minimum threshold is costly 
for a bank. In the face of a possible breach banks will take defensive action to avoid 
the high costs, which will affect the availability and pricing of funding extended to 
customers. The capital framework effect influences the way the banks measure, 
manage and price risk, which affects their behaviour. The economic cycle changes 
the strength of the capital threshold effect as probabilities of default, valuations and 
the perception of risk change.  In turn, this shifts the relative position of the banks’ 
capital to the regulatory threshold and affects bank behaviour. The accelerator 
effects in both models are driven by the relationship between capital and economic 
activity. Higher economic activity reduces the probabilities of default and the 
perception of risk, and improves valuations. This reduces lending spreads, which 
encourages further improvements in economic activity. Borio and Zhu (2012) stress 
that the measurement, management and pricing of risk requires understanding of 
the distribution of risk across financial instruments and across institutions. This 
implies that current economic models must have a richer representation of balance 
sheets if they are to capture the dynamics characterising the financial sector.          
In terms of the effectiveness of fiscal policy, the central argument of the main-
stream economic research is that under zero lower bound conditions, the fiscal 
multipliers are significantly larger (Blanchard and Leigh 2014; Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2011; Delong et al. 2012; Eggertsson 2009). The 
underlying mechanism assumes that policy makers do not respond to movements 
in the output gap and inflation as rates are zero bound, while the increase in inflation 
expectations reduces real rates. In addition, the higher fiscal multiplier is driven by 
higher share of credit constrained households (Eggertsson and Krugman 2012).  
Empirical research also supports the presence of high fiscal multipliers in 
recessionary conditions (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012; Fazzari, Morley, and 
Panovska 2015; Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy 2013; Riera-Crichton, Vegh, and 
Vuletin 2015).  
There is consensus in the economic literature that capital flows are increasingly 
being driven by global factors and reflect risk-taking behaviour of global financial 
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institutions (Bruno and Shin 2015; Byrne and Fiess 2016). Financial sector 
dynamics are key in transmitting capital flow reversal shocks and exacerbating their 
impact (Joyce and Nabar 2009; Mishkin 1999). The impacts, especially in the case 
of sudden stops, can be severe: including banking and sovereign crisis with large 
output and employment losses (Cavallo et al. 2015; Eichengreen and Gupta 2016; 
Magud and Vesperoni 2015; Reinhart and Reinhart 2008). 
The introduction of BASEL III aims to improve the stability of the financial sector. 
The long-term effects on economic activity are expected to be positive (FSB 2010). 
The short-term effects are likely to be negative, though there is no agreement on the 
size of the impact. MAG (2010b) finds small negative impacts in the short run with 
small variations, which are dependent on the tool used to assess the impacts, the 
response of monetary policy and the spill-over effects across countries.  The 
impacts are largely driven by higher interest rate margins. Slovik and Cournède 
(2011) and EU (2011) find similar results. However, IIF (2011) finds significantly 
larger effects. The impact depends on how the higher capital ratios are achieved. 
Achieving the higher ratio through reducing dividends is likely to have a smaller 
impact on the credit cycle compared to reducing the loan portfolio (Cohen and 
Scatigna 2016; Zhu 2008). Empirical research indicates that banks globally have 
chosen to increase their retained earnings as an instrument to achieve the higher 
capital requirements (Cohen and Scatigna 2016).   
While there is broad recognition of the importance of financial sector dynamics, the 
studies lack consistent representation of institutional balance sheets and the 
dynamics identified by Borio and Zhu (2012) and Woodford (2010) .  
Modern Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models rely on the 
financial accelerator mechanism identified by  Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 
(1999) or a household collateral constraint mechanism following the approach by 
Iacoviello (2005). These models assume rational expectations and dynamics based 
on a representative agent, implying almost perfect foresight of risk, which hinders 
the incorporation of cross-sectional and inter-temporal coordination failures (Borio 
and Zhu 2012). In addition, the financial accelerator mechanism ignores the time-
varying pricing of risk and effective risk tolerance.  It is only the balance sheet of a 
representative firm that is important in the financial accelerator mechanism. The 
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models ignore how other balance sheets are affected and how all balance sheets 
interact to determine the impact on the economy. Duca and Muellbauer (2014) 
provide additional criticisms. They argue that in the model by Bernanke, Gertler, 
and Gilchrist (1999)  the  financial frictions are based on only one-period dynamics 
and the mechanism relies only on costly monitoring carried out by banks. There is 
no role for housing or housing markets and there is no feedback via the asset base, 
and the potential solvency of the financial sector is missing. Iacoviello (2005) does 
not include banking sector dynamics.   
Our analysis aims to build on the current literature and present a framework which 
has more detailed financial sector behaviour. The frameworks developed by Borio 
and Zhu (2012) and Woodford (2010) are key to our analysis.  This allows for better 
understanding of the transmission mechanism of economic and financial shocks and 
more informed policy making. Our analysis focuses on South Africa, an emerging 
market economy with a highly developed financial sector and high reliance on 
capital inflows.  
1.2 Objective 
The objective of this thesis is to answer three questions in the context of the South 
African economy. These are: 
1. Was fiscal policy effective in the period immediately after the 2008 
financial crisis? 
2. What is the likely impact of capital flow reversal on the economy? 
3. How would the introduction of a higher leverage ratio affect the economy? 
To answer the three questions and address the limitations of current studies, we 
develop a stock and flow consistent model in the tradition of Backus et al. (1980). 
Our model uses flow-of-funds data produced by the South African Reserve Bank 
to build balance sheets for institutions and create a series of financial Social 
Accounting Matrices.  
For the first question, we study the impact of higher government consumption 
expenditure under recessionary conditions, functioning financial sector and low 
government debt. These were the conditions in South Africa in the period 
immediately after the 2008 financial crisis. We compliment the government 
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expenditure shock with a capital flows shock. This aims to capture the prevailing 
conditions in South Africa. Higher global liquidity translated to a sizable increase 
in capital inflows. 
Capital flows can drive the creation of an asset bubble. This is particularly the case 
for currencies such as the South African rand, which are subject to carry trade 
dynamics (Hassan 2015). The bursting of a bubble represents a threshold point or 
discontinuity driven by the sudden stop in capital flows. This can lead to a sudden 
change in economic behaviour: for example, a change in the way households form 
expectations. In addressing the second question, we highlight how capital flow 
reversal may affect the economy through the financial sector and how this effect 
can be exacerbated if households change their expectation formation process. 
The shock to the leverage ratio is accompanied by different options to raise the 
ratio. These include reducing the size of assets, increasing retained earnings and 
raising equity capital.  In answering the question, we illustrate the ability of our 
framework to capture how the management and pricing of risk by the financial 
sector drives the economic outcomes.      
1.3 Contribution 
The contribution of this work is in three main areas. Our first contribution is a 
technical one, which illustrates how the financial sector can be better represented 
in macroeconomic models. It also highlights the importance of the current G20 Data 
Gap Initiative, which will lead to significant improvements in the quality and 
availability of financial data and allow for further development of the framework, 
presented in the thesis.1 We develop a stock-and-flow-consistent model with 
optimising firms and households and a financial sector that manages its reserves in 
response to perceptions of risk. Our approach to modelling household expectations 
is different from current DSGE models. We aim to capture bounded rationality, 
which is supported by recent research on expectations (Hommes 2011; Roos and 
                                                 
1 For more information of the G20 Data Gap Initiative see http://www.fsb.org/2016/09/second-
phase-of-the-g20-data-gaps-initiative-dgi-2-first-progress-report/ 
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Luhan 2013).2 More importantly, our framework captures elements of the 
theoretical models developed by Borio and Zhu (2012) and Woodford (2010). 
The second set of contributions is in terms of understanding how fiscal, capital flow 
and leverage shocks are transmitted. Our results reaffirm that fiscal multipliers are 
large under recessionary conditions, rising global liquidity, functioning financial 
sector and government debt levels, which are perceived as sustainable. Unlike 
studies which employ DSGE models, the size of the multiplier is highly dependent 
on how the financial sector perceives risk and changes its reserve management 
policy. This affects lending and liquidity in the market, which in turn affects lending 
spreads and asset prices.  Economic activity and the balance sheets of other 
institutions in the economy are affected, which feeds back into the financial sector 
and creates a financial accelerator mechanism. Our ability to model these effects is 
driven by the stock-and-flow consistency of our framework.  
In Chapter 4, we present the capital flow reversal shocks. Capital outflows reduce 
the demand for financial assets and affect negatively the money creation process 
and asset prices. A key contribution in this chapter is the link that we establish 
between sudden stops and the literature on catastrophe theory (Thom 1976).3 Harris 
(1979) shows how a simple economic behavioural function can be related to 
catastrophe theory.  He illustrates how shifts in expectations can be explained by 
catastrophe theory dynamics. While the control variables (for example, national 
income) remain continuous, expectations (of growth of income) can suddenly 
change as the control variable reaches a threshold point (full capacity utilisation).  
We argue that capital flow movements can cause the creation of asset bubbles, 
which occasionally burst as sudden stops occur. The presence of these 
discontinuous points is not assumed in current mainstream models and yet they can 
contribute to large negative impacts. A second contribution to understanding the 
transmission of capital flow reversal shocks is that even in the absence of large 
foreign-denominated liabilities, a capital flow shock can have a sizable impact on 
                                                 
2 Bounded rationality originates in the work of Herbert Simon. For more information see Simon 
(1955), Simon (1982) and Simon (1986) 
3 Rosser Jr (2007) provides a comprehensive review of the literature on catastrophe theory and 
counterarguments to the criticisms raised. He also provides a review of other models that aim to 
capture dynamic discontinuities. Most of these models are similar to catastrophe theory and generate 
similar equilibrium surfaces.    
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the economy through its impact on liquidity and demand for domestic financial 
assets. 
Our analysis contributes to the current work on understanding the short-term 
impacts of BASEL III. The leverage ratio shock confirms that outcomes depend on 
how the capital ratio is achieved. The results generated are larger than those 
generated by other studies on South Africa. They highlight the importance of the 
risk-taking behaviour of the financial sector and its interactions with other 
institutions in the economy. The analysis contributes to a better understanding of 
the transmission mechanism and the implications for monetary policy.  
Our third and final contribution is that the research adds to the knowledge base in 
South Africa. To the best of our knowledge, this is the first framework of this type 
that has been used to study questions on fiscal multipliers, capital flows and 
leverage ratios. Our results also highlight the importance of the financial sector in 
transmitting policy interventions and the role of policy in changing the behaviour 
of the financial sector. Thus, one of our key policy conclusions is that the old model 
of fiscal and monetary policy coordination is outdated. Effective policy 
coordination must include macroprudential policy and understanding of the risk 
behaviour of all institutions in the economy. 
1.4 Structure of the thesis 
Chapter 1 is the introductory chapter. It provides motivation for the research, and 
it outlines the objectives and the main contributions. 
Chapter 2 provides a short overview of the South African economy. The chapter 
highlights the fiscal response post the 2008 financial crisis, the county’s 
experiences with capital flows and its progress with the introduction of the BASEL 
III reforms. 
Chapter 3 presents the modelling framework. The model framework is compared 
to current DSGE models and Post-Keynesian stock-and-flow models. Our 
framework is stock-and-flow consistent in the tradition of Backus et al. (1980) with 
several characteristics resembling current mainstream DSGE models.  The data 
used in the analysis is described and a detailed description of the model is presented.  
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Chapter 4 investigates the impact of capital flow reversal shocks. South Africa 
does not have sizable foreign-currency-denominated debt and thus foreign-currency 
mismatches are not expected to drive the impacts. The model generates larger 
impacts than previous studies on capital-flow reversal shocks in South Africa. The 
impact on the demand for domestic assets and the possible change in expectations 
are found to be important channels in the transmission of capital-flow reversal 
shocks. These effects tend to offset any positive effects associated with the 
depreciation of the currency.  
Chapter 5 presents the fiscal shocks. Government consumption growth is increased 
by one percentage point. We investigate whether the combination of higher fiscal 
expenditure and higher capital inflows had a strong positive impact on economic 
activity in the period immediately after the 2008 financial crisis. We also investigate 
the sensitivity of the results to the size of the output gap. Our conclusion is that the 
presence of financial dynamics can significantly increase the size of the fiscal 
multipliers. The impact is a function of the risk-taking behaviour of the financial 
sector and the consequent impact on lending spreads and asset prices. Expectations 
that the output gap may be closed faster can reduce the impact, as households expect 
an increase in the policy rate. 
Chapter 6 looks at the likely impact of higher leverage ratios on the South African 
economy. We highlight the importance of the capital framework effect and capital 
threshold effect as defined by Borio and Zhu (2012). Our results confirm that 
achieving the ratios through higher retained earnings is the least costly option; 
however, we also highlight that this is likely to reduce household consumption in 
the short run.  We conclude by reemphasising that the effectiveness of monetary 
policy depends on policy makers understanding the impact of macroprudential 
interventions on risk- taking by the financial sector, the impact on lending spreads 
and extension of loans and the feedback effects through the real and financial 
behaviour of other institutions. 
Chapter 7 summarises our results, provides the implications for macroeconomic 
policy based on our analysis and highlights the limitations of the research.   
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Chapter 2 Overview of the South African Economy 
2.1 Overview 
The aim of this chapter is to provide a short overview of the South African 
economy, highlighting its economic developments and characteristics, which are 
key to our analysis. 
South Africa’s key macroeconomic policy characteristics include inflation targeting 
and a flexible exchange-rate regime, which were introduced in 2000, and a 
sustainable counter-cyclical fiscal policy. These policy interventions have been 
fundamental in achieving macro stability and responding effectively to domestic 
and global shocks.  
The introduction of a market-determined inflation exchange rate has increased 
exchange rate volatility, but it has also reduced the accumulation of foreign-
currency-denominated debt (Hassan 2015).  South Africa’s total foreign debt stood 
at 43.6 per cent of GDP in the first quarter of 2016, and just over half of it was 
denominated in foreign currency. This reduces the probability of large and 
disruptive sudden-stop episodes and supports the effectiveness of the 
macroeconomic framework. The composition of South Africa’s foreign debt 
informs our approach to modelling the country’s foreign liabilities in our stock and 
flow consistent framework.     
Another defining feature of the South African economy is its well-developed 
financial sector.  The 2016 Global Competitiveness Report ranks South Africa 
twelfth in terms of its level of financial sector development.4 The South African 
rand is the 20th most traded currency globally and the country has one of the highest 
market capitalisation to GDP ratios (Figure 2.1).5 The Johannesburg Stock 
Exchange is ranked 18th globally in terms of its market capitalisation.6 South 
Africa’s deep and liquid financial markets facilitate funding for private and public 
institutions and support economic development. This indicates that analysis of 
                                                 
4 The report is available at http://reports.weforum.org/global-competitiveness-report-2015-
2016/competitiveness-rankings/ 
5 See the Bank for International Settlements Triennial Central Bank Survey available at 
http://www.bis.org/publ/rpfx16fx.pdf 
6 As of October 2016 
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macroeconomic shocks in the South African context needs to consider financial 
sector behaviour.   
Figure 2.1: Market capitalisation to GDP (%-selected G20 economies) 
 
Source: The World Bank  
We proceed with a brief overview of South Africa’s economic performance. Over 
the period 2000 to 2008, South Africa recorded strong growth rates, like other 
emerging markets, particularly those that rely heavily on commodity exports. 
Overall inflation levels were lower compared to the decade before, supported by 
the inflation targeting regime. While employment growth was equally robust, the 
unemployment rate remained above 20 per cent. Higher employment growth was 
matched by higher participation rates. The major drivers of growth were household 
consumption and expansion in the tertiary sector. Protracted uncertainty related to 
mining legislation did not allow the mining sector to take advantage of the 
commodity boom, which distinguished South Africa from other commodity-based 
economies. 
The high levels of economic activity also exposed South Africa’s low levels of 
domestic savings. Economic growth rates of above 5 per cent were accompanied 
by current account deficits of close to 7 per cent. Corporates accounted for most of 
the domestic savings, while household savings rates often were and remain 
negative. The reliance on capital inflows has become a major source of vulnerability 
and of policy concern.   
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South Africa’s structural constraints are well documented. These include 
infrastructure bottlenecks, low levels of competition in certain markets, skill 
shortages, volatile labour relations and inflexible labour markets, regulatory 
constraints and inefficient state-owned enterprises (Faulkner, Loewald, and 
Makrelov 2013; NPC 2013; NT 2016)  
Figure 2.2: Expenditure on GDP (y-o-y % change) 
 
Source: Statistics South Africa  
Over the period 2010 to 2012, the recovery in the economy achieved growth rates 
in the region of 2.3 to 3.3 per cent. South Africa did not experience a financial crisis. 
However, as shown in Figure 2.2, trend growth slowed significantly. In addition to 
the factors outlined above, the following specific factors shaped the economic 
landscape post the 2008 financial crisis: 
1. Sustained fiscal spending by the South African government. 
2. Protracted and violent labour strikes in the mining and manufacturing 
sectors. 
3. Electricity shortages.  
4. Increased levels of policy uncertainty driven by badly designed and 
coordinated policies as well as political instability. 
5. Slow global recovery and a decline in commodity prices. 
6. Unconventional monetary policy in advanced economies and significant 
capital flows into emerging markets. 
7. The introduction of stricter regulatory requirements for the financial sector.  
The economic slowdown was accompanied by a significant decline in the policy 
rate. The average repo rate declined from 11.6 per cent in 2008 to 5 per cent in 
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2013. The impact on lending rates, however, decreased by less as the lending spread 
widened. In Figure 2.3, we plot the instalment sales rate against the repo rate. The 
spread has widened from 2.7 per cent in 2008 to 4.7 per cent in 2013.7  
Figure 2.3: Lending spread 
 
Source:  South Africa Reserve Bank 
The increase in the spread coincides with a slower pace of lending growth and 
economic activity, higher risk aversion post the 2008 crisis, and the imminent 
implementation of new capital requirements under BASEL III. This indicates that 
the mechanism identified by Woodford (2010) and Borio and Zhu (2012) may be 
present in the South African economy and, thus, it is relevant to include it in our 
analysis.    
In the rest of the chapter, we provide a brief overview of the fiscal conditions pre-
and post the financial crisis, capital flow movements and South Africa’s financial 
sector regulatory framework.  
2.2 The Fiscal Environment 
South Africa’s fiscal system is based on three spheres of government: national, 
provincial and local. The Constitution provides guidelines for the types of 
                                                 
7 We use the instalment sales rates to measure lending costs rather the prime lending rate. The prime 
lending rate has a fixed margin of 3.5 per cent to the repo rate. Banks price debt relative to the prime 
lending by imposing either a positive or negative mark-up. This is captured in the instalment sales 
rate, which measures mainly the rate applied to purchases of vehicles.  
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expenditure for which each sphere of government is responsible. For example, 
national government is responsible for expenditure having a national dimension 
such as defence, tertiary education and foreign affairs. Provincial and national 
governments share responsibilities in areas such as education and health, while 
local government is responsible for expenditure on areas of municipal significance 
such as water and electricity reticulation, cemeteries and local sports facilities. The 
division of revenue is entrenched in law and is guided by the Division of Revenue 
Bill, which ensures fair distribution of resources across the different spheres of 
government. Tax policy falls under the domain of national government. Provincial 
governments have limited revenue-generating power and are only allowed to 
borrow under very limited circumstances, while local governments have some 
significant revenue-generating instruments such as property rates and service 
charges, and they can also borrow.8 While the political system is quasi-federal, the 
fiscal system is more centralised with the revenue powers lying largely with the 
national government.  The national government also has important oversight 
responsibilities over all spheres of government, including state-owned companies 
through the Public Finance Management Act and Municipal Finance Management 
Act. The institutional framework ensues that national government, and particularly 
the National Treasury, is responsible for fiscal policy.       
South Africa’s fiscal position was strong at the beginning of the financial crisis. 
Gross and net debt levels were between 20 and 30 per cent.  As economic activity 
contracted, the output gap widened. Klein (2011) reports an output gap of negative 
2.4 per cent and negative 1.4 per cent for 2009 and 2010, respectively. Ehlers, 
Mboji, and Smal (2013) calculate similar sized output gaps, while Anvari, Ehlers, 
and Rudi (2014) estimate slightly more negative output gaps. These estimates 
internalise the scaling up of fiscal expenditure. The combination of low government 
debt, underutilisation of economic resources and a well-functioning financial 
sector9 created the conditions for countercyclical increase in government 
expenditure. Real government consumption expenditure increased by 5.8 and 4.6 
                                                 
8 Only large metros can borrow, with permission from National Treasury. Some of the small 
municipalities are completely dependent on grants from national government.  
9 South Africa’s banks remained profitable during the crisis with high asset quality and capital ratios. 
While the share of nonperforming loans within total loans jumped from 2 to 6 per cent, it has been 
declining continuously since 2010 (IMF 2015). 
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per cent in 2008 and 2009, well above the average economy-wide growth rate.  
Consumption expenditure remained close to or just above average growth in 
economic activity in 2010 and 2011.   
However, as the economy was hit by several supply side shocks, the sustainability 
and effectiveness of the fiscal expansion became questionable. Over the period 
2012 to 2016, potential growth estimates were revised down, with the most recent 
estimates in the region of 1.9 to 2.4 per cent (Fedderke and Mengisteab 2016).  
Government debt levels, as a percentage of GDP, started to approach the 50 per 
cent level (Figure 2.4). The economic literature indicates that at high debt levels, 
the fiscal multiplier becomes negative as the borrowing cost effect dominates the 
aggregate demand impact of higher fiscal expenditure (Caner, Grennes, and 
Koehler-Geib 2010; Elmeskov and Sutherland 2012; Reinhart and Rogoff 2010).  
This channel requires the modelling of government debt balances and provides 
further support for the incorporation of stock-and-flow-consistent dynamics in our 
analysis. Concerns regarding the sustainability of government debt due to the threat 
of sovereign rating downgrade led to the implementation of spending ceilings, 
which were revised down in 2015 and 2016.   
Figure 2.4: Government debt (% of GDP) 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank  
While government increased its overall levels of government debt significantly, it 
managed to change the composition of debt. Using the flow-of-funds data 
produced by the South African Reserve Bank we plot the cumulative change in 
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short- and long-term debt over the period 2008 to 2015 in Figure 2.5: Cumulative 
government debt issuance over the period 2008 to 2015 
The red bar represents the issuance, while the grey bars show the institutions that 
have purchased the government debt and the amounts. Most of the long-term 
government debt issued has been purchased by Insurers and retirement funds, the 
Public Investment Corporation and the Foreign Sector.  
Figure 2.5: Cumulative government debt issuance over the period 2008 to 
2015 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank  
The bonds purchased by the foreign sector are largely rand denominated.  Only 
about 10 per cent of the government debt is foreign currency denominated. The 
purchases of bonds by Insurers and retirement funds and the Public Investment 
Corporation reflect another important institutional characteristic of the South 
African system, which is the pension system. The Public Investment Corporation 
manages the funds of the Government Employees Pension Fund. Individuals 
accumulate savings for retirement and then use them to purchase retirement 
annuities once they retire.  The fund managers use the retirement savings to 
purchase various financial instruments and generate growth for their members. 
They can invest up to 25 per cent of their portfolio in overseas markets.  There is a 
relationship between household consumption (savings of households) and demand 
for government bonds, return on government bonds, and also demand for foreign 
assets and other domestic financial instruments. This relationship is one example of 
how the real and financial sectors interact and the importance of including financial 
dynamics in the analysis of fiscal multipliers in South Africa.   
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Figure 2.5 also indicates that in the South African context, the monetary authority 
does not conduct balance sheet operations by purchasing government bonds. They 
mainly use forex swaps in open market operations.   
2.3 Capital Flows 
The structurally low levels of domestic savings have led to high reliance on foreign 
savings. This has increased South Africa’s vulnerability to capital-flows volatility.  
Figure 2.6 shows the general trend in capital flows as represented by the net foreign 
savings to GDP and portfolio investment to GDP ratios. The strong increase in CDS 
spreads in 2008 has very negatively affected portfolio flows but not overall capital 
flows. Net foreign direct investment and net other investment has provided a buffer. 
Portfolio flows tend to be more sensitive to risk perceptions. Also, some of the 
effects have been offset by the rand’s depreciation. The rand-dollar exchange rate 
depreciated by 17 per cent in 2008. The data shows a notable decline in foreign 
savings inflows over the period 2009 to 2011 and then a rise, in line with the 
unconventional monetary policy interventions by several advanced economies and 
the increased levels of global liquidity. Portfolio investments generally show higher 
levels of volatility.  
Figure 2.6: Capital flows, CDS spreads and the exchange rate 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank  
The flow of funds data indicates that most of the cumulative foreign savings inflows 
over the period 2008 to 2015 have gone on net basis into Trade credit and short-
term loans, long-term loans, government bonds, and M2 and M3 deposits. This 
indicates that the foreign sector plays an important role in the money creation 
process, the provision of loans and the demand for assets. Despite these large 
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foreign savings inflows, the foreign-currency-denominated liabilities are relatively 
small at just over 20 per cent of GDP. This an important feature of the South African 
economy, which reduces its vulnerability to capital flow reversal shocks. 
In Figure 2.7, we show the adjustment to the large fall in net foreign savings from 
2008 to 2009 in terms of the accumulation of net financial assets by the foreign 
sector. We present the asset classes that have seen the largest adjustment. These 
include deposits with the financial sector and some of the loan categories. There 
was a significant increase in the holding of equities. This adjustment reflects an 
overall decline in net foreign savings compared to 2008 and changes to expected 
relative returns. The average repo rate in 2008 was 11.6 per cent, compared to 8.4 
per cent in 2009, while the JSE All Share index declined by 13 per cent in 2009. 
The combination of lower equity prices, a weaker rand and good dividend payouts 
may have created expectations of higher future returns amongst foreign investors, 
especially given the carry trade characteristics of the South African rand.   
Figure 2.7: Adjustment to lower net foreign savings 
     
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank  
The outcomes also indicate that the impact on capital flow reversal is operating 
through the financial sector and asset prices. The foreign sector affects bond and 
equity markets as well as the money multiplier though its impact on loan extension 
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and direct deposits into the financial system. Assessing the impact of capital flows 
on the economy requires an understanding of how they affect asset prices, interest 
rates and the various markets for financial instruments. 
2.4 Capital Requirements  
The South African Reserve Bank (SARB) is responsible for the regulation and 
supervision of banks and mutual banks. Its mandate, outlined by the Banks Act and 
the Mutual Banks Act, is exercised through the Registrar of Banks and the Bank 
Supervision Department. The Minister of Finance is responsible for issuing 
regulations and formally making supervisory actions. The Financial Services Board 
(FSB) regulates and supervises the non-bank financial services industries, including 
insurance companies. Fund managers and stock exchanges are jointly supervised 
by the FSB and the Johannesburg Stock Exchange. The National Credit Regulator, 
which reports to the Minister of Trade and Industry, has certain regulatory powers 
over lending activity for consumer protection. 10 
South Africa is currently in the process of implementing BASEL III, which started 
in 2013. The regulatory model will follow the Twin Peaks approach by setting up a 
Prudential Authority and a Financial Sector Conduct Authority, both to be housed 
at the Reserve Bank. In terms of progress, the International Monetary Fund and the 
Basel Committee for Bank Supervision find that South Africa is compliant with the 
recommendations for Effective Banking Supervision (BCPs) and the adoption of 
key BASEL III ratios.  The phasing-in of the regulation is expected to be completed 
by 2019. The regulatory framework, which is assessed to be in line with best 
practices, highlights again the high level of financial sector development in South 
Africa.  
In some cases South Africa’s regulatory regime tends to be stricter than BASEL III 
in terms of speed of implementation and size of the ratios. The BASEL III 
recommends that the risk-weighted capital adequacy ratio should be 8 per cent, 
while the South African authorities are implementing a higher ratio of 10.5 per cent.   
                                                 
10 IMF (2015), BCBS (2015a) and BCBS (2015b) provide a comprehensive review of the regulatory 
framework and the progress made with the implementation of BASEL III.  
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South Africa will phase in the leverage ratio by 2018 in line with the 
recommendations by the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision.11  Its 
introduction aims to restrict the build-up of leverage and reinforce the risk-based 
requirements.  The current level set by BASEL III is 3 per cent. The ratio maybe 
adjusted further, based on the current evaluation period whereby regulatory 
authorities are tracking the behaviour of the leverage ratio relative to the risk-based 
capital requirements.   
Table 2.1: Selected Financial Soundness Indicators (sample of G20 
economies) 
 
Source: International Monetary Fund  
South Africa’s capital ratios compare favourably against the benchmarks set by the 
Basel Committee on Bank Supervision as well as the current ratios of other 
countries. The risk-weighted measures are higher than in the other BRICS 
economies and higher than some advanced economies such as Australia and the 
United Kingdom (Table 2.1). It stands out that South Africa has the highest equity 
                                                 
11 BCBS (2014) provides the framework for calculation and introduction of the leverage ratio. 
Year 2015 
(end of 
period)
Regulatory Capital 
to Risk-Weighted 
Assets
Regulatory Tier 
1 Capital to Risk-
Weighted 
Assets
 Capital to 
Assets 
(leverage 
ratio) 
Return on 
Equity
Australia 13,9 11,9 6,3 18,6
Brazil 16,4 12,7 8,5 15,4
China 13,5 11,3 8,4 15,0
France 17,1 13,8 5,8 6,8
India 12,7 10,1 7,2 6,3
Indonesia 21,3 18,8 13,6 17,3
Italy 14,8 12,3 6,2 3,4
Mexico 15,0 13,3 10,4 15,4
Russian 
Federation
12,7 8,5 8,9 2,0
Saudi 
Arabia
18,1 16,2 13,9 14,5
South 
Africa
14,2 13,8 7,0 20,6
Turkey 15,6 13,2 11,0 13,6
United 
Kingdom
19,6 15,7 6,8 13,6
United 
States
14,1 13,1 11,7
3,0
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return amongst the sample of countries, highlighting the strong profitability of the 
sector. 
Despite the relatively high capital ratios, South African banks have chosen to raise 
them over the period 2008 to 2016. The regulatory capital to risk-weighted assets 
ratio has increased from 13 per cent in 2008 to 15.2 per cent in 2016. Over the same 
period, the tier 1 ratio has increased from 11.2 to 14 per cent and the leverage ratio 
from 5.7 to 7.8.   
Using the flow of funds data and plotting the ratio of net savings of the financial 
sector to the net incurrence of financial assets, it appears that the adjustment to 
higher capital ratios has taken place mainly through higher retained earnings 
(Figure 2.8). Cohen and Scatigna (2016) also provide empirical evidence that banks 
in emerging markets, including South Africa, have used retained earnings to 
achieve higher capital ratios.   
Figure 2.8: Ratio of net savings of the financial sector to the net incurrence 
of financial assets 
 
Source: South African Reserve Bank  
 2.5 Conclusion 
In this chapter, we have explained briefly the macroeconomic environment post the 
2008 financial crisis. Our emphasis has been on three distinct macroeconomic 
factors: fiscal policy developments, capital flow movements and the introduction 
of new financial sector regulatory requirements.  These three areas form the core of 
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macroeconomic issues faced by the South African economy as well as other 
emerging economies with high reliance on foreign savings.  
The data highlights the interaction between these three areas and the financial 
sector. In addition, it indicates the possible presence of the mechanisms identified 
by Borio and Zhu (2012) and Woodford (2010). This emphasises the importance of 
including financial sector dynamics in the study of fiscal multipliers, capital flow 
reversal shocks and the introduction of higher capital requirements. 
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Chapter 3 Model Description  
3.1 Our Framework and How it Relates to Other Models 
In this chapter, we provide a detailed description of our framework and we compare 
it to other economic models. Over the last 60 years, two fundamentally different 
paradigms for explaining macroeconomic behaviour have emerged. The first, the 
neo-classical approach, argues that economic activity is driven by the aspirations of 
individual economic agents, who are rational. If all markets clear, there is no 
involuntary unemployment and national income is distributed optimally between 
wages and profits. Production is instantaneous with the market-clearing mechanism 
ensuring that demand and supply are brought into balance. Loans, credit, money, 
and inventories are not needed to bring product markets into equilibrium.  The 
profit-maximizing level of output is determined by the marginal product of labour 
and the real wage. The demand for and supply of labour are a function of the real 
wage. The demand for real money balances is determined by income and the rate 
of interest. The supply of money is exogenous. Market clearing takes place through 
adjustment in the various prices. Long-term equilibrium is determined by real 
variables and the government and the Central Bank have a limited role in achieving 
this equilibrium (Godley and Lavoie 2012). The mainstream paradigm has 
introduced some rigidities in prices and wages and monopolistic competition, which 
have become a defining feature of the current New Keynesian approach.  
The alternative paradigm, called post-Keynesian or structuralist approach, sees 
economic agents as being adaptively rational. There is no natural tendency for 
economies to generate full employment and hence government through fiscal, 
monetary and income policies has an important role to play. Loans, credit, money 
and inventories are important in smoothing consumption and production. This 
approach is characterised by imperfect competition, imperfect information, mark-
up pricing, fixed technical coefficients, and long-run trends being described as a 
function of a chain of short-period decisions (Godley and Lavoie 2012). 
Our framework has elements of both, the New Keynesian approach and the 
structuralist approach, We review the properties of the two frameworks and then 
we compare them against our model. 
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3.1.1 Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models 
Dynamic Stochastic General Equilibrium (DSGE) models are the most advanced 
tool of the neoclassical approach and are playing an increasingly greater role in the 
formulation and communication of monetary policy. Their origin lies in the work 
of Lucas Jr (1975), Kydland and Prescott (1982) and Long Jr and Plosser (1983) on 
real business cycles. Central Banks are the main users of current DSGE models. 
Sbordone et al. (2010) present their key features:  
• Micro foundations based on production and utility functions. Consumers 
and firms maximize welfare and profits subject to budget constraints. The 
micro foundations aim to address the Lucas critique of forecasting models.  
• Estimation techniques based on Bayesian statistics. This allows for prior 
information to be incorporated in the estimation process. DSGE models are 
estimated as a system rather than equation by equation as the previous 
generation macro econometric models. 
• Monetary policy reaction function often in the form of a Taylor rule. This 
highlights their primary role, which is monetary policy analysis. 
• Price and wage stickiness. This implies that prices and wages do not adjust 
instantaneously to economic disturbances. Markets always clear through 
adjustment in the quantities supplied and demanded, and therefore there is 
always short-term equilibrium. 
• Dynamic interaction between the various model blocks, guided by rational 
expectations. DSGE models are solved over a period of time. They are 
generally suited for short-term analysis. Dotsey (2013) and Wickens (2011) 
argue that the rational expectation assumption simply indicates that agents 
do not make systematic errors.  
• Stochastic in nature. This aims to bring the element of uncertainty in the 
model framework. This means that they incorporate random components 
that explain the cyclical behaviour of the economy.  
• Intertemporal optimisation. Current decisions are based on forecasts about 
the future.  
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There are two milestone articles that have added more properties to DSGE models, 
while at the same time making them more suited for policy analysis. Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Evans (2005) introduced  
• habit formation in preferences for consumers;  
• adjustment costs in investment;  
• variable capital utilisation; and  
• the need for firms to borrow working capital in order to finance  
     their wage bill.  
They also showed that an optimisation-based model with nominal and real rigidities 
can account successfully for the effects of a monetary policy shock.  
The second milestone article was the seminal technical contribution of Smets and 
Wouters (2003). They were the first to estimate a micro-founded DSGE model 
using Bayesian estimation and use it to forecast. The model consists of seven 
variables (GDP, consumption, investment, prices, real wages, employment and the 
nominal interest rate) and ten structural shocks (including productivity, labour 
supply, investment preferences, cost-push and monetary policy shocks).  
Recently, DSGE models have tried to improve their specification of financial sector 
dynamics.  Wickens (2011) presents a DSGE model that can cater for bank defaults. 
Households can take loans and buy bonds. Banks have a utility function, which 
determines their nominal loans and nominal borrowing. Loan rates are generally 
higher than deposit rates, reflecting the probability of default. A sudden shock to 
the loan rate may lead to default as the net present value of an investment project 
turns negative. The ability of the representative bank to borrow from other financial 
institutions is limited by its balance sheet (Ellison and Tischbirek 2014; Gertler and 
Karadi 2011; Gertler, Kiyotaki, and Queralto 2012). Many of the models capture 
financial dynamics using either the financial accelerator mechanism as defined by 
Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) or the household collateral constraint 
mechanism following the approach by Iacoviello (2005).12  
                                                 
12 In chapters 4, 5 and 6 we reference various studies that use DSGE models with financial sector 
dynamics to study fiscal, capital reversal and leverage requirements shocks.  
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In the financial accelerator mechanism proposed by Bernanke, Gertler, and 
Gilchrist (1999), a fall in net worth implies that borrowers have little wealth to 
contribute to project finance. This creates a potential divergence between the 
interests of borrowers and lenders, which increases agency costs in the presence of 
asymmetric information. The probability of default increases as the company has 
less of its own funds involved in the project. The higher agency costs require that 
the lenders are compensated through higher premiums, which increase the external 
finance constraints for firms. In a second-round effect, the higher premiums lead to 
a further reduction in net wealth and amplify the initial effect. This effect can start 
with a fall in economic activity, which reduces cash flows, asset prices and profits, 
reducing net worth. Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) illustrate the impact of 
a government expenditure shock in their model. The presence of the financial 
accelerator mechanism magnifies the impact of an increase in government 
expenditure, mainly through its impact on asset prices and the related increase in 
firms’ net worth.   
There are various criticisms that have been raised against DSGE models. Some of 
them criticise the assumptions, whereas others criticise the claims made by DSGE 
modellers with regard to the model’s suitability to study policy questions. Sims 
(2006), Caballero (2010) and Blanchard (2016) criticise DSGE models for their 
simplified assumptions of a representative firm and household; their estimation 
approach, which assumes that coefficients are the same across economies; and 
economic behaviour, which is often not in line with empirical evidence. Economies 
are much more complex, comprising an array of consumers and firms with different 
characteristics and different expectation formation processes. There is increasingly 
more evidence that expectations tend to be characterised by bounded rationality 
rather than perfect rationality as assumed in current DSGE models. 13 
These points are echoed by Tovar (2009), who also argues that DSGE models have 
failed to build in a sufficient representation of the financial sector including 
modelling of financial frictions and relationships such as financial development and 
trade. Heterogenous and systemic risks are not captured (Borio and Zhu 2012; Duca 
and Muellbauer 2014). Financial sector dynamics rely on profit-maximising banks 
                                                 
13 For more information on bounded rationality see Simon (1955). For a survey of the literature see 
Hommes (2011). 
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in the most recent models. This, however, has limited relevance to reality where 
banks are restricted in their ability to optimise by various types of regulation (Van 
den Heuvel 2002). The models are linear and thus cannot capture the boom and bust 
dynamics that characterise the financial sector (Duca and Muellbauer 2014). DSGE 
models do not model consistently the financial stocks and flows of economic 
agents. This makes them less suitable to study questions involving the transmission 
of shocks from the financial sector to the real economy. Some of the DSGE 
weaknesses are a function of computational problems. Adding more detail to the 
model requires greater computational power which is simply not available with 
current computers and mathematical software packages (Rudebusch, Sack, and 
Swanson 2006). The Bayesian econometrics used to estimate them allows for better 
calibration of parameters but at the cost of having a smaller system.  
Solow (2010) criticises DSGE models based on their assumptions of voluntary 
unemployment, which should not be present if agents are rational.  
3.1.2 Stock and Flow Consistent (SFC) modelling 
An alternative approach to DSGE models are the stock and flow consistent (SFC) 
models associated with the work of James Tobin and Wynne Godley (Backus et al. 
1980; Godley and Cripps 1983). Current SFC models are dynamic, but not 
stochastic. They have no representative household or firm and therefore no 
optimisation of welfare or profit takes place. They have price and wage rigidities, 
which are, however, differently specified to DSGE models. Market clearing takes 
place though inventories rather than prices. Agents in SFC models can have rational 
or adaptive expectations.  The framework has been used by both mainstream and 
heterodox economists, though over the last 20 years stock and flow models have 
been synonymous with the Post-Keynesian school.14 
The key financial sector characteristics of stock and flow models as described by 
Godley and Lavoie (2012) are: 
• Track the evolution of stocks and precision regarding time. This is an 
outcome of using the stock-flow coherent approach. Certain logical 
relationships built in the system guide and constrain its dynamics. They lead 
                                                 
14 Caverzasi and Godin (2015) provide a comprehensive review of the evolution of post-Keynesian 
stock and flow models and their applications to economic questions. 
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to its evolution over time. Within period and between period determination 
of macroeconomic variables follows dynamic sequencing, based on these 
stock and flow consistent relationships. 
• Use of several assets and rates of return. This reflects the complexity and 
importance of financial relations in the modelling framework. The 
specification of  relationships is largely based on Backus et al. (1980), who 
showed how the asset demand/allocation changes based on changes in the 
various returns. Households and firms are assumed to formulate long-term 
target asset and wealth positions. Actual positions are adjusted towards 
these targets.  
• Recognition of the importance of modelling the financial and monetary 
policy operations. This includes the asset and liability accumulation 
decisions of monetary authorities and the government. 
• Strict budget constraints. Agents must respect their budget constraints with 
respect to their expectations as well as when they assess their realised 
results. This along with the stock-flow consistency ensures a water-tight 
accounting framework, where the transaction flows of a particular sector are 
determined by the flows of other sectors. For example, in the case of 
portfolio choice with several assets, any change in the demand for an asset 
due to changes in the expected or end-of-period wealth must be matched by 
corresponding changes in the overall value of the remaining assets. This 
change must be of equal size but opposite sign.  
Households in the current Post-Keynesian SFC have no micro foundations. Their 
expectations are not rational and asset accumulation decisions follow consumption 
decisions. 
Producing firms make decisions based on their expectations of what will be 
demanded. This also drives the accumulation of inventories. Investment is driven 
by expected sales and in some studies by Tobin Q dynamics (see, for example, 
Zezza and Dos Santos (2004) and Taylor (2009)). Pricing is not used to clear 
markets. The unit costs are calculated and then a margin is calculated to achieve the 
target level of profit. This determines the overall price levels. 
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Banks play an important role in providing loans which fund inventory 
accumulation. SFC models can handle compulsory reserve requirements, capital 
adequacy ratios, Central Bank advances and bank equity. Thresholds could also be 
introduced, whereby consumer and firm credit is cut off whenever some ratio is 
exceeded. This allows the framework to introduce discontinuities (non-
differentiable functions) in the solution process. In terms of monetary authorities’ 
behaviour, the Central Bank sets the bill rate through purchasing and selling any 
residual amount of Treasury bills (bonds). In addition, the entire system is 
accommodative as financial liabilities are supplied on demand. This specification 
makes these models unsuitable to study credit constraints as the system always 
provides the required funding. The models are generally demand driven, with 
supply adjusting. 
Burgess et al. (2016) highlight the benefits of stock and flow models over DSGE 
models. They argue that stock and flow consistent models are more realistic in terms 
of behaviour; have better specification of expectations; have a more important and 
realistic role for financial assets and institutions; have a more realistic feedback 
between the financial sector and the real economy; are better suited to study the 
evolution of gross and net financial positions; and can reach different steady states 
in response to shocks. They also highlight some of the problems associated with 
stock and flow consistent models compared to DSGE models. These include model 
equations, which are not linked to the optimisation problem of a particular agent, 
have high levels of complexity given the requirement for stock and flow 
consistency, large data requirements and parameters which are subject to the Lucas 
critique. 
A number of recent studies develop stock and flow consistent models. Barwell and 
Burrows (2014) employ the stock and flow consistent approach to study the 
evolution of the UK economy in the years leading to the financial crisis of 2008. 
They stress the importance of balance sheet linkages in identifying financial 
fragilities. Caiani, Godin, and Lucarelli (2014) apply the stock and flow approach 
to Schumpeterian economic development. They analyse the monetary dynamics 
that emerge because of a structural change in the economy driven by innovation. 
The work is extended by Caiani, Godin, and Lucarelli (2015). Burgess et al. (2016) 
develop a stock and flow consistent model for the United Kingdom and use it to 
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study the impact of higher house prices, risk-weighted capital ratio, government 
consumption and sudden stop shocks. In terms of their shocks, their work is similar 
to ours.  
3.1.3 Our framework 
Our framework is based on a simple computable general equilibrium model 
developed by Devarajan and Go (1998). This makes our framework similar to 
current DSGE models and different from current SFC models. Consumption and 
production behaviour are micro founded. This allows us to capture how changes in 
preferences, technology and resource constraints affect outcomes. The model 
framework has intertemporal optimisation. In addition, we incorporate a monetary 
policy reaction function based on a Taylor rule. Prices exhibit a degree of stickiness. 
The model, however, is not stochastic and we do not use Bayesian techniques to 
estimate the coefficients. The model’s similarities to DSGE models also make it 
subject to similar criticisms. While we are not able to address all of them, the 
incorporation of stock and flow dynamics addresses some of the concerns raised 
with respect to the financial sector specifications. 
It is the introduction of stock and flow dynamics that makes our framework similar 
to stock and flow models in the tradition of Backus et al. (1980). The behaviour of 
households, firms, banks, government and the monetary authorities is significantly 
different from the model specification of Godley (1996). For example, the 
behaviour of banks does not accommodate demand for loans. Rather the 
management of risk by the financial sector has important implications for lending 
rates and borrowing in the economy and economic activity. 
Unlike current DSGE models, we model several financial instruments in a stock 
and flow consistent way. The presence of balance sheets is important in addressing 
the three questions that we raise in Chapter 1.  Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia (2004) 
argue that balance sheet effects are important in the transmission of sudden stop 
shocks.  Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) argue that the distribution of debt is 
important as the constraints faced by agents with high debt are different from those 
faced with low debt. The distribution of debt is important in determining the size of 
the fiscal multiplier, as we illustrate in Chapter 5, and it requires a more 
comprehensive representation of balance sheets than what is currently present in 
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DSGE models . The impact of higher capital on the behaviour of banks also requires 
more explicit modelling of balance sheets and financial flows following on the 
transmission mechanism identified by Borio and Zhu (2012).  
Fundamental to our work are the theoretical frameworks developed by Woodford 
(2010) and Borio and Zhu (2012). We provide more detail on the two models in the 
next section.     
Our specification of household expectations is different from DSGE and SFC 
models. Households have model-consistent expectations over a time scale of ten 
periods (the consumer is not infinitely foresighted); however, the expectations 
process can change from period to period and different rules can be introduced. This 
is more in line with recent research, which indicates that households tend to have 
bounded rationality (Hommes 2011; Roos and Luhan 2013). Bounded rationality is 
based on the seminal work of Simon (1955)15, who argues that economic agents do 
not follow the same basic process in making decisions; rather their expectations 
depend on what the situational context is, how it emerges and how reasoning 
operates within this context for different agents.  
We illustrate how our specification of expectations can be used to introduce 
discontinuities in economic behaviour in Chapter 4, which we argue are important 
in understanding the impacts of sudden stop shocks.  
The discussion above indicates that while our framework is stock-and-flow 
consistent, it is significantly different behaviourally from the recent model 
developed by  Burgess et al. (2016). Some of the key differences include the 
presence of optimising households, model-consistent expectations and the presence 
of the financial accelerator mechanism.  
Our study is also significantly different from the work of Duca and Muellbauer 
(2014). While they emphasise the importance of endogenising asset flows and 
prices in economic models, their emphasis is only on household consumption. Their 
approach is to estimate a household consumption function using the household 
                                                 
15 For more information, see Simon (1982) and for criticism of rational expectations, see Simon 
(1986). 
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flow-of-funds account, identifying the financial effects that impact consumption. 
The framework is not stock-and-flow consistent.    
3.1.4 The theoretical models of Borio and Zhu and Woodford 
The model developed by Borio and Zhu (2012) presents a framework which 
explains how regulatory capital requirements affect the behaviour of the financial 
sector. In their model, the impact of higher capital requirements affects the financial 
sector directly through the capital threshold effect and the capital framework effect. 
The capital threshold effect arises because breaching the minimum threshold is 
costly for a bank. In the face of a possible breach, banks will take defensive action 
to avoid the high costs, which will affect the availability and pricing of funding 
extended to customers. This can translate into an increase in lending spreads. The 
effect is particularly strong and can affect the ability of the financial sector to extend 
credit when increasing the capital base is more costly than alternative funding 
sources at the margin.   
The capital framework effect influences the way the banks measure, manage and 
price risk, which affects their behaviour. The economic cycle changes the strength 
of the capital threshold effect as probabilities of default, valuations and the 
perception of risk change.  In turn, this shifts the relative position of the banks’ 
capital to the regulatory threshold and affects bank behaviour. This can increase 
lending, improve net worth of agents across the economy and support economic 
activity further, creating a multiplier effect. The mechanism is affected by the 
response of monetary authorities as interest rates affect cash flows, net interest rate 
margins, earnings and the valuation of assets, which again affect the relative 
position of the bank capital relative to the regulatory threshold. Reductions in the 
policy rate can decrease the returns from certain assets and encourage risk taking in 
order to achieve pre-specified target rates of return. Monetary policy can also affect 
risk behaviour through communication policies and the central bank reaction 
function. Through its actions the Central Bank can increase transparency, reduce 
uncertainty and compress risk premia. The perception that the central bank reaction 
function is effective in reducing downside risks can increase risk taking. The impact 
depends on the composition of balance sheets and the financing constraints faced 
by agents in the economy. This mechanism also operationalises the risk-taking 
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channel in the framework, which is defined as the impact of changes in policy rates 
on either risk perceptions or risk-tolerance. 16 
Liquidity and risk-taking are tightly interconnected and can reinforce each other. 
Lower perceptions of risks and higher risk tolerance weaken external funding and 
transferability constraints and hence increase liquidity. At the same time, weaker 
liquidity constraints can support higher risk-taking.   
The financial accelerator mechanism in the framework developed by Borio and Zhu 
(2012) works through the regulatory regime; the impact of the cycle on probabilities 
of default, valuations and the perception of risk; and the monetary policy decisions 
as explained above. In addition, the mechanism is supported by the mutually 
reinforcing relationship between risk-taking and liquidity. 
Woodford (2010) presents a theoretical framework which links the capital of the 
intermediaries, the supply of intermediation services and economic activity. The 
willingness of financial intermediaries to provide services depends on the lending 
spread, the margin that they can charge over the interest rate paid to savers. The 
lending spread reflects the marginal costs of intermediation. These costs are an 
increasing function of the volume of lending as intermediaries have limited capital. 
Increasing capital is likely to be costly, and increasing leverage is limited by 
regulatory capital requirements. Raising funds through loans is constrained by the 
intermediaries’ collateral. This indicates that for a given quantity of capital, the 
supply schedule for intermediation services will be upward sloping as XS in Figure 
3.1.  The demand for intermediation is represented by the schedule XD.  It shows 
the willingness of borrowers to pay to induce savers to supply funds. This is a profit 
opportunity for the intermediaries to the extent that the cost of intermediation is 
low. The schedule XD reflects a certain level of income. Changes to income shift 
the demand for intermediation. This establishes a relationship between interest 
rates, income and the level intermediation, which is represented as an IS curve in 
the second panel of Figure 3.1. 
                                                 
16 The presence of the risk taking channel is supported by empirical studies such as Adrian and Shin 
(2010). 
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Figure 3.1: Graphical representation of the model (Woodford 2010) 
 
Source: adopted from Woodford (2010) 
Shocks that impair the capital of the intermediary or higher regulatory leverage ratio 
requirements will shift the XS curve up and to the left. The equilibrium credit spread 
increases and the volume of lending declines for any given level of economic 
activity (Y). This implies that the rate paid to savers declines while the rate paid by 
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borrowers rises for the given level of Y. This is true for each possible value of Y, 
which leads to a shift in the IS curve down and to the left.17 If the monetary policy 
reaction function (represented by MP) remains the same, the shift of the XS curve 
leads to lower policy rate and a decline in economic activity. 
The framework can generate financial accelerator effects. For example, the initial 
decline in economic activity is likely to reduce the net worth of financial 
intermediaries and the volumes of loans for any given credit spread. This will shift 
the XS curve further to left. The secondary effects if caused by changes to the 
capital of the intermediary are likely to be more persistent than the initial shock. If 
intermediaries are required to sell assets in a systemic manner, this can create a 
vicious spiral that reduces the capital of intermediaries and loan supply. 
We view the two frameworks as complimentary and fundamental to our analysis.  
Woodford (2010) provides an explicit link between bank capital, level of 
intermediation, interest rate spreads and economic activity. The analysis of Borio 
and Zhu (2012) provide more support why intermediaries may be facing an upward 
sloping supply curve for intermediation services and links the risk taking behaviour 
of the financial sector, which is a source of financial accelerator effects, to how it 
measures, manages and prices risk. This is not only a function of the balance sheet 
of the financial sector, but rather of how the financial sector views the distribution 
of risk across the economy and the balance sheets of all institutions. 
3.2 Detailed Model Description 
We now present our framework comprising of a small general equilibrium model 
with financial stock and flow dynamics.18 The model structure builds on the work 
of Devarajan and Go (1998), Tobin (1982) and Godley and Lavoie (2007). There 
are six types of institutions that make real and financial decisions:  
• the representative household,  
• government,  
• the Central Bank,  
• the representative financial corporation,  
• the representative non-financial corporation and  
                                                 
17 The IS schedule plots the equilibrium value of the rate paid to savers (is) because the policy 
reaction function targets is rather than the rate paid by borrowers.   
18 All the model equations, variables and parameters are presented in the appendix of this chapter. 
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• the rest of the world.  
The financial instruments are grouped in five categories: equities, loans, cash and 
deposit, bonds and other. Figure 3.2 presents the conceptual framework. 
The different agents meet in the financial, product and factor markets.  
Figure 3.2: Diagrammatic representation of the model framework 
 
In the financial market, decisions are made regarding the accumulation of financial 
assets and liabilities. These are represented by the maroon lines labelled Changes 
in the stock of assets and liabilities. There are sub-markets for money, bonds, 
equities and loans. The markets are linked through a set of asset demand functions 
and stock and flow equilibrium rules, which ensure that stock and flow consistency 
is always maintained. The markets for bonds and loans are cleared through their 
rates of return, while the markets for money and equities are cleared on demand. 
The financial sector and the non-financial sector provide money and equities to 
ensure that demand is equal to supply. The rates of return are affected by the policy 
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rate which is determined by the Reserve Bank. It is assumed that the monetary 
authorities follow a Taylor rule (the black line labelled Taylor rule). 
The financial market also distributes net dividend and interest income (represented 
by the large dark blue circle) to all institutions.  
Changes in an agent’s asset portfolio are equal to the changes in the financial 
wealth. This, in turn, is a function of financial wealth from the previous period, 
capital gains, changes to the stock of liabilities and net saving.  Decisions to invest 
in financial assets are driven by the level of economic activity as well as the rates 
of return and costs associated with holding liabilities. The foreign and financial 
sectors make their decisions based on relative returns, following Tobin asset 
demand functions.   
In the product market, the supply of goods and services is driven by producers 
maximising profits subject to a CES production function. We have one domestically 
produced good.  Demands arise from the household, government, investment and 
net exports. These are represented by the blue lines labelled Demand for goods and 
services. Prices of imports, exports and the domestically produced good adjust to 
ensure flow equilibrium in the product market. These are represented in the diagram 
by the red circle labelled Prices. 
In the factor markets, the demands for capital and labour are driven by the real 
borrowing costs in the economy as well as the deviation of aggregate demand from 
its steady state. The economy -wide production function represented by the maroon 
square employs the factors of production and makes factor payments, which are 
distributed to the capital owners and labour (the second dark blue circle labelled 
Income from factor payments).  The real borrowing costs reflect the prevailing 
credit conditions and, along with aggregate demand, proxy the current economic 
conditions. Higher real rates reduce the demand for factors of production directly 
and indirectly through their impact on aggregate demand. Labour demand tends to 
be more sensitive to changes in real borrowing costs and aggregate demand than 
capital as capital is generally activity specific and thus immobile. The factor returns 
adjust reflecting the imperfect substitutability of capital and labour.  These are 
represented by the red circle labelled Factor Payments. Underutilisation of 
production factors represents a negative output gap and lower supply of goods and 
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services than the potential of the economy (the black dotted line labelled Output 
Gap). The level of investment by each institution (the dotted blue line) determines 
the stock of capital employed in the production function. Labour is assumed to grow 
at an exogenous growth rate.  
The three markets are linked through: 
1. The impact of balance sheet changes on real lending rates and the 
subsequent effect on the demand for goods and services and factors of 
production. This channel works primarily through the net worth of the 
financial sector, the lending spread, investment and household 
consumption. This also affects the demand for factors of production. 
2. Inflation and its impact on asset prices and monetary policy decisions.  
3. Financial assets, which generate dividend and interest income. These and 
other income sources generate demand for goods and services as well as 
demand for financial assets and liabilities in the next period. 
4. And finally, economic activity and its impact on asset prices and demand 
for assets and liabilities as well as factors of production.   
Similar to Devarajan and Go (1998), the model includes three macroeconomic 
balances: the government balance, the external balance and the savings-investment 
balance. These are in addition to accounting rules that ensure stock and flow 
consistency on the financial side.  
The financial sector provides intermediation services. Its demand for assets is 
represented by a Tobin asset demand function. Its decisions to accumulate assets 
and liabilities and hold reserves drive the lending spread and contribute to equity 
price growth. The level of reserves held by the financial sector is a main determinant 
of the credit multiplier, a key component of our financial accelerator mechanism.  
The non-financial sector is responsible for the bulk of investment in the economy, 
which is driven by a Tobin-Q specification. The sector provides equities on 
demand, which help fund its investment expenditure and demand for financial 
assets. 
Government receives direct and indirect taxes (represented by the dotted red lines) 
in addition to factor income, dividends, interest income, social contributions and 
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other income. The government consumption expenditure is determined by a 
discretionary growth rate. The change in the stock of bonds issued by the 
government closes the government flow balances. 
The external sector interacts with the domestic economy in both the financial and 
product markets. Exports and imports are modelled as imperfect substitutes to the 
domestically produced good and are driven by changes in relative prices. Some of 
the foreign liabilities of the domestic economy are fixed in foreign currency units, 
while others vary with the level of domestic economic activity. The exchange rate 
ensures the closure of the external balance. It also affects the liability side of the 
foreign sector (expressed in local currency units) and along with exogenous changes 
to foreign savings leads to changes in the financial wealth of the external sector.  
The household maximise consumption subject to a future wealth target and all 
equations in the model. The target is based on an exogenous growth rate, which 
indicates the real wealth that the representative household would like to achieve in 
the future given its current level of wealth. For simplicity, the wealth target 
assumption is adopted in the tradition of Pigou's real wealth effect (Patinkin 1948; 
Tobin 1975).19 The household receives factor income, dividends, interest income, 
social contributions and other income. It makes decisions about consumption 
(savings), investment and asset and liability accumulation. 
The model assumes that savings by the financial and non-financial sector adjusts to 
ensure that the savings-investment balance is maintained.  
The micro-foundations of the model make it significantly different from current 
stock and flow models in the tradition of Godley and Lavoie (2007) and closer to 
standard DSGE models. At the same time, the requirement of stock and flow 
equilibrium on the financial and on the real sides and the absence of rational 
                                                 
19 In their stock and flow consistent models, Godley and Lavoie (2012) employ a specification with 
a level of wealth expected at the end of the period that is based on the actual wealth in the previous 
period plus the level of expected savings. The level of expected wealth is a driver of the demand for 
assets. In our specification, the target level of wealth also drives the household demand for assets.      
However, the target is a function of an exogenous growth rate and real wealth achieved in the 
previous period. Households also optimise intertemporally unlike the models developed by Godley 
and Lavoie. The growth rate is assumed exogenous in order to simplify the dynamics of the model. 
An endogenous growth provides an additional channel for households to respond to the shocks in 
the macroeconomy.  
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expectations differentiate our framework from current DSGE models. What follows 
is a detailed representation of the model.  
Producer behaviour 
The modelling of production, exports and imports follows closely Devarajan and 
Go (1998). There is only one representative producer. A constant elasticity of 
substitution (CES) production function is maximised subject to a given set of input 
and output prices.  We assume constant returns to scale in line with neoclassical 
theory:  
 
𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑡 = 𝛼
𝑝 ∙ (∑ 𝛿𝑓
𝑝 ∙ 𝑄𝐹𝑡𝑓
−𝜌𝑝
𝑓
)
−1 𝜌𝑝⁄
 
 
(1) 
where QVA is the value added in period  𝑡 , 𝛼𝑝 is a shift parameter reflecting total 
factor productivity (TFP), QF is the quantity demanded of each factor f (i.e., labour 
and capital), and 𝛿𝑝 is a share parameter of factor f employed in the production 
process. The elasticity of substitution between factors 𝜎𝑖
𝑝
 is a transformation of 
𝜌𝑝(i.e., 𝜎𝑖
𝑝 = 1 (1 + 𝜌𝑖
𝑝)⁄ ). The factor demand equation is:   
 𝑄𝐹𝑡𝑓 = 𝛼
𝑝−
𝜌𝑝
1+𝜌𝑝 ∙ 𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑡 ∙ (𝛿𝑓
𝑝 ∙
𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑡
𝑊𝐹𝑡𝑓
)
1 (1+𝜌𝑝)⁄
 (2) 
 
Intermediate inputs are a fixed share of valued added. Total aggregate output is 
equal to the sum of value added and intermediate demand.    
Behavioural functions governing international trade 
Imports are modelled using an Armington specification (Armington 1969). 
Imported and domestically produced goods are imperfect substitutes. Changes in 
the relative price of imports lead to a change in the ratio of imports to domestic 
sales:    
 𝑄𝑄𝑡 = 𝛼
𝑞 [𝛿𝑞 ∙ 𝑄𝐷𝑡
−𝜌𝑞
+ (1 − 𝛿𝑞) ∙ 𝑄𝑀𝑡
−𝜌𝑞
]
−1 𝜌𝑞⁄
 (3) 
 (1 − 𝑡𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑃𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝑄𝑡 = 𝑃𝐷𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐷𝑡 + 𝑃𝑀𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝑀𝑡 (4) 
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 𝑃𝑀𝑡 = (1 + 𝑡𝑚𝑡) ∙ 𝑝𝑤𝑚𝑖 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 (5) 
where 𝑡𝑠𝑡  is an indirect sales tax, 𝛼
𝑞 is a shift parameter, 𝛿𝑞 is a share parameter, 
QQ is the composite good consumed domestically at time 𝑡, QD and QM are 
domestically supplied and imported quantities, and PD is the price of domestic good 
QD. The import price PM is determined by world import prices pwm, import tariff 
rates tm and the exchange rate EXR, under the small country assumption, pwm and 
tm are exogenous variables. 𝑃𝑄𝑡 is the composite supply price. 
A constant elasticity of transformation (CET) function determines the relationship 
between the quantity of goods produced for domestic and foreign export markets: 
 𝑄𝐴𝑡 = 𝛼
𝑡 [𝛿𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐷𝑡
𝜌𝑡
+ (1 − 𝛿𝑡) ∙ 𝑄𝐸𝑡
𝜌𝑡
]
1 𝜌𝑡⁄
 (6) 
 𝑃𝐴𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐴𝑡 = 𝑃𝐷𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐷𝑡 + 𝑃𝐸𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐸𝑡 (7) 
 𝑃𝐸𝑡 = (1 − 𝑡𝑒𝑡) ∙ 𝑝𝑤𝑒𝑡 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 (8) 
where QE is the quantity of exports, te is the export tax rate (negative if a subsidy), 
and pwe is the exogenous world export price, 𝛼𝑡 is a shift parameter and 𝛿𝑡 is a 
share parameter. 𝑃𝐸𝑡 is the export deflator, which is a function of the world prices, 
the exchange rate and the export tax.  
The above equations lead to the following first order conditions which define the 
ratio of QD to QM and the ratio of QD to QE: 
 
𝑄𝐷𝑡
𝑄𝑀𝑡
= (
𝛿𝑞
1 − 𝛿𝑞
∙
𝑃𝑀𝑡
𝑃𝐷𝑡
)
1 (1+𝜌𝑞)⁄
 (9) 
 
 
𝑄𝐷𝑡
𝑄𝐸𝑡
= (
𝛿𝑡
1 − 𝛿𝑡
∙
𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝑃𝐷𝑡
)
1 (𝜌𝑡−1)⁄
 (10) 
Prices 
In this section, we outline the specifications driving prices other than PE and PM, 
which were described above. 
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 𝑃𝑄𝑡 = (1 + 𝑖𝑛𝑓) ∙ 𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝜃1
𝑝𝑞 ∙ (𝑦𝑡−1
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑙 − 1) + 𝜃2
𝑝𝑞 ∙ ∆𝑃𝑀𝑡 (11) 
PQ is the supplier price excluding sales taxes. It is also the numeraire price in our 
framework, affecting all other prices. 𝑖𝑛𝑓 is the target rate of inflation, which also 
proxies steady state inflation. The proxy variable for the output gap 𝑦𝑡−1
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑙
, which 
is described below and the change in import prices ∆𝑃𝑀𝑡  affect inflation. The 
coefficient 𝜃1
𝑝𝑞
 measures the responsiveness of prices to the output gap, while the 
coefficient 𝜃2
𝑝𝑞 measures the responsiveness of prices to changes in import prices. 
The equation reflects Phillips curve dynamics.  
The sales price including sales taxes is related to PQ via the simple identity: 
 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 = (1 + 𝑡𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑃𝑄𝑡 (12) 
The prices of domestically produced output PD is determined in equation 13. It is 
a function of the nominal value of the composite output, nominal imports and real 
output of the domestically produced good. 
 𝑃𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝑄𝑡 = 𝑃𝐷𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐷𝑡 + 𝑃𝑀𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝑀𝑡 (13) 
The activity price PA, which is inclusive of activity taxes ta, is defined similarly in 
the equation below. 
 𝑃𝐴𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐴𝑡 = 𝑃𝐷𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐷𝑡 + 𝑃𝐸𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐸𝑡 (14) 
The value-added price is a function of the nominal activity output after tax minus 
the nominal value of intermediates over real value added.  
 𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑡 = 𝑃𝐴𝑡 ∙ (1 − 𝑡𝑎𝑡) ∙ 𝑄𝐴𝑡 − 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑡 (15) 
Our specification of price expectations is a significant departure from current 
mainstream economics and DSGE models. Empirical evidence does not support 
assumptions of rational expectations (Amano, Engle-Warnick, and Shukayev 2011; 
Dias, Duarte, and Rua 2010; Johannsen 2014; Mankiw, Reis, and Wolfers 2003). 
For South Africa, Kabundi and Schaling (2013) also dismiss the assumption that 
inflation expectations are rational. We therefore model inflation expectations as 
adaptive. Equation 16 specifies how price expectations are formed. The coefficient 
𝜃𝑝 captures the response of expectations to deviations of expected from actual 
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prices. More credible monetary policy implies a smaller coefficient. The coefficient 
𝜃𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑒 measures the sensitivity of expectations to changes in the output gap and it is 
significantly smaller compared to the coefficient 𝜃1
𝑝𝑞
. While inflation expectations 
are directly affected by the level of economic activity, this impact is significantly 
smaller than the direct impact on inflation.  
 
𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡
𝑒 = (1 + 𝑖𝑛𝑓)  ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡−1
𝑒 − 𝜃𝑝 ∙ (𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡−1
𝑒 − 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡−1) + 𝜃
𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑒
∙ (𝑦𝑡−1
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑙 − 1) 
(16) 
The equity price is a function of the steady state growth rate 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑞; expected 
inflation, which affects the equity price with elasticity 𝜇1
𝑝𝑒𝑞
; the change in the stock 
of money supply created by the financial sector 𝑆𝐿𝑡
𝑓𝑖𝑛_𝑐𝑑
(a proxy for money supply 
growth), which affects the equity price with elasticity 𝜇2
𝑝𝑒𝑞
; and the change in 
aggregate output, with elasticity  𝜇3
𝑝𝑒𝑞
. These have been identified as important 
drivers of equity prices (Chen, Roll, and Ross 1986; Rapach, Wohar, and Rangvid 
2005). For South Africa, Gupta and Modise (2013) find that interest rates, money 
supply and world oil production growth affect stock prices.  
 
𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡 = ((1 + 𝑠𝑠
𝑝𝑒𝑞) ∙ (1 + 𝜋𝑡
𝑒)𝜇1
𝑝𝑒𝑞
∙ (∆𝑆𝐿𝑡
𝑓𝑖𝑛_𝑐𝑑)𝜇2
𝑝𝑒𝑞
∙ (∆𝑄𝐴𝑡)
𝜇3
𝑝𝑒𝑞
)
∙ 𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡−1 
(17) 
Investment and savings 
Most of the investment in our framework is done by non-financial enterprises. Their 
investment is defined in equation 18.  
 𝐼𝑡 = 𝐼𝑡−1 ∙ 𝛾1
𝐼 ∙ (
∆𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡
∆𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡
)
𝛾2
𝐼
∙ (
1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑙
1 + 𝜋𝑡
𝑒)
𝛾3
𝐼
 (18) 
Investment in every period is linked to past investment through the fixed 
coefficient 𝛾1
𝐼. In addition, investment in the current period varies with the change 
of equity prices to overall prices and the real rate on loans. 𝛾2
𝐼  and 𝛾3
𝐼 are elasticities, 
which measure the responsiveness of investment to the two terms. The term (
∆𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡
∆𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡
) 
captures Tobin Q effects. Higher equity prices relative to prices of goods and 
services (a proxy for the book value of the firm) leads to higher investment. 
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Investment by other institutions such as the household and the financial sector is 
modelled similarly without the Tobin Q effects. 
The savings of the household sector are defined as after tax income minus 
household consumption   and other expenditure:  
 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝐻 = (1 − 𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝐻) ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝑆𝐶𝑡
𝐻 − 𝑂𝐼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝐼𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡
𝐻 − 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐻𝑡 (19) 
where 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝐻 , 𝑆𝐶𝑡
𝐻 , 𝑂𝐼𝑡
𝐻, 𝐼𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡
𝐻, 𝑄𝐻𝑡 are respectively real household income, social 
contributions made by households, other contributions, interest rate expenditure and 
real household expenditure.  
Savings for the financial and non-financial sector adjust to ensure that the savings 
and investment constraint is maintained.  
 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑡
𝑖𝑖 ∙ (1 − 𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝑖 ) ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝑖𝑖 (20) 
The set ii consists of the financial and non-financial sectors. 𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑡
𝑖𝑖 is the marginal 
propensity to save defined as: 
 𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝑀𝑃𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑡) (21) 
The steady state marginal propensity 𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑟 varies, driven by the term 
𝑀𝑃𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑡.Savings for the foreign sector are exogenous, while savings of the 
Central Bank is simply the after-tax income left after paying for interest 
expenditure. 
Financial behaviour  
The financial behaviour in our framework is based on the flow of funds dynamics. 
In every period agents experience a change in their financial wealth. This is driven 
by their decisions to accumulate liabilities (sources of funds), changes to the equity 
price and net savings. The financial wealth is then divided into different financial 
assets. Institutions that save more than they invest have net incurrence of financial 
assets which exceeds the net incurrence of financial liabilities. The opposite takes 
place if investment exceeds savings.  
The equation defining financial wealth is: 
53 
 
 
𝐹𝑊𝑡
𝑖 = ∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑡−1
𝑖,𝑓𝑖  
𝑓𝑖
+ 𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝑆𝐴𝑡−1
𝑖,𝑒𝑞 + ∑ 𝑑𝑙𝑡
𝑖,𝑓𝑖 
𝑓𝑖
+ 𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝑑𝑙𝑡
𝑖,𝑒𝑞 + 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝑖
− 𝑃𝑅𝐶 ∙ 𝐼𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑛𝑡
𝑖  
(22) 
where i is a set of agents consisting of the household, government, the Central Bank, 
financial sector, non-financial sector and the rest of the world. The set fi consists of 
the financial instruments cash and deposits, loans, bonds and other assets. We do 
not model prices for these instruments. We simplify our analysis by assuming that 
agents hold bonds to maturity. SA is the stock of assets, dl is a flow variable and it 
represents the change in the stock of liabilities. Changes to equity prices increase 
the value of equities and the funds available for financial investment. 𝑆𝐴𝑡−1
𝑖,𝑒𝑞
  is the 
stock of equities in the previous period. 
Next, we discuss how the various institutions choose to divide their financial wealth 
across the different financial assets and how they increase their liabilities. 
Assets 
The asset demand specification for the financial and foreign sectors is based on a 
Tobin asset demand function (Backus et al. 1980; Godley and Lavoie 2007; Tobin 
1982).  The general specification is:  
 𝑆𝐴𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑡
𝑖𝑡 = (𝐹𝑊𝑡
𝑖𝑡 − 𝑆𝐴𝑡
𝑖𝑡,𝑙) ∙ (𝜆fii,0 + 𝐴𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑗 ∙ 𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑖,𝑗 + 𝜆fii,4
𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝑖𝑡
𝐹𝑊𝑡
𝑖𝑡
) (23) 
where the set it consists of the foreign and financial sectors, the set fii has the 
financial instruments equities, bonds and cash and deposits.  ∑ 𝜆fii,0 = 1𝑓𝑖𝑖 , 
∑ 𝜆fii,4 = 0𝑓𝑖𝑖 ; A is a matrix of coefficients which satisfies  ∑ 𝐴fii,j = 0𝑓𝑖𝑖 ; 𝑗  is equal 
to the number of financial instruments, in this case three, and ∑ 𝐴fii,j + 𝜆fii,4 = 0𝑗 . 
The coefficients of matrix A show the responsiveness of the holding of a financial 
instrument as an asset to changes in its own return as well as the returns of other 
assets.  An increase in the return of equities, which is a function of equity prices, 
and current period dividend payments, relative to the return on money and bonds, 
increases the demand for equities and their relative share in the financial sector 
portfolio. This is at the cost of reducing the shares of money and bonds. This ensures 
that the share of one asset can increase only if the shares of other assets falls. The 
stock of loans 𝑆𝐴𝑡
𝑖𝑡,𝑙
, which is determined outside the Tobin function, is subtracted 
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from the total financial wealth FW. The coefficient 𝜆fii,4 reflects the transactional 
demand for money, which is represented by the cash and deposit instrument in our 
framework. An increase in the share of nominal income relative to financial wealth 
should translate into a higher share of cash and deposit holding.  
The stock of loans provided by the financial sector to the economy is a function of 
the deposits held by the financial sector in the previous period. Higher cash and 
deposits liability in the previous period translates into higher loans in the current 
period. 
 𝑆𝐴𝑡
𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 = (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑡)  ∙ 𝑆𝐿𝑡−1
𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑑𝑒𝑝
 (24) 
The ratio 𝑅𝑅𝑡  is key to the operations in our model. It reflects the requirements by 
the Central Bank for the financial institutions to hold cash reserves, but it also 
reflects the financial sector’s willingness to hold reserves for other reasons, such as 
to manage liquidity or risk. This aims to capture the mechanism identified by Borio 
and Zhu (2012). A decrease in the ratio can reflect higher willingness to take risk. 
A reduction in the ratio increases the supply of loans and reduces the lending spread. 
This in turn encourages investment in the economy and the building of capital stock. 
The 𝑅𝑅𝑡  ratio provides a link between the behaviour of the financial sector and the 
real economy. At the same time, developments in the real economy affect the ratio 
through the repo rate and the growth in the financial assets of the financial sector. 
The relationship in equation 24 also represents a money multiplier.  
The ratio is calibrated by dividing the stock of loans on the asset side of the financial 
sector through the stock of cash and deposits on the liability side. Movements in the 
repo rate reflect changes in the cycle, which affect asset prices and the net worth of 
agents in the economy, including the financial sector. The repo rate affects bank 
lending directly and indirectly through the financial net worth. The growth in 
financial assets captures the prevailing financial conditions and is sensitive to 
changes in capital requirements. The introduction of higher capital ratio can lead to 
repricing of risk, reduction in the growth of financial sector assets and an increase 
in 𝑅𝑅𝑡. Changes to the ratio affect all institutions through the loan supply by the 
financial sector and the lending spread. This in turn affects assets prices and 
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economic activity, creating feedback loops that operate through the balance sheets 
of all agents.  
 𝛽𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜 is the responsiveness of the reserve ratio to changes in the repo rate, whereas 
𝛽𝑠𝑎 is the responsiveness to changes to the growth in the balance sheet of the 
financial sector. fi is a set including all financial instruments. The equation below 
outlines the specification for the reserve ratio. 
 𝑅𝑅𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡−1 ∙ (1 + ∆𝑟𝑡−1
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜)
𝛽𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜
∙ (
∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑡
𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑓𝑖 𝑓𝑖
∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑡−1
𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑓𝑖 𝑓𝑖
)
𝛽𝑠𝑎
+ 𝜆𝑡
𝑟𝑟 (25) 
This specification also aims to capture the mechanism identified by Woodford 
(2010). In his model, the IS curve links the loan spread to the demand and supply 
of intermediary services and the level of economic activity.20  The supply of 
intermediary services, in turn, depends on the capital of intermediaries as well as 
factors that can loosen or tighten the leverage constraint, such as changing attitudes 
of intermediaries’ creditors. Improvements to the net worth of the financial sector, 
for example, can increase the level of intermediation services, reduce the spread 
and increase economic activity. In our framework, the economic activity is captured 
through the repo rate, the attitudes of intermediaries’ creditors is captured through 
the exogenous parameter 𝜆𝑡
𝑟𝑟 and the term (
∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑡
𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑓𝑖
 𝑓𝑖
∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑡−1
𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑓𝑖
 𝑓𝑖
)
𝛽𝑠𝑎
  accounts for balance 
sheet effects.   
If the relationship between output and interest rates is elastic, the model framework 
can create financial accelerator effects. 
The provision of loans by the rest of the world as well as by nonfinancial companies 
and government is a function of the financial wealth in the previous period and the 
repo rate. Higher repo rate decreases the share. This indicates that with increases in 
                                                 
20 In the baseline model and simulations, we keep the value of 𝜆𝑡
𝑟𝑟  set to zero. However, this requires 
a very large coefficient for 𝛽𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜. This can lead to the conclusion that monetary policy is highly 
effective. While monetary policy in our framework is more effective than in models with limited or 
no financial sector dynamics due to the mechanisms identified by Borio and Zhu (2012), the size of 
the coefficient in this case also reflects a simplification, assuming the factors captured by 𝜆𝑡
𝑟𝑟  are 
directly linked to monetary policy. An alternative specification is to reduce the size of 𝛽𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜   and 
either exogenously or endogenously provide values for 𝜆𝑡
𝑟𝑟 . 
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the repo rate, the economy is likely to slow down and the credit worthiness of 
borrowers to deteriorate.  
The demand for cash and deposits by households, the non-financial sector and 
government is driven by the real rate on cash and deposits as well as the nominal 
income of each institution. Higher real rates increase the demand for deposits as a 
store of value, while higher income increases the transactional demand: 
 𝑆𝐴𝑡
𝑖𝑙,𝑐𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖𝑙,𝑐𝑑 ∙ (
1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑐𝑑
1 + 𝜋𝑡
)
𝜇𝑐𝑑
∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝑖𝑙 (26) 
where il is the set of agents, 𝛼 is the steady state coefficient, which links the stock 
of cash and deposit assets to nominal income, 𝑟𝑡
𝑐𝑑 is the nominal rate on cash and 
deposit holdings and 𝜇𝑐𝑑 captures the responsiveness of cash and deposit holding 
to changes in the real rate. Our specification reflects the use of money for 
transaction purposes as well as store of value. The demand for cash and deposits by 
the Central Bank is kept exogenous. 
Households also demand equities, while the demand for bonds is kept exogenous. 
Households have a low direct exposure to bonds in the underlying data. We assume 
a simple relationship where the stock of equities is equal to the financial wealth not 
invested in other assets. The household equity stock largely represents interests in 
retirement and life funds.  
The demand for equities by the non-financial sector, government and the Central 
Bank is kept exogenous. The decision by government to hold equities is likely to 
be driven by discretionary policies while the Central Bank generally does not hold 
equities. In the case of the non-financial sector, our assumption aims to reduce the 
model complexity. The purchases of equities by this sector are also likely to be a 
function of various strategic considerations which go beyond equity returns. The 
demand for bonds by the non-financial sector is also kept constant, reflecting the 
decreasing direct importance of the sector in the bond market. 
Government does not demand bonds as an asset. The Central Bank’s demand for 
bonds is residual demand. It is based on the flow of funds identity:  
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𝑑𝑎𝑡
𝑟𝑏,𝑏 = 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝑟𝑏 + ∑ 𝑑𝑙𝑡
𝑟𝑏,𝑓𝑖 
𝑓𝑖
+ 𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝑑𝑙𝑡
𝑟𝑏,𝑒−𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝑑𝑎𝑡
𝑟𝑏,𝑒
− ∑ 𝑑𝑎𝑡
𝑟𝑏,𝑓𝑖𝑏  − 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑡
𝑟𝑏
𝑓𝑖𝑏
 
(27) 
where da is the change in the stock of assets and is defined over the set of financial 
instruments fi. Considering that the Central Bank’s liabilities are made mainly of 
cash and deposits, the identity effectively reflects open markets operations. The 
bank expands money supply by purchasing bonds after accounting for net savings. 
This identity ensures that the supply and use of funds are equal. The same identity 
applies to all agents and ensures stock and flow consistency.  
The other financial instrument is kept constant for all agents except the Central 
Bank. This is because we classify foreign reserves under other assets. For the 
Central Bank, the accumulation of other financial assets is given by the identity: 
 𝑆𝐴𝑡
𝑟𝑏,𝑜𝑎 = 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 ∙ 𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝑠𝑎
𝑟𝑏,𝑜𝑎 (28) 
sa is the exogenous other assets of the Central Bank excluding foreign currency 
reserves. The reserves are represented in foreign currency units and are fixed (𝑟𝑒𝑠). 
The other assets (𝑆𝐴𝑡
𝑟𝑏,𝑜𝑎
 ) for the Central Bank fluctuate with changes in the 
exchange rate or discretionary policy decisions, which change the level of reserves.  
Liabilities 
The demand for loans on the liability side is modelled similarly to the demand for 
cash and deposits. 
 𝑆𝐿𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑠,𝑙 = 𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑠,𝑙 ∙ (
1 + 𝑟𝑡
𝑙
1 + 𝜋𝑡
)
𝜇𝑙
∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑠 (29) 
The function represents the demand for loans for all institutions, except the foreign 
sector.  The parameter 𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑠,𝑙 is fixed, while the demand fluctuates with changes in 
the real borrowing costs. The elasticity 𝜇𝑙 is negative. For the foreign sector, we 
keep the loans a fixed share of domestic GDP lagged one period and expressed in 
foreign currency units. The fixed share is calibrated to the base year. 
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 𝑆𝐿𝑡
𝑟𝑜𝑤,𝑙 = 𝛼𝑟𝑜𝑤,𝑙
∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡−1 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑡−1
𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡−1
 (30) 
Government is the only institution that issues bonds. This reflects the information 
in our underlying data. The issuance of bonds is driven by government’s decision 
to consume, save, invest and accumulate financial assets and liabilities. The 
specification reflects the flow of funds identity with bonds on the liability side being 
the balancing item. 
The issuance of equities is modelled endogenously for the financial, nonfinancial 
and foreign sectors. The equity issuance for the financial sector varies directly with 
the accumulation of equities by the household sector.   
 𝑆𝐿𝑡
𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑒 = 𝑠𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑒 + 𝑆𝐴𝑡
𝐻,𝑒
 (31) 
Our definition of equities includes interests in retirement and life funds, which is 
the main financial asset of households and sits on the financial sector balance sheet 
as a liability. The other equity liabilities of the financial sector are exogenous 
(𝑠𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑒).  
The nonfinancial sector supplies equities on demand similar to the specification in 
Godley and Lavoie (2007). The set infin includes all agents except non-financial 
institutions. Changes to equity prices and dividend payments affect the demand for 
equities, leading to changes in the supply of equities by the non-financial sector. 
This ensures that the supply and demand for equities is equal.  
 𝑆𝐿𝑡
𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑒 = ∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑡
𝑖,𝑒 
𝑖
− ∑ 𝑆𝐿𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑒 
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛
 (32) 
The foreign sector equity liability is also a constant share of GDP (expressed in 
foreign currency units), modelled similarly to the loan liability.  
Cash and deposits are created by the Central Bank and the financial sector. The 
Central Bank expands its money supply according to the equation below: 
 𝑆𝐿𝑡
𝑐𝑏,𝑐𝑑 = 𝜎𝑐𝑏,𝑐𝑑 ∙ ∑ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝑖
𝑖
 (33) 
The stock of cash and deposit liabilities of the Central Bank grows with the total 
nominal income in the economy. Higher national income translates into greater 
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transactional demand for money. We assume that the relationship is constant and 
captured through the coefficient  𝛼𝑐𝑏,𝑐𝑑. The financial sector accommodates the 
demand for cash and deposits.   
The other liabilities are fixed for all institutions except the foreign sector as the 
foreign reserves, which fall on the asset side of the Central Bank’s balance sheet, 
fall on the liability side of the foreign sector.  
Interest Rates 
The policy rate is the repo rate set by the Central Bank. We use a Taylor rule 
specification, similar to de Jager, Johnston, and Steinbach (2015), though our 
coefficients are of different size, and we use deviations from actual inflation rather 
than inflation expectations. In our framework, inflation expectations are adaptive 
and thus the current specification also captures the relationship between the policy 
rate and inflation expectations:   
 
𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜 = 𝜌𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜 ∙ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜 + (1 − 𝜌𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜) ∙ (𝑖𝑛𝑓 + 𝛽2
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜 ∙ (𝜋𝑡 − 𝑖𝑛𝑓)
+ 𝛽3
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜 ∙ (𝑦𝑡−1
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑙 − 1)) 
(34) 
where 𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜
 is the repo rate and 𝑦𝑡
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑙   is a proxy for the output gap, which 
measures the capacity utilisation of labour. Interest rate decisions affect all other 
interest rates. While we capture the traditional channels of monetary policy 
mechanism, our framework also has features which capture the intermediation-
interest rate spread channel and the related risk-taking channel (Borio and Zhu 
2012; Woodford 2010).   
 𝑟𝑡
𝑏 = 𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜 + 𝑑𝑟𝑡
𝑏 (35) 
 𝑟𝑡
𝑐𝑑 = 𝜇
2
𝑟𝑐𝑑 ∙ 𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜 + (1 − 𝜇
2
𝑟𝑐𝑑) ∙ 𝑟𝑡
𝑙 (36) 
 𝑟𝑡
𝑙 = 𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜 + 𝑑𝑟𝑡
𝑙 (37) 
The other interest rates modelled are for bonds (𝑟𝑡
𝑏), cash and deposits ( 𝑟𝑡
𝑐𝑑) and 
loans ( 𝑟𝑡
𝑙). In each case the interest rate is a function of the repo rate. The term dr 
fluctuates, bringing the supply and demand of the respective financial instrument 
into equilibrium. Unlike the equity market and the cash and deposit market, the 
markets for loans and bonds are brought into equilibrium via the respective interest 
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rate, which feeds into the asset demand functions described above. The term dr 
represents the interest rate spread.  
A reduction in the supply of loans increases the lending spread over the repo rate 
and reduces demand for loans as explained above.  The spread reflects risk and 
market power.   
The adjustment in the loan market takes place through the balance sheets of the 
household, financial and non-financial sectors. 
The bond market operates similarly. However, in this case the changes in demand 
are on the financial and foreign sectors sides.   An increase in the supply of bonds 
requires higher bond yield to encourage agents to purchase bonds. 
Income of institutions  
Every institution receives factor income (YIF), dividends (DVD), interest income 
(INT), other income (OI) and social contributions (SCOC). The government also 
receives tax revenue. 
 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝑖 = ∑ 𝑌𝐼𝐹𝑡
𝑖,𝑓
𝑓
+ 𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑡
𝑖 + 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑂𝐼𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑆𝐶𝑂𝐶𝑡
𝑖 (38) 
In the case of government, income is equal to  
 
𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 𝑌𝐼𝑂𝑡 + 𝑡𝑠𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝑄𝑡 + 𝑡𝑎𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝐴𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐴𝑡 + 𝑡𝑚𝑡
∙ 𝑝𝑤𝑚𝑡 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝑀𝑡 + ∑ 𝑡𝑑𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑑
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑑
 
(39) 
where 𝑌𝐼𝑂𝑡 is explained by equation 38; government generates tax revenue from 
sales taxes, activity taxes, import tariffs and direct taxes on income such as personal 
income tax and corporate income tax.  
These identities reflect the structure of our financial SAMs, which mirror the 
production and distribution accounts published by the Central Bank. 
The factor income received by each domestic agent is defined as:    
 𝑌𝐼𝐹𝑡
𝑖,𝑓 = 𝑠ℎ𝑟𝑖 ∙ (𝑌𝐹𝑡
𝑓 − 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 ∙ 𝑦𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑤
𝑓) (40) 
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We assume that in each period the share of labour and capital income that goes to 
each domestic agent is fixed. We also assume that the factor income paid to the rest 
of the world (𝑦𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑓 ) is exogenous and fixed in foreign currency units. 𝑌𝐹𝑡
𝑓
 is 
simply the product of the factor return WF and the quantity of factors employed 
QF. All agents except the foreign sector receive capital returns but it is only the 
foreign sector and households that receive wages.  
The dividend income is divided according to the share of equities that each agent 
holds. For example, the more equities households hold, the more dividend income 
they will receive. There are three sources of dividend income. These are the 
financial and non-financial sectors and the rest of the world. The dividend income 
from the foreign sector is exogenous and fixed in foreign currency units. The 
dividend payments by the financial and non-financial sectors are determined by the 
following equation: 
 
𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑖𝑖𝑖 = (1 − 𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝑖𝑖𝑖) ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑆𝐶𝑡
𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝑂𝐼𝑃𝑡
𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐼𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡
𝑖𝑖𝑖
− 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝑖𝑖𝑖 
(41) 
Dividends paid by the financial and non-financial sectors (the set iii) are a function 
of after-tax income, social contributions, interest expenditure and other expenditure 
paid as well as the savings decisions of the two sectors. It is important to note that 
dividend payments can be negative, which is equivalent to the holders of equity 
injecting money into the two sectors. Higher savings reflect higher retained 
earnings. 
Interest income is divided similarly to dividend income. All the interest payments 
go into a pool, which is divided according to the holding of interest bearing assets 
by the various agents. The interest paid by each agent is defined in the two equations 
below: 
 𝐼𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑟𝑡−1
𝑙 ∙ 𝑆𝐿𝑡−1
𝑖,𝑙 + 𝑟𝑡−1
𝑐𝑑 ∙ 𝑆𝐿𝑡−1
𝑖,𝑐𝑑 + 𝐼𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐵𝑡
𝑖 (42) 
 𝐼𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐵𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑟𝑡−1
𝑏 ∙ 𝑑𝑙𝑡−1
𝑖,𝑏  + 𝐼𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐵𝑡−1
𝑖  (43) 
Changes to the interest rates of loans and cash and deposits apply to the entire 
liability stock, whereas for bonds the change applies only to debt issued in the same 
period. 𝐼𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐵𝑡
𝑖 is the interest income generated on bonds. 
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The other income received by agents is a fixed share of the pool of other payments. 
We assume that the share does not change. For domestic agents, we assume that the 
other payments are fixed share of GDP in the previous period, while for the foreign 
sector they are fixed in foreign currency units and fluctuate with changes in the 
exchange rate. The social contribution income is modelled the same way.  
System constraints  
Our system is stock and flow consistent. The model system constraints apply to 
both the real and the financial sides. The real side constraints are similar to other 
Computable General Equilibrium models such as the model developed by 
Devarajan and Go (1998). The income and expenditure must be equal. In addition 
to the real balances, in a financial Social Accounting Matrix (SAM), we have to add 
the financial balances. The financial SAM enforces flow consistency across real 
and financial flows. The sources of funds must equal the uses of funds for every 
institution and the total change (across all institutions) in the holding of a financial 
instrument on the asset side must be equal to the change on the liability side.  
The first real economy constraint is that the total supply must be equal to the total 
demand in the economy.  
 𝑄𝑄𝑡 = 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑡 + 𝑄𝐻𝑡 + 𝑄𝐺𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑖𝑛𝑣 
𝑖
 (44) 
The term inv represents the change in inventories, which are exogenous in our 
framework. The supply in the economy is given by imports and the domestically 
produced good supplied to the local market. 
In our framework, the demand for factors of production (eq 45) is a function of 
𝑦𝑡
𝑔𝑎𝑝
(eq 46), which is a proxy for the output gap. It captures deviations from full 
employment levels driven by the economic cycle.  The 𝑦𝑡
𝑔𝑎𝑝
 can vary between 0.95 
and 1.05, indicating that demand for labour and capital can be slightly below or 
above the supply (i.e. negative or positive output gap). While this is a hard 
constraint, the structure of the model does not allow for it become binding.21 The 
                                                 
21 During the calibration process, the imposition of the constraint led to an effective way of ensuring 
that the system properties of never generating output gaps larger than 5 per cent are achieved. The 
initial imposition of the constraint led to the model generating infeasible solutions. By changing key 
coefficients (in equations 25, 34, 46 and the demands for loans and cash and deposits), the model 
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response of equations 25 (Reserve Ratio), 34 (Taylor rule), 46 (Capacity 
Utilisation) and the responses in the demand for goods, services and financial assets 
and liabilities ensure that deviations from potential growth are rapidly corrected.   
 𝑄𝐹𝑡
𝑓 = 𝑦𝑡
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑓 ∙ 𝑄𝐹𝑆𝑡
𝑓
 (45) 
The proxy variable is a function of the real loan rate and deviations of aggregate 
demand from its steady state. An increase in the real rate reduces the demand for 
factors of production (the output gap becomes more negative), whereas aggregate 
demand growth which exceeds the steady state growth rate increases the demand 
for factors of production.  
 𝑦𝑡
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑓 = 𝑦𝑡−1
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑓 − 𝛼1
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑓 ∙ (𝑟𝑡−1
𝑙 − 𝜋𝑡−1) + 𝛼2
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑓(∆𝐴𝐷𝑡−1 − ∆𝑎𝑑) (46) 
The elasticities 𝛼1
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑓
 and 𝛼2
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑓
reflects the responsiveness of the proxy measure 
to the change in the real rate and the deviation of aggregate demand from its steady 
state growth level. The coefficients for labour are larger, indicating that labour 
changes are more sensitive to changes in aggregate demand and the interest rate 
cycle.  The specification also implies that factor returns adjust. A fall in factor costs 
indicates that either the supply is rising faster than the demand or 𝑦𝑡
𝑔𝑎𝑝
  is falling.  
The next constraint is the current account balance constraint, which ensures that the 
country’s spending of foreign currency is equal to its inflows. It is expressed in 
foreign currency units: 
 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐹𝑡 = 𝑝𝑤𝑚𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝑀𝑡 − 𝑝𝑤𝑒𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐸𝑡 − 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑡 (47) 
where  𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑡 = 𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑓 + 𝑁𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑡 + 𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑡 + 𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡 
Foreign savings (SAVF) are equal to the trade balance minus the balance on the 
income portion (TRANSF) of the current account. The latter is a function of net 
factor payments (𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑓), which are fixed and exogenous, net dividend receipts 
(NDVD), net interest receipts (NINT) and net other income (NOI). We assume that 
foreign savings are fixed, which implies that the current account deficit is fixed.  
The exchange rate adjusts to ensure that the equilibrium is maintained. This is our 
closure with respect to the external balances. For example, an increase in dividend 
                                                 
property to oscillate within a range of negative output gap of 5 per cent to positive output gap of 5 
per cent was achieved. The approach to calibrating all parameters is explained in section 3.4. 
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outflows, holding foreign savings fixed, requires the exchange rate to depreciate, 
reducing the outflows in foreign currency units and imports, while increasing 
exports.  
The last real economy constraint is the savings-investment balance, which ensures 
that total savings in the economy are equal to total investment. The adjustment, as 
indicated earlier, takes place through the savings rate of the financial and non- 
financial sectors. 
 ∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
+ 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 ∙ 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐹𝑡 = ∑ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
+ 𝑖𝑛𝑣 (48) 
There are two financial constraints. The first one is that the sources of funds must 
be equal to the uses of funds for every institution. This constraint is enforced though 
our approach of calculating gross financial wealth available for investment in every 
period and its allocation to various assets. The second constraint is that the stock of 
liabilities is equal to the stock of financial assets for every financial instrument.  
 ∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑡
𝑓𝑖,𝑖
𝑖
= ∑ 𝑆𝐿𝑡
𝑓𝑖,𝑖
𝑖
 (49) 
For loans and bonds, this is achieved through the loan and bond rates respectively. 
For equities and cash and deposits, the adjustment takes place through the non-
financial equity liabilities and the cash and deposit liability of the financial sector. 
In the case of other assets, the adjustment takes place through the other liabilities 
of the foreign sector.  
Consumers 
The entire system of equations is solved maximising the household utility function:  
 𝑈0 = ∑ 𝛽
𝑡10
𝑡=0 𝐿𝑜𝑔(𝑄𝐻𝑡) (50) 
where 𝛽 = (1 + 𝜌)−1 , 𝜌 is a positive parameter and 𝛽 is the implied discount 
factor. In every period the household solves an intertemporal optimisation problem 
to determine the current value of its consumption and savings, based on the real 
financial wealth that it wants to achieve in 10 periods, plus the model constraints 
determined by the other equations in the system. The choice of a finite period 
reflects the permanent income hypothesis (Friedman 1957).  Households base their 
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consumption not on their current income, but the income they generate over a period 
of time.  The target real net wealth is set as follows: 
 𝐹𝑊𝑡,𝑡+10
𝐻 = 𝐹𝑊𝑡−1
𝐻 ∙ (1 + 𝜇 𝑓𝑤)10 (51) 
The target wealth in the current period is based on the solution from the previous 
period adjusted for a real return 𝜇 𝑓𝑤.  
Dynamics 
Figure 3.3 provides a diagrammatic representation of the household optimisation 
solution. The boxes represent the optimal path. In principle, the model could run 
forever; however, we limit the solution to 22 periods.  
Figure 3.3: The household optimisation path 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The dynamics of the model presented here differ from standard recursive CGE 
models. On the one side, the intertemporal optimisation of the household requires 
that the model system is solved simultaneously over a finite period of time. At the 
same time, once a solution is found, the variables in the current period become fixed 
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state variables for the intertemporal optimisation in the next period. The diagram 
below explains the solution process. At period t, the representative household 
decides on consumption and savings based on its expectations about the economy 
over the next 10 periods and a level of wealth that it wants to achieve. The target is 
based on an exogenous growth rate, which indicates the real wealth that the 
representative household would like to achieve in the future given its current level 
of wealth. For simplicity, the wealth target assumption is adopted in the tradition of 
Pigou's real wealth effect (Patinkin 1948; Tobin 1975).  Once a solution is found 
for period t, the household solves for period t+1. The solution values for period t 
are used as starting values for period t+1.22 
Our assumptions about expectations are different from mainstream DSGE models. 
The household has model-consistent expectations (similar to DSGE models) within 
each period. It has good understanding of the structure of the economy and uses the 
rules in the model to form expectations. However, the ability of households to 
foresee the future is limited to ten periods (two and a half years)23 and the formation 
of expectations can vary between periods. New formation of expectations can be 
introduced, for example, by shortening or increasing the optimisation period, 
changing the value of coefficients or the structure of equations between periods 
represented by the blue blocks in Figure 3.3. As the household solves for each 
period, new information about the economy becomes available, which is 
incorporated into the next period’s optimisation. Our expectation formation 
resembles the process identified by Roos and Luhan (2013). They find that 
households have bounded rationality rather than full-rationality.24 A significant 
number of households use more sophisticated models of the economy taking 
additional information into account as it becomes available to form expectations, 
                                                 
22 In terms of model dynamics, the solution process is introduced through a loop, which traces the 
path identified by the blue blocks in Figure 3.3. Once a solution is found for t, the loop moves to the 
next period. In each case the solution for the variable represented by the blue block is derived 
through intertemporal optimisation reflecting the structure of the model economy and the household 
desire to achieve a certain level of wealth in the future.  
23 The assumption of ten periods reflects the period that monetary shocks take to dissipate in an 
economy and the inflation expectations period generally being targeted by Central banks. We have 
assumed that this period also reflects the household expectation horizon.      
24 Hommes (2011) provides a review of the literature on bounded rationality. The theory of bounded 
rationality originates in the seminal work of Simon (1955). 
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but they do not have perfect foresight. The presence of only one household in our 
framework, however, limits our ability to capture heterogeneity of expectations.  
The model description above outlined some of the dynamic equations. These 
include, for example, prices (eq 11), prices expectations (eq 16), financial wealth 
(eq 22), the Tobin asset demand function (eq 23) and the Taylor rule (eq 34). In 
addition to these, the capital stock follows the standard approach where capital 
stock (𝑄𝐹𝑆𝑡
𝑘) in the current period is a function of capital stock in the previous 
period after depreciation (𝛿) plus total real investment in the previous period.  
                               𝑄𝐹𝑆𝑡
𝑘 = (1 − 𝛿) ∙  𝑄𝐹𝑆𝑡−1
𝑘 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖,𝑡−1
𝑖
+ 𝑖𝑛𝑣 (52) 
The labour supply (𝑄𝐹𝑆𝑡
𝑙) is simply modelled as growing by an exogenous growth 
rate 𝜌𝑙𝑎𝑏 . 
  𝑄𝐹𝑆𝑡
𝑙 = (1 + 𝜌𝑙𝑎𝑏) ∙  𝑄𝐹𝑆𝑡−1
𝑙  (53) 
Finally, the household optimisation is assumed to generate a constant savings rate 
(savings plan) over the 10-quarter optimisation period. This is driven by the 
equation below, which ensures that the after-tax savings rate in the current period 
is equal to the rate in the previous period.   
 
𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝐻
(1 − 𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝐻) ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝐻 =
𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑡−1
𝐻
(1 − 𝑡𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻 ) ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡−1
𝐻  (54) 
The solution process for households is different to conventional models, which use 
savings to smooth consumption. In our model, wealth accumulation is more 
important than consumption. Savings-smoothing ensures more stable path for 
household wealth as well as interest and dividend income.   
Demands arise from the household, government, investment and net exports. The 
growth rate in aggregate demand reflects: the household’s decision to accumulate 
wealth given its total income and performance of financial markets; government’s 
exogenous growth rate in consumption; investment by institutions, which is a 
function of income, borrowing costs and equity prices (in the case of non-financial 
firms); and relative export and import prices, domestic demand and production, 
which determine net exports. Growth rate in aggregate demand, which exceeds the 
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steady state ∆𝑎𝑑 pushes 𝑦𝑡
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑓
, which leads to higher borrowing costs in the 
economy and starts a process of re-equilibrating.  
3.3 Data  
In this section, we present the data used to calibrate the model. We construct 
financial macro Social Accounting Matrices (SAMs) for the South African 
economy over the period 2001 to 2012. Our approach follows the method outlined 
by Emini and Fofack (2003) and Hubic (2012). Capital and financial blocks are 
added to the standard SAM. These reflect the transactions that take place in the 
financial sector: the incurrence of liabilities and the accumulation of assets by 
institutions. The changes in liabilities and assets for a particular institution also 
reflect how the savings-investment balance (capital account) is financed.  
Table 3.1: Aggregation of financial instruments  
 
The financial block requires flow of funds data, which is produced by the South 
African Reserve Bank and is available from 1970. The South African data provides 
for 11 institutional units and 23 financial instruments.  These are aggregated into 
six institutions and five financial instruments. The aggregation is driven by: 
availability of production and distribution accounts, which are available on a more 
aggregate level; other data limitations, which we outline below; and the need to 
Cash and Deposits Equities Loans
Cash and demand monetary 
deposits;           
Short/medium-term 
monetary deposits;        
Long-term monetary 
deposits;                  
Deposits with other financial 
institutions ;              
Deposits with other 
institutions;
Securities of public 
enterprises;                                               
Ordinary shares;            
Interest in retirement and life 
funds;                                  
Other loan stock and 
preference shares; 
Bank loans and advances;  
Trade credit and short-term 
loans;                                  
Long-term loans;                   
Mortgage loans;
Bonds
Treasury bills;                   
Short-term government 
bonds;                          
Long-term government 
bonds;                                       
Non-marketable government 
bonds;                     
Securities of local 
governments;
Other
Gold and other foreign reserves;                                           
Other bills;                                                                
Foreign branch/head office balances;                            
Amounts receivable/payable                                         
Other assets/liabilities;                                          
Balancing item;
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reduce the computational and behavioural complexity of the model. After the 
aggregation, the financial instruments are cash and deposits, equities, bonds, loans 
and other, while the institutions are the representative household, financial sector, 
Reserve Bank, non-financial enterprises, government and the foreign sector. 
The aggregation of institutions does not lead to consolidation of flows – i.e flows 
between institutions which are part of the same category are not netted out. This 
reflects the absence of whom-to-whom accounts in South Africa as well as the 
presence of the same practice in the production, accumulation and distribution 
accounts.    
Table 3.1 and Table 3.2 summarise the aggregation. The financial macro SAMs 
impose flow consistency on the model.  
Table 3.2: Institutional aggregation 
 
The stock consistency requires the construction of balance sheets which are 
consistent with the flow of funds data. While the Reserve Bank provides balance 
sheet information for some institutions, it is impossible to link the balance sheet 
information to the flow of funds data as there is no consistency in terms of the 
financial instruments listed in the different tables. The quality of balance sheet 
information is a significant limitation to the framework that we present. This is a 
global problem which is highlighted by the G20 Data Gap Initiative.25  
We provide a short overview on our approach to constructing financial balance 
sheets. The building of balance sheets for institutions relies on flow of funds data 
from 1970 onwards and the balance sheet information available in the Quarterly 
                                                 
25 For more information of the G20 Data Gap Initiative see http://www.fsb.org/2016/09/second-
phase-of-the-g20-data-gaps-initiative-dgi-2-first-progress-report/ 
 
Foreign Sector SARB Financial Sector 
Foreign Sector; Monetary Authority; Other monetary institutions;   
Public Investment 
Corporation; Insurers and 
Retirement Funds;  Other 
Financial Institutions         
Government Non-financial Entreprises Households 
Central and Provincial 
Government;                   
Local Government; 
Public Sector;                 
Private Sector;
Households; 
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Bulletin published by the South African Reserve Bank. It is important to note that 
our institutional balance sheets deal only with financial instruments as consistent 
data on ownership of non-financial assets and liabilities is not available. Thus, our 
balance sheets are partial but consistent when it comes to financial assets and 
liabilities.   
The general approach followed is to add up the data from the flow of funds over the 
period 1970 to 2001. This calculates the stock of assets and liabilities accumulated 
over the period. While the values are smaller than the actual stock of assets and 
liabilities, they will be a good approximation as the values over the period 1970 to 
2001 should exceed by far the stock values prior to 1970. They should constitute 
most assets and liabilities accumulated. The approach is similar to the perpetual 
inventory method and resembles the method employed by Aron and Muellbauer 
(2006) and Aron, Muellbauer, and Prinsloo (2006). They estimate household wealth 
and balance sheets for South Africa.   
Our second step is to compare the values of stocks generated in the first step against 
the balance sheet information presented in the Quarterly Bulletin for some of the 
institutions. Generally, the approach using the flow of funds data generates stock 
variables, which are in line with the Quarterly Bulletin data for deposits and some 
of the loan variables, but significantly different for equities and bonds. This is due 
to the flow of funds data recording some transactions at book value and some at 
market value, creating a discrepancy between the balance sheets generated in the 
first step and the balance sheets presented in Quarterly Bulletin.  
A key challenge with the flow of funds data is that it does not distinguish between 
changes due to changes in the holding of units, changes due to changes in the price 
of the financial instrument and other changes. The second challenge is that the 
financial instruments in the flow of funds data are not directly comparable to the 
financial instruments used in the different balance sheets presented in the Quarterly 
Bulletin. More importantly, balance sheets are not produced for all institutions and 
there is no consistency in terms of the representation of financial instruments.  This 
requires that we create our own consistent financial balance sheets. 
In the next step, the data is updated with the balance sheet information from the 
Quarterly Bulletin where significant differences exist and it is reasonable to assume 
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that the differences are primarily because of uncaptured capital gain effects. The 
flow of funds data is applied to the updated balance sheet information for 2001 to 
generate balance sheet information for the period 2002 to 2012.  This approach 
guarantees that the balance sheet data generated over the period from 2002 to 2012 
links to the set of financial SAMs through the changes in assets and liabilities. The 
approach ensures consistency in stocks and flows. The data is aggregated following 
the matching in Table 3.1 and Table 3.2. The stock variables are not consolidated 
during the aggregation process – i.e. no netting out takes place. This is driven again 
by the absence of whom-to-whom accounts and the use of the same practice in the 
production, accumulation and distribution accounts. 
The balance sheet data from the Quarterly Bulletin is also compared to the balance 
sheets calculated using the flow of funds for 2012. Again, there are some 
discrepancies for some financial instruments, particularly equities. Despite these 
differences, no further changes are made to the balance sheet data calculated using 
the flow of funds data as this requires changes to the underlying net purchases of 
financial assets and liabilities. This will break the link with the financial SAMs and 
the savings and investment data and create flow and stock inconsistencies in our 
data set.  
The absence of separate price and quantity effects in the flow of funds data hinders 
the modelling of prices for financial instruments, particularly the prices of bonds 
and equities. We model only the equity price, which is based on the Johannesburg 
Stock Exchange all share index. The adjustment to the equity stocks follows the 
same approach as outlined by Aron and Muellbauer (2006).  This adjustment leads 
to equity stock values which are more in line with the balance sheet information 
from the Quarterly Bulletin. 
The two categories Amounts receivable/payable and Other assets/liabilities are 
grouped in a category labelled Other. These two items tend to generate large 
negative flows for some institutions, which persist over a long period of time. The 
behaviour of these flows reflects the current challenges with the flow of funds data, 
which are expected to be resolved as part of the G-20 Data Gap Initiative. We have 
chosen to treat the other category as a residual item, which is important to balance 
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the stocks and the financial macro SAMs, but it has no behavioural function in our 
model. 
Table 3.3 and Table 3.4 below provide a summary of the balance sheets generated 
through the process described above as well the assets and liabilities owned by the 
various institutions. While our aim is not to provide a detailed assessment of the 
balance sheet information, we need to highlight some trends. 26 
The largest compositional changes are experienced by the Reserve Bank as well the 
financial, non-financial and foreign sectors. For the Reserve Bank, the share of 
loans as part of assets and liabilities has declined while the share of cash and deposit 
liabilities has increased over the period 2001 to 2012. In the case of the financial 
and non-financial sector, there has been a notable increase in holding of equities as 
percentage of total assets and liabilities. This reflects price effects but also greater 
issuance of shares. The share of loans as assets on the balance sheet of non-financial 
institutions has been halved. The share of loans on the balance sheet of financial 
institutions is small – around 20 per cent. This reflects our aggregation approach, 
which groups other monetary institutions with all other financial institutions, thus 
diluting the share of total loans in overall assets. The share of equities has 
significantly increased in the foreign portfolio of residents. This reflects the 
relaxation of exchange controls, which has led to the increased purchases of equities 
by South African residents.  
Looking at the specific financial instruments in Table 3.4, the value of equities has 
seen the strongest growth over the period largely driven by a significant increase in 
the price.   
The financial sector has the largest share of equities on the asset and liability sides 
compared to other institutions. On the liability side, the share reflects our 
classification approach. Household interests in retirement and life funds were 
classified as part of the financial sector equity liability. This also explains the large 
equity ownership share of households. Household financial wealth is mainly in the 
form of interests in retirement and life funds, which accounted for almost 90 per 
cent of the total household financial assets in 2012. This reflects the South African 
                                                 
26 For more information on South Africa’s flow of funds data see Monyela and Madonsela (2015). 
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pension system, where individuals’ contributions to retirement annuities and 
pension funds during their working life are used to purchase pension upon 
retirement.    
The financial sector, as expected, holds almost all the cash and deposits in the 
economy on the liability side (92 per cent in 2012), in line with its intermediation 
function. The sector also holds a large share of the cash and deposits assets, 
followed by the non-financial sector and households.   
The largest holders of government bonds are the financial sector with close to 77 
per cent of all bonds, a share which has been stable over the period 2001 to 2012, 
and the foreign sector, whose share has doubled over the period. The foreign 
sector’s importance as funder to the domestic economy has increased significantly 
with the asset side increasing by more than 700 per cent. This reflects relaxation of 
capital controls, high global liquidity and low domestic savings. The 
disproportional increase in the liability side implies that depending on the rates of 
return on the asset and liability side and the exchange rate, the net dividend and 
interest income outflows are likely to remain large and contribute negatively to the 
current account.  
Loans are mainly provided by financial institutions, but also by non-financial 
enterprises and the foreign sector. Non-financial enterprises provide mainly trade 
loans and are also a large recipient of loans, along with households. For households, 
close of 50 per cent of their loan liability is in the form of mortgages, while for non-
financial institution the loan category is dominated by bank loans and advances.  
The Other category is negative for some institutions. This reflects the challenges 
with the flow of funds data, which were explained earlier. The Other category is 
used as an exogenous item. It is modelled endogenously only for the Reserve Bank 
and the Foreign Sector. Foreign reserves of the Reserve Bank are classified in the 
Other category. They are an asset for the Bank and a liability for the foreign sector. 
We described our modelling approach of the foreign currency reserves in the 
previous section. 
The data used for the econometric calibration of some of the coefficients is sourced 
from the Reserve Bank and it is also published in the Quarterly Bulletin. This is 
data on interest rates, growth rates and price indices.  
74 
 
 
 
Table 3.3: Composition of partial financial balance sheets of institutions 
  
Source: Own calculation based on South African Reserve Bank data 
 
 
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Cash and Deposits 0,1 43,7 14,0 36,5 48,9 0,0 34,7 1,2 26,3 0,1 10,5 13,7
Bonds 6,2 0,0 9,9 0,0 2,3 75,8 5,9 0,0 0,1 0,0 6,7 0,3
Equities 1,6 6,9 37,7 51,7 4,2 0,3 12,7 72,0 78,5 0,0 74,5 41,4
Loans 19,1 53,1 26,8 4,1 35,2 13,7 39,3 30,6 1,8 83,1 11,9 28,7
Other 73,0 -3,7 11,6 7,7 9,4 10,1 7,5 -3,8 -6,7 16,8 -3,6 15,8
Total (R million) 148 908 110 755 2 867 644 2 866 737 108 290 516 141 1 071 964 1 083 222 1 170 652 718 843 468 229 539 989
Cash and Deposits 4,2 75,8 16,1 29,4 99,9 0,0 31,4 0,1 13,7 0,0 2,4 0,2
Bonds 1,2 0,0 6,9 0,0 0,5 70,2 0,9 0,0 0,5 0,0 5,4 0,0
Equities 2,0 5,0 52,0 62,7 10,2 0,7 30,3 83,4 87,6 0,0 70,6 74,7
Loans 5,5 32,5 21,3 3,8 44,8 8,0 19,7 22,1 0,5 77,8 13,9 10,0
Other 87,1 -13,3 3,7 4,1 -55,4 21,1 17,6 -5,6 -2,2 22,2 7,7 15,2
Total (R million) 502 472 462 685 13 296 904 14 603 042 504 817 1 698 866 3 044 478 6 879 223 6 858 709 2 141 453 3 862 913 2 285 463
% change 237,4 317,8 363,7 409,4 366,2 229,1 184,0 535,1 485,9 197,9 725,0 323,2
Reserve Bank Financial institutions Non-financial institutions Households
year 2001 (% of total)
 year 2012 (% of total)
Rest of the WorldGovernments
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Table 3.4: Ownership of financial instruments 
 
Source: Own calculation based on South African Reserve Bank data 
3.4 Calibration 
In this section, we explain our calibration strategy and we present the value of the 
coefficients. 
The data used is a series of financial Social Accounting Matrices over the period 
2002 to 2012 and National Accounts data for South Africa. The data sources are 
discussed in the previous section. 
The derivation of the scale and share parameters for the Armington and CET 
functions follows the standard approach in CGE models as described by Condon, 
Dahl, and Devarajan (1987). We use 2002 as the base year, but we also compare 
the values of coefficients and ratios using later years. There are several coefficients, 
which are calibrated directly from the base year macro SAM. These include tax 
rates, various share parameters and the relationship between intermediate inputs 
and value added. Prices such as PQ, PEQ and the exchange rate are set to one in the 
first quarter of 2002.  The financial balance sheets for 2002 are used with the base 
year SAM to generate coefficients which link economic behaviour to the holding 
of stocks. For example, these include the parameters 𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑠,𝑙 (in the loan demand 
function) and 𝛼𝑖𝑙,𝑐𝑑 (in the cash and deposit function). The values of all coefficients 
are listed below in Table 3.5. 
The substitution elasticities are based on the recent analysis by Kreuser, Burger, 
and Rankin (2015) and Saikkonen (2015). The two studies provide substitution 
elasticities for several sectors. Our factor substitution elasticity is in the lower range 
Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities Assets Liabilities
Reserve Bank 0,1 0,3 0,0 6,3 2,1 4,4 2,3 0,0 25,0 -1,0
Financial Institutions 43,4 59,4 34,0 88,4 57,6 8,8 72,6 0,0 76,3 51,0
Government 0,2 0,1 4,5 0,0 2,9 5,3 0,6 99,6 2,3 12,0
Non-financial 
institutions
5,5 31,3 31,4 1,1 31,6 24,9 16,1 0,0 18,4 -9,5
Households 36,9 0,0 26,0 0,1 1,6 44,9 0,4 0,0 -18,1 27,7
Rest of the Word 14,0 9,0 4,1 6,3 4,2 11,6 8,0 0,4 -3,8 19,6
Total (R million) 2 493 277 2 493 277 1 183 143 1 183 143 1 331 370 1 331 370 392 842 392 842 435 055 435 055
Reserve Bank 0,1 0,1 0,5 7,5 0,6 3,5 0,5 0,0 22,4 -4,6
Financial Institutions 41,5 55,0 46,1 92,2 66,5 13,0 76,9 0,0 37,0 45,1
Government 0,3 0,1 10,8 0,0 5,3 3,2 0,2 100,0 -20,9 26,9
Non-financial 
institutions
5,6 34,5 20,5 0,2 14,1 35,7 2,2 0,0 40,2 -28,9
Households 36,1 0,0 20,1 0,0 0,7 39,2 2,8 0,0 -11,4 35,6
Rest of the Word 16,4 10,3 2,0 0,1 12,6 5,3 17,4 0,0 22,4 26,0
Total (R million) 16 629 425 16 629 425 4 659 809 4 659 809 4 253 065 4 253 065 1 192 420 1 192 420 1 335 574 1 335 574
% change 567,0 567,0 293,9 293,9 219,5 219,5 203,5 203,5 207,0 207,0
 year 2001 (% of total)
year 2012 (% of total)
Equities Cash and Deposits Loans Bonds Other
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of those provided by Kreuser, Burger, and Rankin (2015), in line with the short-
term nature of our framework. Our Armington elasticity is 0.5, while our CET 
elasticity is 0.2. Saikkonen (2015) finds that the Armington elasticities vary 
between 0.39 to 1.38. We assume a low CET elasticity consistent with available 
evidence on limited export response to exchange rate shifts. 
A key challenge with our model is that many of the coefficients related to financial 
behaviour are not available for South Africa. This is a large area for future research. 
Our strategy here is to utilise coefficients generated by other studies, bearing in 
mind the limitations of this approach, or to get some sense of the relationship 
through simple econometric estimates, which are further calibrated in the model to 
generate a consistent baseline. 
The coefficients for the asset demand function are based on those used by Godley 
(1996) and Godley and Lavoie (2007). The coefficients reflect the stronger response 
of equity and bonds to changes in relative prices. The 𝜆i0 coefficients, which reflect 
the initial shares, are calibrated using our balance sheet data for 2002.  
An econometric approach is used to generate priors for several elasticities. These 
include the elasticities in the equation for the reserve ratio, the elasticities 𝜇𝑙 and 
𝜇𝑐𝑑 in the demand for loans and cash and deposits equation as well as 𝛼1
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑓
 and 
𝛼2
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑓
 in the equation defining the output gap specification.  The priors are 
manually adjusted so that the model generates a consistent baseline. 
Steady state growth rates reflect average values for the period from 2002 to 2012 
using quarterly annualised data. The growth of the labour force represents the 
average quarterly labour force growth in South Africa. Growth in government 
consumption expenditure and total factor productivity is calibrated similarly. The 
inflation target is assumed to be six per cent in line with the upper bound of the 
inflation target and the level of inflation expectations by trade unions and 
businesses, which appear to be stuck at that level. 
Finally, several exogenous variables are fixed to the baseline year. These include 
foreign savings, income generated by non-residents, foreign income generated by 
residents, interest income on the liabilities of the foreign sector, the bond and cash 
and deposit liabilities of the foreign sector as well as foreign currency prices of 
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South African exports and imports. Exogenising these variables and fixing them to 
the base year values reduces the complexity of the model and eliminates the shocks 
that may come from their changing values.  
Table 3.5: Exogenous parameters 
 
   
𝛼1
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑙
 
𝛼1
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑘
 
Responsiveness of the 
demand for factors of 
production to real loan 
rates  
0.45 
0.40 
𝜇𝑙 Responsiveness of the 
demand for loans to 
changes in the real 
borrowing costs 
-5 
𝛼2
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑙
 
𝛼2
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑘
 
Responsiveness of the 
demand for factors of 
production to aggregate 
demand  
0.35 
0.3 
𝜇1
𝑝𝑒𝑞
 Responsiveness of 
equity prices to 
inflation expectations 
0.55 
𝛼𝑚𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑐𝑑 Demand for cash and 
deposits as share of 
income – government 
sector 
0.13 𝜇2
𝑝𝑒𝑞
 Responsiveness of 
equity prices to money 
supply 
0.2 
𝛼𝑚ℎℎ𝑑,𝑐𝑑 Demand for cash and 
deposits as share of 
income – household 
0.34 𝜇3
𝑝𝑒𝑞
 Responsiveness of 
equity prices to 
economic activity 
0.33 
𝛼𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑐𝑑 Demand for cash and 
deposits as share of 
income – nonfinancial 
sector 
1.16 𝜇2
𝑟𝑐𝑑 Coefficient in the cash 
and deposit rate 
equation 
0.6 
𝛼𝑐𝑏,𝑙 Demand for loans as 
share of income -
Reserve Bank 
12.7 𝜆𝑏,0
𝑓𝑖𝑛
 
𝜆𝑏,0
𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤  
 
Tobin demand 
coefficient showing the 
steady state share of 
bonds in total wealth 
(𝑓𝑖𝑛 -financial sector, 
𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤 -foreign sector) 
0.22 
0.18 
𝛼𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑙 Demand for loans as 
share of income -
financial sector 
0.31 𝜆𝑒𝑞,0
𝑓𝑖𝑛
 
𝜆𝑒𝑞,0
𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤  
Tobin demand 
coefficient showing the 
steady state share of 
equities in total wealth  
0.52 
0.73 
𝛼𝑚𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑙 Demand for loans as 
share of income -
government sector 
0.25 𝜆𝑐𝑑,0
𝑓𝑖𝑛
 
𝜆𝑐𝑑,0
𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤  
Tobin demand 
coefficient showing the 
steady state share of 
cash and deposits in 
total wealth  
0.26 
0.1 
𝛼𝑚ℎℎ𝑑,𝑙 Demand for loans as 
share of income -
household sector 
0.61 𝜆𝑏,1
𝑓𝑖𝑛
 
𝜆𝑏,1
𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤  
Tobin demand 
coefficient -
responsiveness of bond 
to changes in the bond 
return  
1.99 
1.99 
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𝛼𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤,𝑙 Demand for loans as 
share of GDP -foreign 
sector 
0.12 𝜆𝑏,2
𝑓𝑖𝑛
 
𝜆𝑏,2
𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤  
Tobin demand 
coefficient -
responsiveness of bond 
to changes in the 
equity return  
-1.6 
-1.6 
 
𝛼𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑙 Demand for loans as 
share of income -non-
financial sector 
1.26 𝜆𝑏,3
𝑓𝑖𝑛
 
𝜆𝑏,3
𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤  
Tobin demand 
coefficient -
responsiveness of bond 
to changes in the cash 
and deposit return  
-0.2 
-0.2 
 
𝛼𝑝 Production function 
shift parameter (base 
year) 
0.84 𝜆𝑏,4
𝑓𝑖𝑛
 
𝜆𝑏,4
𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤  
Tobin demand 
coefficient -
responsiveness of bond 
to changes in 
transactional demand 
for money 
0 
0 
𝛼𝑚 Import function shift 
parameter 
1.32 𝜆𝑒𝑞,1
𝑓𝑖𝑛
 
𝜆𝑒𝑞,1
𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤  
Tobin demand 
coefficient -
responsiveness of 
equity to changes in 
the bond return  
-1.3 
-1.3 
 
𝛼𝑡 Export function shift 
parameter 
5.55 𝜆𝑒𝑞,2
𝑓𝑖𝑛
 
𝜆𝑒𝑞,2
𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤  
Tobin demand 
coefficient -
responsiveness of 
equity to changes in 
the equity return  
1.6 
1.6 
 
𝛽𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜 Responsiveness of the 
financial sector reserve 
ratio to changes in the 
repo rate 
15.3 𝜆𝑒𝑞,3
𝑓𝑖𝑛
 
𝜆𝑒𝑞,3
𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤  
Tobin demand 
coefficient -
responsiveness of 
equity to changes in 
the cash and deposit 
return  
-0.6 
-0.6 
 
𝛽1
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜
 Responsiveness of the 
supply of loans to 
changes in the repo rate 
-0.7 𝜆𝑒𝑞,4
𝑓𝑖𝑛
 
𝜆𝑒𝑞,4
𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤  
Tobin demand 
coefficient -
responsiveness of 
equity to changes in 
transactional demand 
for money 
-
0.001 
-
0.001 
𝛽2
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜
 Taylor rule coefficient 
on inflation  
2.0 𝜆𝑐𝑑,1
𝑓𝑖𝑛
 
𝜆𝑐𝑑,1
𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤  
Tobin demand 
coefficient -
responsiveness of cash 
and deposit to changes 
in the bond return  
-0.66 
-0.66 
𝛽3
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜
 Taylor rule coefficient 
on the output gap 
0.3 𝜆𝑐𝑑,2
𝑓𝑖𝑛
 
𝜆𝑐𝑑,2
𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤  
Tobin demand 
coefficient -
responsiveness of cash 
and deposit to changes 
in the equity return  
-0.04 
-0.04 
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𝛽𝑠𝑎 Responsiveness of the 
financial sector reserve 
ratio to changes in the 
growth rate of financial 
assets 
-0.1 𝜆𝑐𝑑,3
𝑓𝑖𝑛
 
𝜆𝑐𝑑,3
𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤  
Tobin demand 
coefficient -
responsiveness of cash 
and deposit to changes 
in the cash and deposit 
return  
0.7 
0.7 
 
𝛾1
𝐼 Steady state growth rate 
of investment  
1.04 𝜆𝑐𝑑,4
𝑓𝑖𝑛
 
𝜆𝑐𝑑,4
𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤  
Tobin demand 
coefficient -
responsiveness of cash 
and deposit to changes 
in transactional 
demand for money 
0.001 
0.001 
𝛾2
𝐼  Responsiveness of 
investment by the non-
financial sector to the 
Tobin Q term   
0.14 𝜎𝑐𝑑  Growth of cash and 
deposit liabilities of 
the Reserve Bank 
coefficient  
0.027 
𝛾3
𝐼  Responsiveness of 
investment to the real 
loan rate  
-0.9 𝑔𝑟𝑔 Government 
consumption growth 
rate 
0.026 
𝛿 Capital depreciation 
rate  
0.5 𝑖𝑛𝑓 Inflation target (steady 
state inflation) 
0.06 
𝛿𝑝 Production function 
share parameter 
0.0001 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎 Quantity of aggregate 
intermediate input per 
output. 
0.06 
𝛿𝑞 Import function share 
parameter 
0.03 𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡 Quantity of aggregate 
output per value added. 
0.44 
𝛿𝑡 Export function share 
parameter 
0.99 𝑙𝑑𝑚𝑔𝑜𝑣  
𝑙𝑑𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤  
𝑙𝑑𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛 
 
           
Share of wealth 
provided as loans for 
the non-financial, 
government and 
foreign sectors 
0.421 
0.065 
0.385 
𝜃𝑝 Responsiveness of price 
expectation to 
deviations of expected 
prices from actual 
prices in the previous 
period 
0.2 𝑙𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤 share of foreign loan 
and equity liability as 
percentage of GDP 
0.18 
𝜃1
𝑝𝑞
 Responsiveness of 
prices to changes in the 
output gap 
1.5 𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑛  
𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛  
Steady state savings 
rate 
0.07 
0.44 
𝜃2
𝑝𝑞
 Responsiveness of 
prices to changes in 
import prices 
0.5 𝑜𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑚𝑓𝑖𝑛 
𝑜𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑚𝑚ℎℎ𝑑  
𝑜𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑔𝑜𝑣  
𝑜𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑚𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤 
𝑜𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑚𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛 
Other income paid as 
share of GDP 
0.15 
0.04 
0.01 
0.001 
0.01 
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𝜃𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑒  Responsiveness of price 
expectations to the 
output gap 
0.3 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑓𝑖𝑛  
𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑚ℎℎ𝑑  
𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑔𝑜𝑣  
𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤  
𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛  
Share of other income 
received 
0.23 
0.68 
0.01 
0.03 
0.06 
 
𝜌𝑙𝑎𝑏  Labour force growth 0.01 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑠𝑜𝑐
𝑓𝑖𝑛 
𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑚ℎℎ𝑑  
𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑚𝑔𝑜𝑣  
Share of social 
contributions received 
0.51 
0.46 
0.03 
𝜌𝑝 Production function 
substitution elasticity 
-1 𝑠𝑜𝑐_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑓𝑖𝑛 
𝑠𝑜𝑐_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑚ℎℎ𝑑  
𝑠𝑜𝑐_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑚𝑔𝑜𝑣  
𝑠𝑜𝑐_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛 
Social contributions 
paid as a share of GDP 
0.05 
0.09 
0.03 
0.004 
𝜌𝑞 Import function 
substitution elasticity 
1 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑞  Steady state growth in 
equity prices 
0.03 
𝜌𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜 Interest rate smoothing 
coefficient 
0.7 𝑡𝑎 Activity tax rate 
 
0.009 
𝜌𝑡 Export function 
substitution elasticity 
11 𝑡𝑑 Personal direct tax rate 0.009 
𝜇𝑐𝑑  Responsiveness of the 
demand for cash and 
deposits to changes in 
the real return  
0.2 𝑡𝑚 Import tariff rate 0.027 
𝜇 𝑓𝑤 Target real growth rate 
for household wealth 
0.15 𝑡𝑠 Sales tax rate 0.038 
      
 
We move next to discuss the baseline that our model generates.   
3.5 Model Baseline 
In Figure 3.4, we present the model-generated baseline, given the choice of values 
for the coefficients and the set of exogenous variables. The set of initial conditions 
implies that inflation is rising at the beginning of the baseline period. This causes 
the repo rate, through the Taylor specification in equation 34, to increase, which in 
turn affects the lending rate. The higher rates reduce investment and consumption 
growth, which slows down overall GDP growth. The slowdown in the economy 
affects the willingness of banks to hold reserves through equation 25. The reserve 
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ratio initially increases because of the higher repo rate. As the slowdown in 
economic activity also affects the growth in financial sector asset, this increases the 
willingness of the sector to hold reserves and puts additional pressure on the reserve 
ratio. The economic cycle affects probabilities of default, valuations and the 
perception of risk, which changes the financial sector willingness to hold reserves.  
The slower pace of economic activity also affects the household creation of equity 
assets.  As the economy slows down and inflationary pressures decrease, the policy 
rates along with other interest rates start to fall. This provides support to aggregate 
demand, which accelerates. With greater economic activity, financial activity also 
accelerates supported by falling willingness of the financial sector to hold reserves 
and lower lending spreads. Stronger economic activity and growth in money supply 
support equity growth through equation 17, which supports wealth creation.   The 
growth in loans is in line with GDP growth and falling lending rates.  As the loan 
rate starts to rise, lending slows down and the GDP growth rate moderates.   
The quarterly growth rates for aggregate demand variables are on average in the 
region of 1.5 to 2 per cent higher than the actual growth rates achieved. This reflects 
that some of the key variables are kept fixed and exogenous.  The model achieves 
stability in the output gap and the reserve ratio to the extent that these as well other 
variables tend oscillate around a trend path. This represents the steady state of the 
model.  The system is driven by a mechanism that ensure that the model framework 
always tries to converge to an output gap of zero. It always oscillates around an 
output gap of zero, similar to real economies. The steady state dynamics are 
different to current DSGE models, which return to constant steady state growth 
rates.  A shock to the system shifts the cycle. The steady state is achieved through 
a set of dynamic equations and parameters, which represent steady state growth 
rates. The key equations are 25 (Reserve Ratio), 34 (Taylor rule) and 46 (Capacity 
Utilisation).  Parameters include the steady state growth rate in aggregate demand 
∆𝑎𝑑, government consumption expenditure 𝑔𝑟𝑔
𝑡
, labour force growth rate 𝜌𝑙𝑎𝑏  and 
the steady state growth in equity prices 𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑞.  The sets of equations and parameters 
ensure that deviation from potential growth are corrected and capital and labour 
grow at similar rates in the baseline, keeping relative prices constant.  
82 
 
Figure 3.4: Baseline Path 
 
Source: Model simulation 
In the next three chapters, we illustrate the properties of our model by applying it 
to our three research questions.  
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3.6 Appendix:  Detailed model representation 
Indices  
𝑓 Factors (labor and capital) incb Agents (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛 ⊂ 𝑖 
)- all sectors except 
the central bank. 
fi Financial instruments (cash 
and deposits(cd), bonds(b), 
equities(e), loans (l) and 
other financial 
instruments(oa)) 
infin Agents (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛 ⊂ 𝑖 
)- all sectors except 
the non-financial 
sector. 
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑏 Financial instruments 
(𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑏 ⊂ 𝑓𝑖 ) - all except 
bonds. 
ing Agents (𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛 ⊂ 𝑖 
)- all sectors except 
government. 
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑡 Financial instruments 
(𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑏 ⊂ 𝑓𝑖 ) – interest 
bearing. 
ins Agents (𝑖𝑛𝑠 ⊂ 𝑖 )- 
households, 
financial and non-
financial sectors 
𝑖 Agents (households(h), 
financial sector(fin), non-
financial sector(nfin), 
government(gov), reserve 
bank (rb), the rest of the 
world (row) 
insd Agents (𝑖𝑛𝑠 ⊂ 𝑖 )- 
domestic sectors 
ifin Agents (𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑛 ⊂ 𝑖 )- all 
sectors except the financial 
sector. 
it Agents (𝑖𝑡 ⊂ 𝑖 )- 
financial and 
foreign sectors 
𝑖𝑖 Agents (𝑖𝑖 ⊂ 𝑖 ) financial 
and non-financial sectors 
le Financial 
instruments (𝑙𝑒 ⊂
𝑓𝑖 )- loans and 
equities 
il Agents (𝑖𝑙 ⊂ 𝑖 )- 
households, the non-
financial sector and 
government 
  
in  Agents (𝑖𝑛 ⊂ 𝑖 )- the non-
financial and foreign 
sectors and government 
𝑡 Time periods 
Exogenous parameters   
𝛼1
𝑔𝑎𝑝
 Responsiveness of the 
demand for factors of 
production to real loan rates  
𝜇3
𝑝𝑒𝑞
 Responsiveness of 
equity prices to 
economic activity 
𝛼2
𝑔𝑎𝑝
 Responsiveness of the 
demand for factors of 
production to aggregate 
demand  
𝜇𝑐𝑑 Responsiveness of 
the demand for 
cash and deposits 
to changes in the 
real return  
𝛼𝑖,𝑐𝑑  Demand for cash and 
deposits as share of income  
𝜆𝑓𝑖,𝑓𝑖
𝑖𝑡  Coefficients 
describing the 
responsiveness of 
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the demand for 
assets for the 
foreign and 
financial sectors to 
changes in asset 
returns.  
𝛼𝑖,𝑙  Demand for loans as share 
of income or GDP for the 
foreign sector 
𝜎𝑐𝑑  Growth of cash 
and deposit 
liabilities  
𝛼𝑝 Production function shift 
parameter 
𝑑𝑣𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑝𝑎𝑟 Translation key for 
dividend income 
𝛼𝑚 Import function shift 
parameter 
𝑔𝑟𝑔 Government 
consumption 
growth rate 
𝛼𝑡 Export function shift 
parameter 
𝑖𝑛𝑓 Inflation target 
(steady state 
inflation) 
𝛽 Discount factor for 
household consumption 
𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎 Quantity of 
aggregate 
intermediate input 
per output. 
𝛽𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜 Responsiveness of the 
financial sector reserve 
ratio to changes in the repo 
rate 
𝑖𝑛𝑣 Change in 
inventories 
𝛽1
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜
 Responsiveness of the 
supply of loans to changes 
in the repo rate 
𝑖𝑣𝑎𝑡 Quantity of 
aggregate output 
per value added. 
𝛽2
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜
 Taylor rule coefficient on 
inflation  
𝑙𝑑 Share of wealth 
provided as loans 
for the non-
financial, 
government and 
foreign sectors 
𝛽3
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜
 Taylor rule coefficient on 
the output gap 
𝑙𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤 share of foreign 
loan and equity 
liability as 
percentage of GDP 
𝛽𝑠𝑎 Responsiveness of the 
financial sector reserve 
ratio to changes in the 
growth rate of financial 
assets 
𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑟 Steady state 
savings rate 
𝛾1
𝐼 Steady state growth rate of 
investment  
𝑚𝑝𝑠01 0-1 parameter with 
1 for institutions, 
which marginal 
propensity to save 
adjusts 
𝛾2
𝐼  Responsiveness of 
investment by the non-
𝑛𝑡
𝑖
 Net change in 
capital transfers 
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financial sector to the Tobin 
Q term   
𝛾3
𝐼  Responsiveness of 
investment to the real loan 
rate  
𝑜𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑚 Other income paid 
as share of GDP 
𝛿 Capital depreciation rate  𝑝𝑤𝑒 World export price 
𝛿𝑝 Production function share 
parameter 
𝑝𝑤𝑚 World import price 
𝛿𝑞 Import function share 
parameter 
𝑟 Statistical residual 
𝛿𝑡 Export function share 
parameter 
𝑟𝑒𝑠 Foreign currency 
reserves 
𝜃𝑝 Responsiveness of price 
expectation to deviations of 
expected prices from actual 
prices in the previous 
period 
𝑠𝑎 Stock of other 
assets excluding 
reserves 
𝜃1
𝑝𝑞
 Responsiveness of prices to 
changes in the output gap 
𝑠𝑙 Stock of equity 
liabilities of the 
financial sector 
other than interests 
in retirement and 
life funds 
𝜃2
𝑝𝑞
 Responsiveness of prices to 
changes in import prices 
𝑠𝑙𝑟 Other than reserve 
liabilities for the 
foreign sector 
𝜃𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑒  Responsiveness of price 
expectations to the output 
gap 
𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑡 Share of interest 
income 
𝜌𝑙𝑎𝑏  Labour force growth 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡 Share of other 
income 
𝜌𝑝 Production function 
substitution elasticity 
𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑠𝑜𝑐 Share of social 
contributions 
received 
𝜌𝑞 Import function substitution 
elasticity 
𝑠ℎ𝑟 Share of interest 
income 
𝜌𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜 Interest rate smoothing 
coefficient 
𝑠𝑜𝑐_𝑝𝑎𝑟 Social 
contributions paid 
as a share of GDP 
𝜌𝑡 Export function substitution 
elasticity 
𝑠𝑠𝑝𝑒𝑞  Steady state 
growth in equity 
prices 
𝜇𝑐𝑑  Responsiveness of the 
demand for cash and 
deposits to changes in the 
real return  
𝑡𝑎 Activity tax rate 
 
𝜇 𝑓𝑤 Target real growth rate for 
household wealth 
𝑡𝑑 Personal direct tax 
rate 
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𝜇𝑙 Responsiveness of the 
demand for loans to 
changes in the real 
borrowing costs 
𝑡𝑚 Import tariff rate 
𝜇1
𝑝𝑒𝑞
 Responsiveness of equity 
prices to inflation 
𝑡𝑠 Sales tax rate 
𝜇2
𝑝𝑒𝑞
 Responsiveness of equity 
prices to money supply 
𝑦𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑤 factor income 
payments to the 
foreign sector 
𝜇2
𝑟𝑐𝑑 Coefficient in the cash and 
deposit rate equation 
𝑦𝑓𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤 factor income 
received from the 
foreign sector 
Endogenous 
variables 
   
𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆 Stock of assets 𝑁𝑂𝐼 Net other income 
inflows 
𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵 Stock of liabilities 𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑇 Net interest income 
inflows 
𝑑_𝑎𝑠_𝑏 Change in the stock of 
bonds (assets) 
𝑁𝑊 Net wealth of 
institutions 
𝑑_𝑎𝑠_𝑐𝑑 Change in the stock of cash 
and deposits (assets) 
𝑂𝐼 Other income 
𝑑_𝑎𝑠_𝑒 Change in the stock of 
equities (assets) 
𝑂𝐼𝑃 Other payments 
𝑑_𝑎𝑠_𝑙 Change in the stock of 
loans (assets) 
𝑃𝐴 Aggregate sector 
output price 
𝑑_𝑎𝑠_𝑜𝑎 Change in the stock of 
other (assets) 
𝑃𝐷 Domestic supply 
price with margin 
𝑑_𝑙𝑖𝑏_𝑏 Change in the stock of 
bonds(liabilities) 
𝑃𝐸 Export price 
𝑑_𝑙𝑖𝑏_𝑐𝑑 Change in the stock of cash 
and deposits (liabilities) 
𝑃𝐸𝑄 Equity price 
𝑑_𝑙𝑖𝑏_𝑒 Change in the stock of 
equities (liabilities) 
𝑃𝑀 Import price 
𝑑_𝑙𝑖𝑏_𝑙 Change in the stock of 
loans (liabilities) 
𝑃𝑄 Composite supply 
price 
𝑑_𝑙𝑖𝑏_𝑜𝑎 Change in the stock of 
other (liabilities) 
𝑃𝑅𝐶 Price including 
sales taxes 
𝐷𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐵 Bond rate-adjustment factor  𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑑 Inflation 
𝐷𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐷 Cash and deposit rate-
adjustment factor  
𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑒 Expected prices 
𝐷𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐿 Loan rate-adjustment factor  𝑃𝑉𝐴 Composite value-
added price 
𝐷𝑉𝐷 Dividend income 𝑄𝐴 Aggregate output 
quantity 
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𝐷𝑉𝐷𝐶𝑂𝐸𝐹 Share of dividend income 𝑄𝐷 Domestic supply 
quantity 
𝐷𝑉𝐷𝐹𝐼𝑁 Dividends paid by the 
financial sector 
𝑄𝐸 Export quantity 
𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑃 Dividends paid  𝑄𝐹 Factor demand 
𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑊 Dividends paid by the 
foreign sector 
𝑄𝐹𝑆 Factor supply 
𝐸𝑋𝑅 Exchange rate 𝑄𝐺 Government 
consumption 
quantity 
𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑇 Interest income paid to the 
rest of the world  
𝑄𝐻 Household 
consumption 
quantity 
𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐵 Bond rate  𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴 Intermediate input                
𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐷 Cash and deposit rate  𝑄𝑀 Import quantity 
𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐿 Loan rate  𝑄𝑄 Composite supply 
quantity 
𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂 Repo rate  𝑄𝑉𝐴 Composite value-
added quantity 
𝐹𝑊 Financial wealth  𝑅𝑅 Reserve ratio 
𝐹𝑊1 Real financial wealth  𝑆𝐴𝑉 Savings of agents 
𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑃 Factor demand adjustment 
factor (proxy for output 
gap)  
𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐹 Foreign savings 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑃 Real GDP 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑃 Social 
contributions paid 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐼𝑁𝐶𝑇 Interest income  𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅 Income from social 
contribution 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷 Real interest expenditure 
bonds 
𝑈 Household Utility 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑃1 Real interest expenditure 𝑊𝐹 Economy-wide 
factor return 
𝐼𝑁𝑉 Investment 𝑌𝐹 Total factor 
income 
𝑀𝑃𝑆 Marginal propensity to save 𝑌𝐼 Real agent income 
𝑁𝐷𝑉𝐷 Net dividend inflows 𝑌𝐼𝐹 Factor income 
    
 
Prices and interest rates  
𝑃𝑀𝑡 = 𝑝𝑤𝑚𝑡 ∙ (1 + 𝑡𝑚𝑡) ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 A1 
𝑃𝐸𝑡 = 𝑝𝑤𝑒𝑡 ∙ (1 − 𝑡𝑒𝑡) ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 A2 
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𝑃𝑄𝑡 = (1 + 𝑖𝑛𝑓) ∙ 𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝜃1
𝑝𝑞 ∙ (𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡−1
𝑙 − 1) + 𝜃2
𝑝𝑞 ∙ ∆𝑃𝑀𝑡 A3 
𝑃𝑄
𝑡
∙ 𝑄𝑄
𝑡
= 𝑃𝐷𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐷𝑡 + 𝑃𝑀𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝑀𝑡 A4 
𝑃𝐴𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐴𝑡 = 𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐷𝑡 + 𝑃𝐸𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐸𝑡 A5 
𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 = (1 + 𝑡𝑠𝑡) ∙ 𝑃𝑄𝑡 A6 
𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑑𝑡 = ∆𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 A7 
𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡
𝑒 = (1 + 𝑖𝑛𝑓)  ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡−1
𝑒 − 𝜃𝑝 ∙ (𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡−1
𝑒 − 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡−1) + 𝜃
𝑝𝑟𝑐𝑒 ∙ (𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡−1
𝑙 −
1)               A8 
𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡 = ((1 + 𝑠𝑠
𝑝𝑒𝑞) ∙ (1 + 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑑𝑡
𝑒)𝜇1
𝑝𝑒𝑞
∙ (∆𝑆𝐿𝑡
𝑓𝑖𝑛_𝑐𝑑)𝜇2
𝑝𝑒𝑞
∙ (∆𝑄𝐴𝑡)
𝜇3
𝑝𝑒𝑞
) ∙ 𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡−1 
A9 
𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑡 = 0.7 ∙ 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑡−1 + 0.3 ∙ (𝑖𝑛𝑓 + 2.0 ∙ (𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑑𝑡 − 𝑖𝑛𝑓) + 0.35
∙ (𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡−1
𝑙 ))      
A10 
𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐵𝑡 = 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 𝐷𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐵𝑡  A11 
𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑡 = 0.6 ∙ 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 0.4 ∙ 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐿𝑡 A12 
𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐿𝑡 = 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑡 + 𝐷𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐿𝑡  A13 
Production and trade   
𝑄𝑉𝐴
𝑐𝑠𝑡
= 𝛼𝑐𝑠𝑡
𝑝
∙ ∑ (𝛿𝑓𝑐𝑠
𝑝
∙ 𝑄𝐹
𝑓𝑐𝑠𝑡
−𝜌𝑐𝑠
𝑝
)
−1 𝜌𝑐𝑠
𝑝⁄
𝑓
 A14 
𝑊𝐹𝑓𝑡 = 𝑃𝑉𝐴𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝑉𝐴𝑡 ∙ ∑ (𝛿𝑓
𝑝
∙ 𝑄𝐹
𝑓𝑡
−𝜌𝑝)
−1
∙ 𝛿𝑓
𝑝
∙ 𝑄𝐹
𝑓𝑡
−𝜌𝑝−1
𝑓′
 A15 
𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴
𝑡
= 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑎 ∙ 𝑄𝐴
𝑡
 A16 
𝑄𝑉𝐴
𝑡
+ 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴
𝑡
= 𝑄𝐴
𝑡
 A17 
𝑄𝐴
𝑡
= 𝛼𝑡 ∙ (𝛿𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐸
𝑡
𝜌𝑡 + (1 − 𝛿𝑡) ∙ 𝑄𝐷
𝑡
𝜌𝑡)
1 𝜌𝑡⁄
 A18 
𝑄𝐸
𝑡
𝑄𝐷
𝑡
= (
𝑃𝐸𝑡
𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑡
∙
(1 − 𝛿𝑡)
𝛿𝑡
)
1 (𝜌𝑡−1)⁄
 A19 
𝑄𝑄
𝑡
= 𝛼𝑞 ∙ (𝛿𝑞 ∙ 𝑄𝑀
𝑡
−𝜌𝑞 + (1 − 𝛿𝑞) ∙ 𝑄𝐷
𝑡
−𝜌𝑞)
−1 𝜌𝑡⁄
 A20 
𝑄𝑀
𝑡
𝑄𝐷
𝑡
= (
𝑃𝐷𝐷𝑡
𝑃𝑀𝑡
∙
(1 − 𝛿𝑞)
𝛿𝑞
)
1 (1+𝜌𝑡)⁄
 A21 
Incomes and expenditures  
𝑌𝐹𝑓𝑡 = 𝑊𝐹𝑓𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐹𝑓𝑡 + 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 ∙ 𝑦𝑓𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡 A22 
𝑌𝐼𝐹𝑓𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑖 ∙ (𝑌𝐹𝑓𝑡 − 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 ∙ 𝑦𝑓𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑡)  
𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = (1 − 𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝑖𝑖) ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝑖𝑖 − 𝑆𝐶𝑡
𝑖𝑖 − 𝑂𝐼𝑃𝑡
𝑖𝑖 − 𝐼𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡
𝑖𝑖 − 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝑖𝑖  A23 
𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑃1𝑡
𝑖
= 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐿𝑡−1 ∙ 𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡−1
𝑖,𝑙 + 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑡−1 ∙ 𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡−1
𝑖,𝑐𝑑
+ 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑡
𝑖  
A24 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑡
𝑖 = 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐵𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑑_𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑡−1
𝑖,𝑏  + 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑃𝐵𝑂𝑁𝐷𝑡−1
𝑖  A25 
89 
 
𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑡
𝑖 = 𝐷𝑉𝐷𝐶𝑂𝐸𝐹𝑡
𝑖 ∙ (∑ 𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑃𝑡
𝑖𝑖
𝑖𝑖
+ 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 ∙ 𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑅𝑂𝑊𝑡)  A26 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝑖 = 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐸𝐹𝑡
𝑖 ∙ ∑ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑃1𝑡
𝑖
𝑖
         A27 
𝑂𝐼𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑖 ∙  ∑ 𝑂𝐼𝑃𝑡
𝑖
𝑖
     A28 
𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑠ℎ𝑖𝑓𝑜𝑠𝑜𝑐𝑖 ∙  ∑ 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑃𝑡
𝑖
𝑖
     A29 
𝑂𝐼𝑃𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑜𝑖𝑝𝑝𝑟𝑚𝑖 ∙  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑃𝑡−1     A30 
𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑃𝑡
𝑖 = 𝑠𝑜𝑐_𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖 ∙  𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑃𝑡−1     A31 
𝐷𝑉𝐷𝐶𝑂𝐸𝐹𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑑 = 𝑑𝑣𝑑𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑑 ∙  
𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡−1
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑑,𝑒
∑ 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡−1
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑑,𝑒
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑑
 A32 
𝐷𝑉𝐷𝐶𝑂𝐸𝐹𝑡
𝑟𝑜𝑤 = 1 − ∑ 𝐷𝑉𝐷𝐶𝑂𝐸𝐹𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑑
𝑖𝑠𝑛𝑑
 A33 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐸𝐹𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑑 = 𝑖𝑛𝑡𝑐𝑜𝑒𝑓𝑝𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑑 ∙  
∑ 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡−1
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑑,𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑡
∑ 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡−1
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑑,𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑡
𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑡,𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑑
 A34 
𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐸𝐹𝑡
𝑟𝑜𝑤 = 1 − ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐶𝑂𝐸𝐹𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑑
𝑖𝑠𝑛𝑑
 A35 
 
Incomes and expenditures continued  
𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝑖 = ∑ 𝑌𝐼𝐹𝑡
𝑖,𝑓
𝑓
+ 𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑡
𝑖 + 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑂𝐼𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑡
𝑖  A36 
𝑈0 = ∑ 𝛽
𝑡10
𝑡=0 𝐿𝑛(𝑄𝐻𝑡) A37 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡
𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛 = 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡−1
𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛 ∙ 𝛾1
𝐼 ∙ (
∆𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡
∆𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡
)
𝛾2
𝐼
∙ (
1 + 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐿𝑡
1 + 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑑𝑡
𝑒 )
𝛾3
𝐼
 A38 
𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛 = 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡−1
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛 ∙ 𝛾1
𝐼 ∙ (
1 + 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐿𝑡
1 + 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑑𝑡
𝑒 )
𝛾3
𝐼
  
𝑄𝐺
𝑡
= 𝑔𝑟𝑔
𝑡
∙ 𝑄𝐺
𝑡−1
 A39 
𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑃𝑡 = 𝑄𝐻𝑡 + 𝑄𝐺𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
+ 𝑖𝑛𝑣 + 𝑄𝐸𝑡 − 𝑄𝑀𝑡 + 𝑟 A40 
𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣 = ∑ 𝑌𝐼𝐹𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑓
𝑓
+ 𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣 + 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣 + 𝑂𝐼𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣 + 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑅𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣 + 𝑡𝑠𝑡
∙ 𝑃𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝑄𝑡     + 𝑡𝑎𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝐴𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐴𝑡 + 𝑡𝑚𝑡 ∙ 𝑝𝑤𝑚𝑡 ∙ 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝑀𝑡
+ ∑ 𝑡𝑑𝑡 ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑑
𝑖𝑛𝑠𝑑
 
A41 
Equilibrium conditions  
𝑄𝐹𝑡
𝑓 = 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐹𝑆𝑡
𝑓
 A42 
𝑄𝑄𝑡 = 𝑄𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐴𝑡 + 𝑄𝐻𝑡 + 𝑄𝐺𝑡 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑖𝑛𝑣 
𝑖
 A43 
𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡
𝑓 = 𝐺𝐺𝐴𝑃𝑡−1
𝑓 − 𝛼1
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑓 ∙ (𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐿𝑡−1 − 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑑𝑡−1) + 𝛼2
𝑔𝑎𝑝,𝑓(∆𝐴𝐷𝑡−1 − ∆𝑎𝑑) A44 
𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐹𝑡 = 𝑝𝑤𝑚𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝑀𝑡 − 𝑝𝑤𝑚𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐸𝑡 − 𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑡 A45 
90 
 
𝑇𝑅𝐴𝑁𝑆𝐹𝑡 = 𝑛𝑦𝑖𝑓 + 𝑁𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑡 + 𝑁𝑂𝐼𝑡 + 𝑁𝐼𝑁𝑇𝑡  A46 
∑ 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡
𝑖,𝑓𝑖
𝑖
= ∑ 𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡
𝑖,𝑓𝑖
𝑖
 A47 
𝑑_𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑏 = 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣 + ∑ 𝑑_𝑎𝑠𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑓𝑖𝑏 + 𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝑑_𝑎𝑠𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑒 − 𝑛𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣
𝑓𝑖𝑏
− 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣
− ∑ 𝑑𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑓𝑖 −   
𝑓𝑖
𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝑑_𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑒
 
A48 
∑ 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
+ 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 ∙ 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐹𝑡 = ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖
𝑖
𝑖
+ 𝑖𝑛𝑣 A49 
𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝐻
(1 − 𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝐻) ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝐻 =
𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑡−1
𝐻
(1 − 𝑡𝑑𝑡−1
𝐻 ) ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡−1 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡−1
𝐻  A50 
Factor accumulation    
  𝑄𝐹𝑆𝑡
𝑘 = (1 − 𝛿) ∙ 𝑄𝐹𝑆𝑡−1
𝑘 + ∑ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑖𝑡−1
𝑖
+ 𝑖𝑛𝑣 A51 
  𝑄𝐹𝑆𝑡
𝑙 = (1 + 𝜌𝑙𝑎𝑏) ∙ 𝑄𝐹𝑆𝑡−1
𝑙  A52 
Savings  
𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝐶𝐵 = (1 − 𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝐶𝐵) ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝐶𝐵 − 𝐼𝐸𝑋𝑃𝑡
𝐶𝐵  A53 
𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝐻 = (1 − 𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝐻) ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝐻 − 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑃𝑡
𝐻 − 𝑂𝐼𝑃𝑡
𝐻 − 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑃1𝑡
𝐻 − 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡
∙ 𝑄𝐻𝑡  
A54 
𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣 = 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣 − 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑄𝐺𝑡 − 𝑆𝑂𝐶𝐶𝑂𝑁𝑇𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣 − 𝑂𝐼𝑃𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣 − 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡
∙ 𝐼𝑁𝑇𝐸𝑋𝑃1𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣
 
A55 
𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑚𝑝𝑠𝑏𝑎𝑟𝑖𝑖(1 + 𝑀𝑃𝑆𝐴𝐷𝐽𝑡 ∙ 𝑚𝑝𝑠01𝑡
𝑖𝑖) A56 
𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝑖𝑖 = 𝑀𝑃𝑆𝑡
𝑖𝑖(1 − 𝑡𝑑𝑡
𝑖) ∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝑖𝑖  A57 
Financial side  
𝐹𝑊𝑡
𝑖 = ∑ 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡−1
𝑖,𝑓𝑖  
𝑓𝑖
+ 𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡−1
𝑖,𝑒𝑞 + ∑ 𝑑_𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑡
𝑖,𝑓𝑖  
𝑓𝑖
+ 𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝑑_𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑡
𝑖,𝑒𝑞 + 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝑖
− 𝑃𝑅𝐶 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡
𝑖 + 𝑛𝑡
𝑖  
A58 
𝐹𝑊1𝑡,𝑡+10
𝐻 = 𝐹𝑊1𝑡−1
𝐻 ∙ (1 + 𝜇 𝑓𝑤)10 
 
A59 
𝐹𝑊1𝑡
𝑖 =
𝐹𝑊𝑡
𝑖
𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡
 
 
A60 
𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐸𝑄𝑡 =
𝐷𝑉𝐷𝑡−1
𝑓𝑖𝑛
𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡−1 ∙ 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡−1
𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑒𝑞
 A61 
  
𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡
𝑖𝑡,𝑓𝑖 = (𝐹𝑊𝑡
𝑖𝑖𝑖 − 𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡
𝑖𝑖𝑖,𝑙) ∙ (𝜆𝑓0 + 𝐴𝑓𝑖,𝑗 ∙ 𝑟𝑓𝑖,𝑗 + 𝜆𝑓𝑖,4
∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝑖𝑡
𝐹𝑊𝑡
𝑖𝑡
) A62 
𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡
ℎ,𝑒 = 𝐹𝑊𝑡
ℎ − 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡
ℎ,𝑒  − 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡
ℎ,𝑜𝑎 − 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡
ℎ,𝑙 − 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡
ℎ,𝑏
 A63 
𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡
𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑙𝑜𝑎𝑛𝑠 = (1 − 𝑅𝑅𝑡)  ∙ 𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡−1
𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑐𝑎𝑠ℎ𝑑𝑒𝑝
 A64 
𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡
𝑖𝑛,𝑙 = 𝑙𝑑𝑖𝑛 ∙ (1 + 𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑡)
𝛽1
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜
∙ 𝐹𝑊𝑡
𝑖𝑛 A65 
𝑅𝑅𝑡 = 𝑅𝑅𝑡−1 ∙ (1 + ∆𝐹𝑅𝐸𝑃𝑂𝑡)
𝛽𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜 ∙ (
∑ 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡
𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑓𝑖  𝑓𝑖 + 𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡
𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑒𝑞
∑ 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡−1
𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑓𝑖  𝑓𝑖 + 𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡−1
𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑒𝑞
)
𝛽
𝑠𝑎
 A66 
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𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡
𝑖𝑙,𝑐𝑑 = 𝛼𝑖𝑙,𝑐𝑑 ∙ (
1 + 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐶𝐷𝑡
1 + 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑑𝑡
)
𝜇𝑐𝑑
∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝑖𝑙  A67 
𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡
𝑟𝑏,𝑜𝑎 = 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 ∙ 𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝑠𝑎
𝑟𝑏,𝑜𝑎      A68 
𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡
𝑟𝑏,𝑏 = 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡−1
𝑟𝑏,𝑏 + 𝑑_𝑎𝑠𝑡
𝑟𝑏,𝑏      A69 
𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡
𝑟𝑜𝑤,𝑜𝑎 = 𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡 ∙ 𝑟𝑒𝑠 + 𝑠𝑙𝑟
𝑜𝑎      A70 
𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑠,𝑙 = 𝛼𝑖𝑛𝑠,𝑙 ∙ (
1 + 𝐹𝑅𝐴𝑇𝐸𝐿𝑡
1 + 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑑𝑡
)
𝜇𝑙
∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑠 A71 
𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡
𝑟𝑜𝑤,𝑙𝑒 = 𝑙𝑚𝑟𝑜𝑤𝑙𝑒
∙ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡−1 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑃𝑡−1
𝐸𝑋𝑅𝑡−1
     A72 
𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡
𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑒𝑞 = 𝑠𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑒 + 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡
𝐻,𝑒𝑞       A73 
𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡
𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑒𝑞 = ∑ 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡
𝑖,𝑒𝑞  
𝑖
− ∑ 𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑒𝑞  
𝑖𝑛𝑓𝑖𝑛
   A74 
𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡
𝑐𝑏,𝑐𝑑 = 𝜎𝑐𝑑 ∙ ∑ 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝑌𝐼𝑡
𝑖
𝑖
      A75 
𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡
𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑐𝑑 = ∑ 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡
𝑖,𝑐𝑑  
𝑖
− ∑ 𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡
𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑐𝑑  
𝑖𝑓𝑖𝑛
      A76 
𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑏 = 𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡−1
𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑏 + 𝑑_𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑡
𝑔𝑜𝑣,𝑏      A77 
𝑑_𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑔,𝑏 = 𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵 𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑔,𝑏 − 𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵 𝑡−1
𝑖𝑛𝑔,𝑏     A78 
𝑑_𝑎𝑠𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑏,𝑏 = 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑡
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑏,𝑏 − 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑡−1
𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑏,𝑏     A79 
𝑑_𝑎𝑠𝑡
𝑟𝑏,𝑏 = 𝑆𝐴𝑉𝑡
𝑟𝑏 + ∑ 𝑑_𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑡
𝑟𝑏,𝑓𝑖  
𝑓𝑖
+ 𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝑑_𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑡
𝑟𝑏,𝑒−𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝑑_𝑎𝑠𝑡
𝑟𝑏,𝑒
− ∑ 𝑑_𝑎𝑠𝑡
𝑟𝑏,𝑓𝑖𝑏  − 𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝐼𝑁𝑉𝑡
𝑟𝑏 + 𝑛𝑡
𝑐𝑏
𝑓𝑖𝑏
 
A80 
𝑑_𝑙𝑖𝑏𝑡
𝑖,𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑏 = 𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵 𝑡
𝑖,𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑏 − 𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵 𝑡−1
𝑖,𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑏     A81 
𝑑_𝑎𝑠𝑡
𝑖,𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑏 = 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑡
𝑖,𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑏 − 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆 𝑡−1
𝑖,𝑓𝑖𝑛𝑏     A82 
𝑁𝑊𝑡
𝑖 =
(∑ 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡
𝑖,𝑓𝑖  𝑓𝑖 + 𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝐵𝑆𝐴𝑆𝑆𝑡
𝑖,𝑒   − ∑ 𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡
𝑖,𝑓𝑖  𝑓𝑖 − 𝑃𝐸𝑄𝑡 ∙ 𝐵𝑆𝐿𝐼𝐵𝑡
𝑖,𝑒)
𝑃𝑅𝐶𝑡 ∙ 𝐺𝐷𝑃𝑀𝑃𝑡
 A83 
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Chapter 4  The Impact of Capital Flow Reversal Shock 
4.1 Introduction  
The normalisation in US monetary policy and its impact on global liquidity has 
increased concerns over capital flow reversal. Countries with high reliance on 
capital flows such as South Africa are likely to be affected the most. 
Capital flow movements are increasingly being driven by global factors and reflect 
risk-taking behaviour of global financial institutions (Bruno and Shin 2015; Byrne 
and Fiess 2016). Financial sector dynamics are key in transmitting capital flow 
reversal shocks and exacerbating their impact (Joyce and Nabar 2009; Mishkin 
1999). This is particularly the case when the domestic economy has large stocks of 
short-term foreign-denominated liabilities, which lead to a large deterioration in net 
wealth in the presence of a rapid depreciation of the currency (Calvo, Izquierdo, 
and Loo-Kung 2006). In addition, capital flow reversals can be associated with 
discontinuities in economic behaviour, as a result of asset bubbles bursting, which 
worsen the negative effects. 
We argue that current DSGE models are not suited to explain the capital flow 
reversal shock mechanism as their representation of balance sheets and financial 
sector dynamics is only partial.  We illustrate how in our stock-and-flow-consistent 
framework, a capital flow reversal shock transmits itself through the balance sheets 
of all institutions and how the framework generates financial accelerator effects. In 
our model these effects operate through the reserve management of the financial 
sector, the lending spread, asset prices, the balance sheets of all institutions and the 
feedback mechanisms from economic activity. 
The results are generally small compared to the experience of other countries, but 
the model generates larger impacts on domestic demand compared to other studies 
evaluating the impact of capital flow reversal on South Africa.27 The main reason 
behind the relatively small impacts is the low holding of foreign-denominated debt 
by South African institutions. A depreciation in the currency does not translate into 
a large rise in the liabilities of domestic institutions. However, the outflow of 
foreign savings still reduces the availability of savings in the domestic economy, 
                                                 
27 See Frankel, Smit, and Sturzenegger (2008) and Smit, Grobler, and Nel (2014) 
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lowers the level of intermediation and pushes loan spreads up and asset prices down. 
Even in the absence of large stocks of foreign debt, the capital flow reversal shock 
does have an impact on the domestic economy through its impact on liquidity and 
demand for domestic financial assets. A capital flow reversal shock is still 
contractionary. 28  
We also illustrate how our framework handles discontinuity in expectations by 
shortening the household optimisation period. Household expectations change from 
model-consistent to more myopic in the presence of a large negative shock. For 
example, if the reduction in lending is accompanied by the bursting of a property 
price bubble. This increases the household savings and reduces the household 
ability to smooth consumption. The impact on domestic demand is significantly 
larger.   
4.2 Literature review  
The reasons for capital flows reversal and sudden stops include both domestic and 
global factors, with perceptions of risk being an increasingly important driver 
(Ahmed and Zlate 2014; Brafu-Insaidoo and Biekpe 2014; Forbes and Warnock 
2012; Rey 2015; Rothenberg and Warnock 2011).29 Recent research indicates that 
the risk-taking channel of monetary policy identified by Borio and Zhu (2012) is a 
major driver of capital flows. For example, Bruno and Shin (2015) find that 
expansionary monetary policy in the US reduces risk premium and borrowing cost 
for global banks, which increases funding for international subsidiaries and other 
regional banks as relative returns increase. Risk-taking increases beyond national 
borders. This result is also supported by Byrne and Fiess (2016), who find evidence 
that banks will actively lend to emerging markets if US long-run rates are low.  
Risk perceptions are also key to the theoretical model developed by Blanchard et 
al. (2010). They link risk perception, balance sheets and capital flow movements. 
In their framework, capital flows are driven by agents exhibiting home bias in the 
presence of liquidity constraints and perceptions of higher risk. The strength of the 
impact depends on the stock of debt. Higher stock of debt exacerbates the home 
                                                 
28 This links our analysis to the recent literature on whether capital inflows are contractionary or 
expansionary. See, for example, Blanchard et al. (2016). 
29 Sarno, Tsiakas, and Ulloa (2016) find that global factors such as US interest rates and global risk 
aversion explain close to 80 per cent of the variation in global bond and equity flows. 
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bias and levels of risk aversion, increasing the domestic borrowing rate and leading 
to a larger output loss. The authors proceed to find empirical evidence supporting 
their theoretical model. 
The importance of risk taking in driving capital flows is illustrated in empirical 
studies, which find perceptions of risk as a major driver of the probability of sudden 
stops. While domestic factors such as credit extension, economic overheating and 
currency overvaluation are important for the probability of sudden stops, global 
factors and, in particular, risk taking are playing an increasingly important role. 
Eichengreen and Gupta (2016) and Ghosh, Ostry, and Qureshi (2016) find that an 
increase in risk aversion significantly raises the probability of sudden stop.30 
The impacts, especially in the case of sudden stops, can be severe – including 
banking and sovereign crisis with large output and employment losses (Cavallo et 
al. 2015; Eichengreen and Gupta 2016; Magud and Vesperoni 2015; Reinhart and 
Reinhart 2008).31 The impact can be long-lasting as the impact on investment is 
strong and negative, largely due to a deterioration in financial conditions (Joyce and 
Nabar 2009).  
Calvo (1998) describes the transmission mechanism for sudden stops. High share 
of consumption expenditure on non-tradables prevents the instantaneous 
adjustment of the current account to the decline in capital flows, and increases 
output costs. The fall in the consumption of non-tradables and the associated real 
devaluation increase the share of non-performing loans and bankruptcies, which 
tightens credit constraints in the economy, reduces the marginal and average 
productivity of physical capital and leads to human capital destruction. This effect 
is made stronger by the presence of foreign-currency-denominated debt with short 
maturities, which may require refinancing. Higher shares of foreign currency loans 
to the non-tradable sector and lower levels of trade openness exacerbate the 
situation as the tradable sector cannot provide a cushion against the fall in aggregate 
                                                 
30 At the same time, a period of higher than average flows, the so-called capital bonanza, also 
increases the probability of capital reversal and financial crisis as it tends to create excessive 
lending (Caballero 2016; Reinhart and Reinhart 2008). 
31Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) provide a short review of the different definitions of sudden stops 
used in the literature. Episodes of sudden stop generally refer to a sudden and large decline in capital 
flows, which is accompanied by a significant increase in some measure of external cost of funding 
(Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia 2004; Cavallo and Frankel 2008).  
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demand and the deterioration in balance sheets (Calvo, Izquierdo, and Loo-Kung 
2006). Through the interlinkages in the economy, the tradable sector is also affected 
negatively.  
Further, Calvo (1998) argues that fiscal and monetary policy responses are likely to 
worsen the situation, especially in the presence of large foreign-currency-
denominated debt. The ability of fiscal policy to expand is limited by falling 
revenues, rising debt costs and financial markets that may struggle to intermediate 
government debt. The likely pro-cyclical path of government expenditure mainly 
reduces the demand for non-tradables, leading to further depreciation and 
deterioration in financial conditions. At the same time, expansionary monetary 
policy that increases high-powered money is also likely to increase the devaluation. 
The use of reserves can offset the impact of the reversal in capital flows but it can 
also lead to speculative attacks.  
We argue that the transmission of a capital-flow shock through the economy via the 
risk-taking channel is supported by a financial accelerator mechanism (Bernanke, 
Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999). In this case the foreign sector is the lender and the 
domestic economy the borrower. An increase in capital inflows reduces domestic 
credit constraints and increases lending. This increases asset prices and capital gains 
and improves the net worth of domestic institutions, encouraging further inflows.32 
In a second round effect this translates into further improvements in net worth. This 
mechanism, however, is quite different from the standard financial accelerator 
mechanism, which does not take into account exchange rate movements and their 
likely impact on the balance sheet of domestic firms. Movements in the currency 
can reinforce the financial accelerator mechanism. Higher capital inflows lead to an 
appreciation of the currency, which should eliminate the arbitrage opportunity and 
slow down the inflows. The appreciation, however, improves the balance sheets of 
those firms whose debt is denominated in foreign currency and, along with higher 
asset prices, encourages higher inflows (Brunnermeier et al. 2012).33 The reversal 
                                                 
32 A number of studies provide evidence for the link between capital flow and asset prices; see, for 
example, IMF (2010), IMF (2013a) and Sá, Towbin, and Wieladek (2011). 
33 While the exchange rate plays a smaller role in countries that have a fixed exchange rate, the 
financial accelerator mechanism remains important. Magud and Vesperoni (2015) find that countries 
with fixed exchange rates have stronger credit extension associated with large capital inflows and 
create more foreign liabilities. In addition, the fixed exchange rate prevents the adjustment between 
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in capital flows starts a process which works the opposite way, with the exchange 
rate and asset prices exacerbating credit constraints. Asymmetric information and 
moral hazard problems in the banking sector increase and foreign funders become 
more likely to pull their funds out (Goldstein and Turner 1996; Mishkin 1996). 
Companies engage in distress sales driving down asset prices, encouraging further 
capital outflows and exchange rate depreciation and setting off a downward spiral 
(Joyce and Nabar 2009). In this case the depreciation of the currency, which is 
expected to stabilise the economy through its impact on competitiveness, may 
increase the output losses through its impact on net worth (Blanchard et al. 2010).   
Balance sheet dynamics are central to the negative effects associated with capital 
flow reversal or the extreme sudden stop situation (Calvo, Izquierdo, and Loo-Kung 
2006; Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia 2004). Mishkin (1999) argues that a reversal in 
capital flows has large economic impacts only if it affects the balance sheets of 
economic agents and in particular the balance sheet of banks. This is supported by 
Joyce and Nabar (2009), who find that sudden stops are associated with large 
negative impacts only in the presence of a banking crisis, as this leads to a disruption 
in intermediation and a large fall in investment.  A banking crisis exacerbates any 
possible currency crisis as a result of the  initial capital flow reversal, leading to a 
vicious spiral, which may lead to sovereign debt crisis (Kaminsky and Reinhart 
1999; Reinhart and Rogoff 2011).34 
The risk-taking behaviour and the financial accelerator mechanism are dependent 
on the level of financial development. The economic literature indicates that the 
level of financial development can have both positive and negative effects on the 
probability and the size of the impact associated with capital flow reversals. In the 
presence of a global shock, countries with less developed financial sectors 
experience outflows, while those with more developed financial sectors tend to 
attract inflows (Mendoza, Quadrini, and Ríos‐Rull 2009; Farhi, Caballero, and 
Gourinchas 2008; Ju and Wei 2011). Demand for intermediation services and the 
                                                 
the tradable and non-tradable sectors, which generates larger output losses than economies 
characterised by a flexible exchange rate. 
34
The analysis of balance sheet dynamics is also important to understand whether frictions in the 
economy originate on the borrower’s or the lender’s balance sheet and to identify the appropriate 
policy interventions (Brunnermeier and Oehmke 2012). 
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stability of the financial sector provide a pull factor for capital flows. These models, 
however, fail to explain why financial development may reduce the probability and 
severity of a capital flow crisis on the economy.  
Aghion, Bacchetta, and Banerjee (2004) develop a model where the level of 
financial development is represented by the credit multiplier. In their framework 
economies with an intermediate level of financial development are most unstable. 
As the economic cycle turns, credit worthiness deteriorates – as cash flows decline, 
capital flows reverse, the credit constraint becomes more binding, and investment 
falls. In more financially advanced economies, the financial sector continues to 
provide liquidity and companies are not constrained by cash flow problems. In 
economies with low levels of financial development, investment is less dependent 
on credit extension and thus capital outflows have a less disruptive effect. Aghion 
et al. (2009) extend the model to include exchange rate volatility. They argue that 
high levels of financial development mitigate against the negative impacts 
associated with exchange rate volatility. The financial sector can support companies 
that are highly liquidity dependent, and their profitability is affected by movements 
in the exchange rate.  
Several other theoretical models generate similar findings. For example, González 
and Ranciere (2005) develop a model driven by the incentives for the financial 
sector to take insurance against bank crisis. They argue that countries with 
intermediate levels of financial development face a higher opportunity cost of 
insurance represented by the marginal rate of return to investment. This leads to a 
higher frequency of bank crisis. Higher development translates into a decline in the 
marginal rate of return, which makes it optimal for banks to be fully insured. In the 
model developed by Dell'Ariccia and Marquez (2004), financial liberalisation is 
followed by poor screening of borrowers and over-lending, which translate into 
financial fragility. Over time, as the level of financial development rises, screening 
practices improve and lending grows at stable rates. Rajan (1994) develops a similar 
model and argues that higher levels of financial development improve bank 
supervision, which in turn creates better incentives for bank managers and less risk 
taking during good times. Empirically, Loayza et al. (2006) and Aghion et al. 
(2009) provide support for these models.   
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The discussion so far indicates that countries with high levels of financial 
development are more likely to attract capital flows at times of financial stress, as 
they can provide liquidity during capital flow reversals and have better risk sharing.  
Higher levels of financial development, however, are also likely to increase the 
level of debt and equity flows, which, unlike foreign direct investment, are more 
likely to lead to capital reversal and sudden stop episodes (Caballero 2016; Forbes 
and Warnock 2012; Jongwanich and Kohpaiboon 2013).35  This destabilising 
impact may reflect the fact that debt and equity flows are more dependent on the 
creditworthiness of domestic firms than foreign direct investment (Aghion, 
Bacchetta, and Banerjee 2004). 
Rajan (2005) argues that while high levels of financial development have made it 
easier for economies to diversify across small shocks, it has also exposed them to 
large systemic shocks, which generate significant movements in asset prices. The 
underlying mechanism is based on an incentive structure which encourages risk 
taking by financial sector managers and herding with other investment managers 
on investment choices to avoid relative underperformance. This behaviour 
underlines the risk-taking channel of monetary policy, drives capital flow 
movements and leads to asset prices moving away from their fundamentals.   
At the same time, this mechanism underlines the building up of asset price bubbles, 
which can be fully consistent with rational behaviour (Blanchard and Watson 
1982).36 Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012) argue that herding of investment 
decisions drives bubble creation, as investors purchase overpriced assets in order to 
avoid being priced out of the market in the next period. This is also in line with 
asset price bubble models, which argue that fund managers have an incentive to 
herd and purchase overvalued assets as no trading may reveal that they have no 
ability to find undervalued assets (Allen and Gorton 1993). The process is supported 
                                                 
35 A key limitation in this analysis is whether the definition of foreign direct investment affects the 
results. Portfolio flows become foreign direct investment at some threshold point as the stake 
purchased in a company becomes significant. If this point is low, it will be difficult to distinguish 
between foreign direct investment and portfolio flows.   
36  In the model developed by Blanchard and Watson (1982) rational expectations and behaviour do 
not imply that the price of an asset is equal to its fundamental value. If others believe that extraneous 
events play an important part in driving the price, then it is rational to purchase the asset if one is 
compensated for the probability of a bubble burst. This effectively indicates that in the process of 
following other investment managers on investment choices, rational bubbles are likely to emerge.  
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by easy access to credit and the limited liability of fund managers if the markets 
turn against them (Allen and Gale 2000). The complexity of financial instruments 
associated with high levels of financial development and the inability of investors 
to understand the information built into these instruments reinforces the bubble 
creation process through theoretical models which rely on informational frictions 
and heterogeneous beliefs (Abreu and Brunnermeier 2003; De Long et al. 1990; 
Ofek and Richardson 2003).37,38 At the same time, the presence of these instruments 
creates uncertainty with regard to who bears what losses once the bubble bursts, 
amplifying the negative financial and economic conditions (Rajan 2005). Finally, 
the bubble creation process is supported by the inability of investors to internalise 
the negative externality that they are causing on the financial system as leverage 
and maturity mismatches become excessive (Brunnermeier and Oehmke 2012).   
The bursting of bubbles represents a threshold point or discontinuity driven by the 
continuous deterioration of some economic indicators. The sudden change links 
capital flow reversal episodes and financial bubbles to the literature on catastrophe 
theory (Thom 1976).39 Harris (1979) shows the applicability of catastrophe theory 
and, in particular, cusp catastrophes to economic behavioural functions, including 
expectations. By releasing the assumption of strict-quasi concavity in the utility 
function, he illustrates how cusp catastrophe theory can explain discontinuities, 
hysteresis or divergence in the behaviour of demand in response to continuous 
changes in price and budget variables. Similarly, he argues than sudden changes in 
expectations can be explained by cusp catastrophe episodes rather than “animal 
spirits”.  Zeeman (1974) introduces catastrophe theory to financial markets. In his 
model, the presence of chartists, who chase trends and have no knowledge of the 
true value of an asset, creates instability.  As the size of excess demand of chartists 
increases, the cusp point is passed, leading to possible discontinuities. The reliance 
of Zeeman’s model on heterogeneous beliefs resembles theoretical models that rely 
                                                 
37 Brunnermeier and Oehmke (2012) provide a comprehensive review of the literature on asset price 
bubbles. 
38 This literature also links to the sudden stop models developed by Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia 
(2004) and Calvo, Izquierdo, and Loo-Kung (2006), which rely on information frictions to generate 
sudden stop episodes. 
39 Rosser Jr (2007) provides a comprehensive review of the literature on catastrophe theory and 
counterarguments to the criticisms raised. He also provides a review of other models which aim to 
capture dynamic discontinuities. Most of these models are similar to catastrophe theory and generate 
similar equilibrium surfaces.    
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on information frictions to explain bubble creation, providing a link between the 
two strands of literature.40 Barunik and Vosvrda (2009) provide empirical support 
to the presence of catastrophe theory dynamics in financial markets. They find that 
cusp catastrophe models fit the data better for the financial market crash in October 
1987, as that was driven by internal forces, compared to September 2001, when the 
crash was driven by terrorists’ activities, and thus the dynamics do not conform to 
a cusp-catastrophe episode.41  
While Calvo (2003) does not link discontinuities in his model to catastrophe theory, 
he presents a framework which generates a low growth or a high growth 
equilibrium. The point of discontinuity is defined by a critical debt value, which is 
related to a production parameter. Any shock that causes the economy to move 
beyond the critical debt value leads to a sudden stop. At that point the current 
account shifts to zero, creating a discontinuity. 
The possible presence of discontinuities in the real economy and financial sector 
when bubbles burst indicates that current general equilibrium models are less suited 
to study sudden stops in capital flows, as these models rely on continuous behaviour 
in both dependent and independent variables. However, as argued by Harris (1979) 
and shown by Barunik and Vosvrda (2009), not all booms are followed by cusp-
catastrophe crashes, which indicates that current models may capture the dynamics 
some times but not at all times.  
A stronger criticism of current mainstream economic models used to study capital 
flow reversal episodes is that they do not include financial sector dynamics despite 
the importance of the financial sector in driving capital flows and in the 
transmission mechanism of capital flow reversal shocks. Mendoza (2006) provides 
a review of a number of small DSGE models which rely on debt-deflation 
mechanism and credit constraints to generate large negative economic impacts in 
response to sudden stop episodes. Similarly, Fornaro (2015) develops a small 
general equilibrium model with rational expectations, nominal wage rigidities and 
                                                 
40 More recently, Rheinlaender and Steinkamp (2004) extend Zeeman’s model by introducing a 
stochastic element. In their framework, the random element tends to stabilise the non-linear 
dynamics. Higher share of chartist traders relative to the deterministic case is required to generate 
unstable behaviour. 
41 It is possible that higher order catastrophes may fit the data better in 2001 but this is not explored 
by the authors. 
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a financial accelerator mechanism based also on Fisher's debt deflation. The model 
includes the demand for foreign and domestic bonds by optimising consumers. The 
household collateral constraint is driven by the household land holding, which is 
used in the production process. An exchange rate depreciation reduces the collateral 
constraint by increasing output, which reduces the negative impacts associated with 
sudden stop. The foreign debt accumulated does not affect the net worth of the 
consumer or the economy. This seems to contradict the impacts identified in the 
literature. Ottonello (2013) develops a similar model but with a collateral constraint 
linked to the value of collateral in the form of tradable and nontradable income and 
debt denominated in foreign currency units. In this case an exchange rate 
depreciation creates a trade-off between the level of unemployment and the degree 
to which the credit constraint is binding.  While these models tend to generate a 
financial accelerator mechanism, the financial sector is not modelled explicitly and 
there is no consistent stock accounting.    
A different but related strand of DSGE models aims to study portfolio allocation 
between foreign and domestic assets, and how this generates capital flows.  These 
models also have no financial sector or balance sheet dynamics (Devereux and 
Sutherland 2009; Tille and van Wincoop 2010).  
Some macro-prudential liquidity stress-testing tools such as the model developed 
by Neagu and Racaru (2013) capture detailed balance sheet dynamics and have been 
used to study the impact of capital flow reversal on the banking sector. While the 
financial dynamics in that framework address some of the criticisms raised against 
DSGE models, the model lacks real economy dynamics and is unable to identify 
the impacts on employment and output.      
For South Africa, a number of papers look at the determinants of capital flows.  
Earlier papers such as Fedderke and Liu (2002) and Wesso (2001) look at overall 
capital flows. They find interest rate, inflation differentials, exchange rate 
movements, political risk, real GDP growth rate and the government deficit as 
important drivers of capital flows. Aron, Leape, and Tomas (2010), Ahmed, Funke, 
and Arezki (2005) and Rangasamy (2014) study the determinants of specific 
elements of capital flows and find the drivers that apply to the aggregate measure 
also apply to the elements. Aron, Leape, and Tomas (2010) argue that South Africa 
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has benefitted from large equity inflows due to its deep capital markets. This is in 
line with theoretical models which predict that high levels of financial development 
attract capital flows. They also find that risk aversion is a significant driver of both 
equity and overall flows and that good performance by the US stock market leads 
to higher flows into South Africa. The latter results, according to these authors, 
represent a global liquidity effect driven by higher profitability.  These findings also 
provide support for the global transmission risk taking channel identified by Bruno 
and Shin (2015). Ahmed, Funke, and Arezki (2005) also find evidence that the 
depth of capital markets is important for capital inflows, particularly total portfolio 
investment and investment in debt securities. They also find that the effectiveness 
of law and order is an important driver of equity investment. Rangasamy (2014) 
provides empirical support for the argument that equity flow reversal episodes tend 
to be stronger than FDI and other investment flows for South Africa, in line with 
the international literature.42 
Hassan (2015) links capital flows, in particular bond flows, to carry trade 
opportunities (conditions characterised by relatively high interest rate differential 
and low volatility). The carry trade mechanism works similarly to a financial 
accelerator mechanism, which generates asset price bubbles. More inflows lead to 
currency appreciation, which increases the carry trade returns and makes local 
assets even more attractive. Hassan argues that the destabilising effects of these 
inflows for the economy are limited, as there seems to be no relationship between 
the inflows and long-term rand volatility; the inflows have not created a credit 
boom; South Africa’s capital control mechanism allows firms to take capital out of 
the country when the rand is strong and bring it back when the rand is weak, 
offsetting somewhat the carry trade effects on the economy; and, the level of 
exchange rate flexibility translates into lower carry trade flows compared to 
countries that intervene to manage their currencies.43 The dismissal of the impact 
of carry flows on credit booms is explained by the depth of South Africa’s financial 
markets.  Local banks do not have to acquire non-core funding from abroad as they 
have a large deposit base and deep financial markets. However, we disagree with 
                                                 
42 A number of studies include South Africa as part of panel data analysis. These include, for 
example, Sarno, Tsiakas, and Ulloa (2016), Reinhart and Reinhart (2008) and Rey (2015).   
43 The last point relies on speculation by credit traders who expect that the intervention will become 
costly and eventually the currency will appreciate.  
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this argument. Our argument is that flows increase liquidity in the market, 
appreciate the currency, lower borrowing rates, increase asset prices and risk-
taking. This can increase the probability of sudden stops.     
In terms of economic impacts of capital flow reversal and sudden stops, Smit, 
Grobler, and Nel (2014) provide an assessment of the likely impact, using a 
macroeconometric model. Their results indicate that a sudden stop scenario can 
reduce GDP growth by 2.4 percentage points and employment growth by 0.7 
percentage points. The magnitude of the impact is smaller compared to studies 
looking at the impacts in a sample of countries historically (Cavallo et al. 2015; 
Reinhart and Reinhart 2008). The adjustment takes place mainly through domestic 
demand and imports rather than exports. The recovery is quick and follows the 
recovery in capital flows.  Smit, Grobler and Nel argue that while their framework 
does not include a financial sector for South Africa, this is not a significant 
limitation as most of South Africa’s debt is denominated in local currency. This 
may also explain the smaller results compared to the impacts presented in the 
international literature. We argue, however, that the high level of financial 
development in South Africa is still an important factor in the assessment of capital 
flow reversal through the channels identified above. A similar macroeconometric 
model with no financial sector dynamics is used by Frankel, Smit, and Sturzenegger 
(2008) to generate the likely impact of sudden stops on the South African economy. 
The results indicate that the impact varies depending on the response of the 
monetary authority and the size of the exchange rate depreciation. Higher repo rates 
tend to exacerbate the negative short-term impacts on GDP growth, while the 
exchange rate depreciation tends to mitigate the negative impacts by decreasing 
imports and increasing exports. These authors argue that the probability of sudden 
stop and its impact are lower in South Africa compared to other countries as debt is 
mostly denominated in local currency units and it is of long maturity, the exchange 
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rate is very flexible and the economy is more open than other emerging markets. 
44,45  
4.3 Results 
We simulate the impact of 2 per cent of GDP decline in net foreign savings over 
four quarters and explain the transmission mechanism in our stock-and-flow-
consistent model. We compare the result from the main simulation with a scenario 
where the capital flow reversal shock changes the household expectations from 
model-consistent to more myopic. This aims to show how discontinuity in the 
behaviour of households affects the results and illustrates the ability of our 
framework to capture discontinuous behaviour.  Such behaviour, as highlighted in 
the literature review section, can be due to a bubble bursting, which is likely in the 
presence of capital flow reversal episodes.  
The decline in foreign savings reduces liquidity in the domestic market and requires 
rebalancing of investment and domestic savings in order to maintain the 
equilibrium. The decreased level of liquidity increases the financial sector’s 
willingness to hold reserves. The reserve ratio in our model jumps, reducing the 
money multiplier and the supply of loans by the financial sector (panel 1 in Figure 
4.1). The reduction in the supply of loans increases the spread over the repo rate 
and the loan rate rises.  This is depicted in panel 2 of Figure 4.1. The trend reflects 
the initial fall in foreign savings inflows and the consequent recovery. The reduction 
in foreign savings tightens financial constraints and increases perceptions of risks 
and the lending spread, reducing the level of intermediation.  
The increase in the reserve ratio is driven also by the fall in the value of financial 
sector assets, which is explained below.  
                                                 
44 IMF (2013b) also emphasises the likely impact of capital flow reversal on South Africa as a result 
of US monetary policy normalisation; however, they do not provide quantitative estimates of the 
economic impact. They argue that South Africa is likely to see a large outflow due to its twin deficits, 
but there are also mitigating factors such as government debt that is almost entirely denominated in 
rand terms and is mostly long term. 
45 A few studies look at the impacts of sudden stop in a sample of countries, including South Africa. 
However, they do not provide specific impacts for South Africa (Calvo, Izquierdo, and Mejia 2004; 
Cavallo et al. 2015; Joyce and Nabar 2009; Reinhart and Reinhart 2008).  These studies tend to 
argue that the impacts tend to be larger than those identified by Frankel, Smit, and Sturzenegger 
(2008) and Smit, Grobler, and Nel (2014), especially if the sudden stop is accompanied by a banking 
crisis. 
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Figure 4.1: Interest rate spread and reserve ratio  
 
Source: Model simulations 
The increase in the nominal loan rate translates into higher real rate.  This effect is 
strengthened by a fall in inflation and inflation expectations relative to the 
baseline (panel 1 in Figure 4.2). The output response dominates the exchange rate 
impact on inflation. The higher real rates affect the economy in a number of 
different ways: 
1. Firstly, investment falls across all institutions, which helps rebalance 
savings and investment. 
2. The increase in the real rates affects negatively aggregate demand and the 
demand for factors of production, which decrease utilisation in the economy 
and, thus, production. 
3. The demand for loans decreases, thus decreasing the sources of funding 
available for investment in real and financial assets.  
4. Interest income increases.    
Table 4.1 shows the impact on investment at one (t+1) and ten periods (t+10) after 
the shock. Investment by non-financial firms is initially 3.8 per cent lower, and it is 
3.9 per cent lower in the outer years despite the recovery in net foreign savings. 
This result is in line with the long-term impacts on investment found by Joyce and 
Nabar (2009). This decline reflects the permanent decline in the equity price (panel 
2 Figure 4.2 below). The fall in the equity price relative to the baseline reflects a 
lower expectation of inflation initially, and lower growth in money supply, but more 
importantly the medium-term effect is driven by a permanently lower stock of 
capital and lower levels of capacity utilisation compared to the baseline.  
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Table 4.1: Impact on real expenditure  
 
Source: Model simulations 
Exports and imports follow the expected trends as the reduction in foreign savings 
translates into a depreciation of the exchange rate (see panel 6, Figure 4.2). The 
decline in imports is significantly larger than the increase in exports.  It reflects not 
only the depreciation in the currency but also the significant decline in aggregate 
demand.  
The response is dependent on the assumed elasticities in the Constant Elasticity of 
Substitution and Armington functions. As the flow of foreign savings normalises 
and the exchange rate depreciation is reversed, the level of exports declines 
compared to the baseline, while the level of imports recovers but remains below the 
baseline level. The normalisation of imports also reflects recovery in household 
consumption in the outer years. As in Smit, Grobler, and Nel (2014), the main 
adjustment is through imports, which reduces the overall negative effect on GDP. 
The lower inflation and lower utilisation of resources reduce the repo rate through 
the Taylor rule specification. This in turn reduces the real policy rate, and it helps 
to alleviate some of the pressures from the increase in the real lending rates.   
The savings of the financial and non-financial sectors increase by reducing dividend 
payments (panel 7 in Figure 4.2  below). Total dividend payments are close to 40 
per cent lower compared to the baseline, which affects negatively the income of all 
institutions, particularly household income.  
per cent deviation from 
baseline
t+1 t+10
Household expenditure -2,43 -0,67
Investment
  Non-financial firms -3,81 -3,88
  Other-institutions -4,11 -4,14
Exports 0,25 -0,97
Imports -4,74 -0,96
GDP -0,48 -0,97
capital flow 
reversal
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Figure 4.2: Impacts on rates and prices 
 
Source: Model simulations 
This decline in dividend income is offset somewhat for some institutions by an 
increase in interest income (panel 8 Figure 4.2). For households, however, the 
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combination of lower dividend income and higher interest expenditure reduces their 
ability to save and consume 
Factor income also declines as capacity utilisation declines. Figure 4.2 shows 
divergent trends in capital and labour wages. We assume full employment. The 
labour force increases but economic activity is lower than in the baseline, labour 
wages must fall in order for labour to be absorbed. In the case of capital, the effect 
is more positive over the entire horizon. This reflects the fall in investment and the 
slower pace of capital accumulation in the scenario.  
Table 4.1 indicates that the immediate impact on household consumption is large 
and negative; however, as foreign savings normalise, household consumption 
recovers marginally. There are several forces that affect household behaviour. On 
the one side, household income falls as explained above which translates into lower 
consumption. On the other side, the fall in the equity price and the lower provision 
of loans make it more difficult for the household to achieve its wealth target. The 
household needs to save more and consume less in order to compensate for the fall 
in the sources of funding and to achieve its desired level of future wealth and 
consumption.  The lower level of expected inflation mitigates somewhat this impact 
in the short run as the household is targeting real wealth. The graphs below illustrate 
the adjustment process for the household. 
Figure 4.3: Household optimisation behaviour 
 
Source: Model simulations 
The graph presents the household optimisation behaviour at three points in time: 
the time the shock takes place (t), ten periods after the shock (t+10) and 15 periods 
(t+15) after the shock. The largest differences in growth rates are in period t.  At 
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time t, the economy is faced with a sudden shock, household wealth falls.  The 
household must consume less and save more in order to achieve its target level of 
wealth.  Household consumption declines due to lower income and fewer sources 
of funding, but also a greater need to save in order to achieve its target level of 
wealth. The growth rates in the simulation are significantly lower initially. The 
household, however, expects that the simulation growth rates are going to rise and 
exceed those in the baseline given the cyclical structure of the economy and the 
likely response of monetary authorities to the shock. The stronger growth rate of 
financial wealth in the outer years of the optimisation period allows the households 
to consume more. At this point, the households cannot see that the capital flow 
reversal shock continues for four quarters. This expectation of future improvements 
lowers the impact of capital flow reversal on household consumption in period t. It 
allows households to smooth their consumption. 
By period t+10, households face lower equity prices and the expected recovery in 
period t has not taken place. Household consumption growth is lower in order to 
maintain the growth in real financial wealth close to the baseline. By period t+15, 
the growth rates in the baseline and the simulation are very similar for household 
consumption and wealth. However, in level terms, household wealth and household 
consumption are permanently lower as the temporary credit constraint on the 
economy has reduced the stock of financial wealth compared to the baseline.  
In the next tables, we present the impact on the stocks of assets and liabilities and 
we explain the impacts at period t+3. 
The financial wealth of the foreign sector is affected mainly by the fall in savings 
and the depreciation in the currency. The decrease in foreign savings reduces the 
financial wealth available for investing by the foreign sector, while the exchange 
rate increases the local currency value of foreign currency denominated liabilities. 
The depreciation in the currency increases the value of bonds and cash and deposit 
liabilities relative to the baseline. We have assumed that their value is fixed in 
foreign currency units. The stocks of foreign loans and equity assets of domestic 
residents (these are liabilities for the foreign sector) are linked to domestic output. 
Lower domestic output and weaker domestic currency discourage domestic 
institutions from increasing their holding of foreign equities and loans.  
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Table 4.2: Changes to the holding of financial assets 
 
Source: Model simulations 
Table 4.3: Changes to the holding of financial liabilities 
 
Source: Model simulations 
The foreign sector holding of financial assets declines across the board as the 
sources of funding and, in particular, foreign savings decline. The decrease in the 
holding of bonds is smaller compared to the other asset classes, which reflects their 
higher relative return. 46  
It is this higher relative return of bonds, which also encourages the financial sector 
to increase its holding of bonds (Table 4.2), which can also reflect some form of a 
flight to safety as bonds are associated with lower risk of default. This impact works 
through the Tobin asset-demand function which drives the demand for assets for 
the financial and foreign sectors.  
The lower levels of cash and deposits received by the financial sector affect the 
financial accelerator mechanism in our framework. The extension of loans is lower 
                                                 
46 Stocks where a change is not recorded reflects that the asset or liability instrument is modelled 
exogenously or that the institution does not hold the particular asset or liability. 
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because the financial sector chooses to hold more reserves, but also because the 
level of cash and deposits declines relative to the baseline. In addition, this negative 
effect on financial wealth is accompanied by a decline in equity liabilities, driven 
by the slower creation of equity assets by households as well as the lower equity 
price. The loans borrowed by the financial sector experience no change. There are 
two effects that determine the impact on the demand for loans by the financial 
sector.  Higher loan rates discourage borrowing, but higher interest income 
encourages borrowing. These two effects offset each other. Overall, the pool of 
funds generated from the sources of funding and available for investment is lower 
relative to the baseline, despite the higher levels of net savings. All asset holdings 
for the sector, except bonds, decline.  
The non-financial sector also funds its financial wealth through net savings, loans 
and equity sales. While savings increase initially, the lower demand for equities due 
to their lower return and lower levels of economic activity leads to a significant 
reduction in the equity liability for the sector (Table 4.3).  At the same time, the 
higher loan rate and lower income decrease the demand for loans. The equity and 
loan effect offset the positive impacts from higher savings.  The financial wealth 
available for investing declines, which leads to a decline in the holding of assets 
across the board.  
The decline in the cash and deposits holding of household reflects lower income, 
which offsets the impact of higher cash and deposit rates. The fall in the 
transactional demand for money is higher than the increase in the demand for 
money as a store of value. The decline in financial wealth translates into a lower 
demand for equities on the asset side. The decline in the value of assets also reflects 
the fact that the representative household has achieved lower levels of wealth in the 
previous periods. The household’s anticipation of a recovery in the economy based 
on its model-consistent expectations has allowed it to smooth consumption, and to 
save less in the initial periods of the optimisation horizon.  
Government maintains its levels of spending, which translates into higher issuance 
of bonds given its falling income in Table 4.3. The increase in bond issuance is also 
driven by the fall in the other sources of funds such as loans. In terms of our 
specification, the decline in the loan liabilities relative to the baseline is driven by 
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the higher borrowing costs and the lower income of government.  The marginal 
decrease in the government equities, both on the asset and liability sides, reflects 
the lower equity price as the quantity of equities is modelled exogenously. Similarly 
to the other institutions, the decrease in the sources of funding (liabilities) is 
matched by a decline in the uses of funding (assets).   
The Reserve Bank sees a large increase in interest income as loan and cash and 
deposit rates rise. This increases the demand for loans as a source of funding, raising 
the financial wealth of the Reserve Bank and translating into higher purchases of 
bonds. Our assumption is that any increase in the financial wealth of the Reserve 
Bank translates into a greater holding of bonds.  The stocks of all other assets are 
assumed exogenous.47 
Below we outline the changes in net financial wealth, measured as the difference 
between the stock of financial assets and the stock of financial liabilities divided by 
nominal GDP. The results indicate that the net financial position of the country 
improves as a result of a reversal in capital flows. This is not surprising as the assets 
of the foreign sector are denominated in rand terms in our framework whereas the 
liabilities (the foreign assets of the domestic sector) are denominated in foreign 
currency units. The domestic economy benefits from the depreciation in the 
currency. At the same time the decline in foreign savings reduces the sources of 
funding and the stock of assets held by the foreign sector relative to the baseline. 
Table 4.4: Changes to net financial wealth 
 
Source: Model simulations 
                                                 
47 The change in equities reflects the fall in the equity prices and not the stock of equities.  
Net Financial Wealth
change as percent of GDP t+1 t+10
Central Bank 0,0 0,0
Financial sector 1,1 0,3
Non-financial sector 3,4 4,2
Households 0,2 0,7
Government -0,4 0,0
ROW -4,3 -5,2
sudden stop
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In our framework, which is stock and flow consistent, the deterioration in the net 
wealth of one sector must be matched by improvements in the net wealth of other 
sectors. In this case, the improvement takes place mainly through the balance sheets 
of the financial and non-financial sectors, which increase savings to offset the fall 
in foreign savings. For the financial sector this effect is temporary, while for the 
non-financial sector the impact carries throughout the simulation period. The more 
permanent effect for the non-financial sector is explained by the higher net savings 
in the outer years, which are driven by permanently lower levels of investment.   
The impact on domestic demand is similar to the mild scenario of Smit, Grobler, 
and Nel (2014); however, our shock is significantly smaller, almost half as large. 
Our transmission mechanism is significantly different and assumes the amplifying 
effects of the financial sector, which in our framework work through the balance 
sheets of all institutions in the economy. The results are relatively small compared 
to international experiences as South Africa has a relatively low stock of foreign-
currency denominated debt. This also minimises the probability of a capital flow 
reversal shock causing a banking crisis. However, our analysis indicates that even 
in the absence of foreign-currency denominated debt, the financial sector has an 
important role in promulgating shocks through the economy.  The effect is largely 
through the financial sector as the foreign sector affects demand for assets and 
liabilities, asset prices and the money creation process.  
In our analysis so far, we have assumed that there is no structural change in the 
behaviour of institutions in response to the capital flow reversal shock.  A structural 
change reflects a discontinuity linked, for example, to bubble bursting, as pointed 
out in the literature review section. General equilibrium models are continuous 
models and cannot handle catastrophe-theory-type dynamics. The nature of our 
framework, however, allows us to introduce such dynamics. While we cannot 
change the behaviour within periods as the household optimises, we can change 
behaviour between periods.  
In response to a negative shock, the household shortens its optimisation period. It 
tries to achieve its target wealth sooner as the future looks more uncertain. 
Household expectations become more myopic. The simulation aims to capture the 
break in expectations described by Harris (1979). This is also in line with economic 
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literature, which shows that agents switch between different forecasting rules and 
excess volatility can be explained by these changes (Grandmont 1998; Hommes 
2011; Roos and Luhan 2013). 
In Figure 4.4, we present the baseline consumption path indexed to 100 in period 
zero. The household optimisation, which starts at period zero is labelled as t-2. 
Figure 4.4 shows that the consumption paths overlap over the solution period.   
Figure 4.4: Consumption path in the base 
 
Source: Model simulations 
The shock takes place in the second period. The optimisation path labelled t in Figure 4.5 
has shifted to the right reflecting that households need to save more and consume 
less. This path reflects the growth rates depicted in Figure 4.3.  
The optimisation in the next period (t+1) follows on t. As the outer periods of the 
optimisation horizon are reached, the path of household consumption gets closer to 
the path set in period t-1. The shift in the optimisation path is also affected by the 
household anticipating a recovery in the economy as was highlight earlier. This 
leads to a lower adjustment in household consumption expenditure in the initial 
periods of the optimisation horizon. The outer year optimisation paths, labelled 
t+10 and t+16, are close to the baseline path. 
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Figure 4.5: Consumption path following a reversal in capital flows without a 
change in the household optimisation horizon 
 
Source: Model simulations 
In the second simulation, we introduce discontinuity by changing household 
expectations from model-consistent to more myopic. The shock leads to households 
shortening their optimisation horizon and thus trying to achieve their level of target 
wealth over a shorter period. The results are presented in Figure 4.6.  
Figure 4.6: Consumption path following a reversal in capital flows with a 
change in the household optimisation horizon 
 
Source: Model simulations 
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The shock is introduced by assuming that in the period when the shock takes place, 
households reduce their horizon to three periods, while trying to achieve the same 
level of financial wealth. The optimisation horizon reverses gradually as the shock 
is reversed.  
Figure 4.7: Ratio of consumption under simulation two to simulation one 
 
Source: Model simulations 
The results show a larger shift to the right. The impact on consumption is larger, 
reflecting that the household saves more, which is a function of its expectations. 
Now, it cannot foresee a recovery in the economy and it has a shorter period of time 
to achieve its wealth target. The sudden change in expectations and consequent 
behaviour of the household exacerbates the negative effects associated with the 
capital flow reversal shock. This is shown in The shock is introduced by assuming 
that in the period when the shock takes place, households reduce their horizon to 
three periods, while trying to achieve the same level of financial wealth. The 
optimisation horizon reverses gradually as the shock is reversed.  
Figure 4.7, which plots the ratio of consumption under simulation two to simulation 
one, indexed to 100 in the base year.  The impact shows a larger decline in 
household consumption over the period associated with the capital flow reversal 
shock. The trend shows recovery as capital flows normalise and the optimisation 
period moves gradually from three periods back to ten periods. In the outer years, 
household consumption in simulation two is slightly higher relative to simulation 
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one as income is relatively higher. The higher levels of savings in the initial periods 
of simulation two provide for a higher stock of assets, which generates relatively 
higher interest and dividend income in the outer periods.  
While in the first simulation, household consumption was 2.4 percent lower relative 
to the baseline in period t+1, now it is almost four per cent lower.  The higher 
savings by households, however, reduce some of the negative effects on investment 
associated with the reversal in foreign savings.   Liquidity, proxied by the growth 
in cash and deposits, is higher compared to simulation one, which reduces the 
negative impact on the financial sector’s reserve ratio. This leads to a lower loan 
rate and higher investment compared to simulation one. 
4.4 Conclusion 
Our main result is that even in the absence of a large stock of foreign-currency-
denominated debt, a capital flow reversal shock can still generate a sizable impact. 
The reduction in capital flows reduces liquidity in the domestic market and 
increases the need to raise the level of domestic net savings. Financial sector 
perceptions of risk increase, which encourages the sector to hold more reserves and 
reduces the supply of loans. This pushes the lending spread and reduces the equity 
price. Economic activity declines. The real economy effects feed back to the 
financial sector though the balance sheets of all institutions, creating a financial 
accelerator effect.   
The results can be significantly larger if there is a change in the expectation 
formation process of households. We introduce a discontinuity in our framework, 
which worsens the real economy impacts and increases volatility.  As indicated 
before, such discontinuity can be linked, for example, to a property bubble 
bursting.48  
In terms of policy implications, our analysis indicates that in the absence of large 
foreign-currency denominated liabilities, capital flow reversal shocks still affect the 
domestic economy through their impact on financial markets and possibly 
                                                 
48 While we have chosen to introduce discontinuities in the solution process by changing the 
household expectation formation, there are also other ways to introduce this type of behaviour.  
These include changes to the functional specification of the model as well as some of the parameters.  
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expectations in the economy. Our analysis provides support to the framework 
developed by Blanchard et al. (2016). While developments in the global economy 
are increasingly a driver of capital flows, there are domestic policy interventions 
that can prevent large negative effects. For example, domestic policies must avoid 
the development of bubbles during the capital flow surge, which can cause 
significant economic disruptions as they burst in the presence of capital flow 
reversal shocks. Policy makers also have significant control over liquidity in the 
domestic market, which if used effectively can reduce the negative effects 
associated with the financial accelerator mechanism. The impacts on the loan 
spread and asset prices are likely to be less negative and the real impacts on the 
economy more muted.  
Despite a fall in the repo rate, the loan rate increased as the spread jumped following 
the decline in foreign savings. This creates a policy dilemma.  A decline in the repo 
rate can exacerbate the foreign savings outflow by reducing the real risk-adjusted 
interest rate differential, which has a contractionary impact on the economy. If the 
economy has foreign currency denominated liabilities, the stronger depreciation 
will worsen the economic impacts.  While this issue is beyond the scope of this 
paper to provide a detailed analysis, we argue that a repo rate increase may reduce 
lending rates by reducing the outflow of foreign savings and the increase in the 
lending spread.  However, this is also a risky policy option because if the repo rate 
increase does not help to slow down the capital flow reversal or the lending spread 
impact is smaller than the increase in the repo rate, loan rates will be even higher 
and more contractionary. This highlights the need for policy makers to have a good 
understanding of the link between monetary policy actions, liquidity management, 
risk perceptions of the financial sector and the likely impact on borrowing rates. 
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Chapter 5 Fiscal Multipliers in South Africa 
5.1 Introduction 
The severity of the economic recession after the 2008 financial crisis led 
governments across the world to adopt fiscal stimulus measures between 2008 and 
2010. This, and subsequent attempts to reverse budget deficits, have been 
accompanied by a resurgence of economic research on the effectiveness of fiscal 
policy in influencing aggregate demand and GDP.  
The central argument of the New Keynesian framework is that under zero lower 
bound conditions, multipliers are significantly larger (Blanchard and Leigh 2014; 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2011; Delong et al. 2012; Eggertsson 2009). 
The underlying mechanism assumes that the Taylor rule does not respond to 
movements in the output gap and inflation as rates are zero bound, while the 
increase in inflation expectations reduces real rates. This stimulates investment and 
consumption. 
We argue that this mechanism is not sufficient to explain the larger fiscal multipliers 
during the post-2008 crisis. It does not capture financial sector dynamics, which 
were particularly important for the crisis and post-crisis periods.  
The novelty of our work is that we study the impacts of fiscal policy in a model 
which explicitly models flows and balance sheets in the economy. We develop a 
small general equilibrium model that builds on Devarajan and Go (1998) and is 
stock and flow consistent in the tradition of Backus et al. (1980) and Godley and 
Lavoie (2007).49 Unlike the standard financial accelerator mechanism, our 
framework captures the interlinkages of all balance sheets in the economy. In 
addition, it links economic activity, asset price movements, bank capital, 
perceptions of risks by the financial sector and lending spreads (the difference 
between the loan rate and the repo rate), capturing the dynamics identified by 
Woodford (2010) and Borio and Zhu (2012).   
                                                 
49 There are five specific properties of stock and flow consistent models as identified by Tobin 
(1982). These are precision regarding time, tracking of stocks, several assets and rates of return, 
modelling of financial and monetary policy operations, Walras’s Law and adding up constraint. 
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We calibrate the model to South African data and assess the likely impact of fiscal 
expenditure on output after 2008. We assume away the Ricardian household 
assumption as it does not apply in the South African context (Mathfield 2006).  
Our results indicate that the fiscal multiplier should have been in the range of 2 to 
3 in the period immediately after the 2008 financial crisis given the negative output 
gap, the low government debt to GDP ratio, the monetary policy stance, the health 
of the South African financial sector and the large inflow of foreign savings into 
the economy. Our results are significantly different from recent studies on South 
Africa as well as studies looking at the size of fiscal multipliers in other emerging 
markets. The differences are driven by the absence of Ricardian households in our 
framework, the lack of supply side constraints, the unresponsiveness of monetary 
authorities to the closing but still negative output gap (similar to zero-bound interest 
rate conditions) and, most importantly, the presence of stock and flow consistent 
financial sector dynamics, which amplify the impact of a fiscal stimulus.   
Higher fiscal expenditure increases aggregate demand, stimulating domestic 
economic activity in the presence of idle resources. Factor incomes increase, 
improving firms’ profitability and household income. This translates into higher 
deposits with banks. The supply of loans increases as there are more deposits with 
the financial sector. Following the mechanisms outlined by Borio and Zhu (2012) 
and Woodford (2010), the acceleration in economic activity, reduces the 
probabilities of default and the perception of risk, and improves valuations and the 
net worth of the financial sector, leading to higher levels of intermediation and 
lower lending spreads. The decline in lending spreads simulates economic activity 
further, creating a feedback loop, which operates through the balance sheets of all 
agents unlike the financial accelerator mechanism proposed by Bernanke, Gertler, 
and Gilchrist (1999) .  The effect depends on the inflows of foreign savings which 
reduce the savings constraint facing the domestic economy and allow for 
investment expenditure to accelerate. This result is in line with the theoretical model 
of Blanchard et al. (2016).  In the absence of foreign savings, the higher multiplier 
is primarily driven by the higher levels of household consumption as the higher 
equity prices make it easier for the representative household to achieve its level of 
target wealth.  
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Our result relies on low debt agents or credit unconstraint agents – in this case 
government, expanding demand and fuelling a financial accelerator mechanism. 
The latter depends on the health of the financial sector.  In a stock and flow 
consistent framework, this implies that the deterioration in the net worth of 
government is offset by an improvement in the net worth of other agents. Our results 
also indicate that an inflow of foreign savings can amplify the fiscal multiplier by 
reducing the savings constraint in the economy, strengthening the financial 
accelerator mechanism and allowing for more funds to be available for 
consumption. This result is in line with the theoretical model of Blanchard et al. 
(2016).  
5.2 Literature Review 
The mainstream theoretical mechanism to assess the size of fiscal multipliers relies 
on New Keynesian dynamics, which have been built into Dynamic Stochastic 
General Equilibrium models (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005; Smets and 
Wouters 2007).  The critical assumptions affecting the size of the fiscal multipliers 
are monetary policy driven by a Taylor rule and inflation explained by a New 
Keynesian Phillips curve, Ricardian households and rational expectations 
combined with limited or no financial frictions and sticky prices and wages. Under 
the Taylor rule specification, an increase in aggregate demand will narrow the 
output gap, pushing (even if the output gap is still negative) the policy rate directly 
through the Taylor rule and indirectly through its impact on inflation via the Phillips 
curve. Real rates increase. This in turn affects consumption and investment 
negatively and leads to the familiar crowding out effect.  
The Ricardian households anticipate that current fiscal expenditure will have to be 
offset by higher taxes in the future as they have perfect knowledge of government 
intertemporal constraints. This leads households to increase savings to compensate 
for the impact of higher taxes in the future on their permanent income, leading to 
lower household consumption now. The absence of financial frictions assumes 
away any financial accelerator effects that may amplify the positive or negative 
effects associated with fiscal policy decisions. The effect is offset somewhat by the 
assumption of sticky prices and wages, which amplifies aggregate demand effects. 
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Coenen (2012) studies the impact of expansionary fiscal policy in seven structural 
DSGE models and compares the results to two academic DSGE models. In their 
study, monetary accommodation and a higher share of non-Ricardian households 
increase the multipliers significantly. Interestingly, lower nominal rigidities 
translate into higher multipliers as they increase the inflationary impacts and 
decrease real rates in the presence of monetary accommodation. They acknowledge 
that the absence of financial frictions can underestimate the size of the fiscal 
multipliers in DSGE models.  
Recent empirical research, however, indicates that fiscal multipliers tend to be 
larger during recessionary periods (Auerbach and Gorodnichenko 2012; Fazzari, 
Morley, and Panovska 2015; Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy 2013; Riera-Crichton, 
Vegh, and Vuletin 2015).50,51 This questions the underlying theoretical mechanisms 
in the New Keynesian framework.  
The response of mainstream economics and the main theoretical innovations in 
studying the expansionary potential of fiscal policy in a recession has involved 
modelling its impact when the policy interest rate is at a zero lower bound, a 
situation that was effectively reached in the United States, the United Kingdom, and 
the Eurozone as the Federal Reserve, Bank of England, and European Central Bank 
lowered interest rates to near zero  (Blanchard and Leigh 2014; Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 2011; Delong et al. 2012; Eggertsson 2009). For example, 
Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) find a spending multiplier of 3.7 under 
zero lower bound conditions compared to a multiplier of 1.1 under normal 
conditions. Eggertsson (2009) finds a spending multiplier of 2.3 under zero lower 
bound conditions compared to 0.5 under normal conditions. 
In the presence of a zero lower bound that prevents nominal interest rates falling to 
adjust real interest rates towards the level that would be required by a standard 
monetary policy rule, higher government expenditure pushes inflation expectations 
up, thereby reducing real rates and stimulating private consumption and investment. 
                                                 
50 Mineshima, Poplawski-Ribeiro, and Weber (2014) provide a comprehensive review of the recent 
literature on fiscal multipliers for advanced countries, and Batini, Eyraud, and Weber (2014) for 
emerging economies.  
51 For example, Auerbach and Gorodnichenko (2012) find a spending multiplier of 2.4 in 
recessionary conditions, while Owyang, Ramey, and Zubairy (2013) find a multiplier of 1.6 for 
Canada. 
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In a second-round effect, the reduced output gap leads to a further rise in inflation 
expectations and stimulates the economy (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 
2011). Effectively, the Taylor rule mechanism is switched off at zero nominal 
interest rates causing real rates to fall as inflation expectations rise 
The multiplier effect is likely to be stronger if the fiscal expansion is driven by 
measures supporting aggregate demand rather than aggregate supply as the latter 
tends to increase the spare capacity in the economy and deflationary pressures 
(Coenen 2012; Eggertsson 2009).52   
In addition, the assumption regarding Ricardian households is less binding as the 
number of credit-constrained households increases in economic conditions 
characterised by zero lower bound. The Ricardian equivalence theorem relies on 
assumptions such as absence of credit constraints on households and similar interest 
rates and time horizons for government and households. There is no evidence that 
these assumptions hold, particularly during times of economic slowdown.53  
Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) present a different theoretical model to explain the 
higher multipliers under zero lower bound conditions, which operates via the real 
stock of debt. In their framework, liquidity constrained debtors are forced to repay 
debt, and thus their spending depends on current rather than expected future 
income. Under conditions, characterised by zero bounds on nominal interest rates, 
expansionary fiscal policy can stop the deflationary spiral, reduce the stock of real 
debt and halt the deleveraging process, which in turn eases the credit constraint and 
supports further expansion in output. Their model works through inflation rather 
than expected inflation as in Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011). To the 
extent that inflation expectations are adaptive, higher inflation today can reduce the 
stock of real debt, but it can also increase inflation expectations reducing real rates 
and amplifying the size of fiscal multipliers.  
Some recent DSGE models assume that Ricardian equivalence does not hold for all 
households by introducing a certain share of credit constrained households. In Gali, 
                                                 
52 The level of hysteresis can have a significant impact on the size of the fiscal multipliers, and thus 
fiscal expansion measures which even support aggregate supply may have a strong positive impact 
on output (Delong et al. 2012). 
53 Carlin and Soskice (2015) provide discussion of the required conditions for the Ricardian 
equivalence theorem to hold.  
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Lopez-Salido, and Valles (2007), the size of the multiplier varies with the share of 
rule-of-thumb households and the degree of price stickiness. Higher price stickiness 
reduces the mark-up in the presence of a fiscal expansion. A similar mechanism is 
employed by Cogan et al. (2010). However, they find a lower multiplier as their 
study uses a lower share of credit constrained households and wage rigidities, which 
reduces the impact of a fiscal expansion on household income.   
A limitation of the New Keynesian framework and the related DSGE models is the 
absence of financial sector dynamics. This is particularly important since 
recessionary conditions are often a by-product of financial sector crises, which also 
cause more severe economic slowdowns, accompanied by weaker recoveries 
(Reinhart and Rogoff 2009). Financial markets are also the main determinant of the 
sustainability of government debt and thus the effectiveness of fiscal policy 
(Afonso, Baxa, and Slavik 2011; Mittnik and Semmler 2013).54 For example, 
Proaño, Schoder, and Semmler (2014) find that at high levels of financial stress the 
government debt-to-GDP level has a negative impact on economic activity, 
regardless of the debt levels.55  
Studies employing New Keynesian models have addressed the criticism of a lack 
of financial sector dynamics by introducing the financial accelerator mechanism 
proposed by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999). A fall in net worth implies 
that borrowers have little wealth to contribute to project finance. This creates a 
potential divergence between the interests of borrowers and lenders, which 
increases agency costs in the presence of asymmetric information. The probability 
of default increases as the company has less of its own funds involved in the project. 
The higher agency costs require that the lenders are compensated through higher 
premiums, which increase the external finance constraints for firms. In a second-
round effect, the higher premiums lead to a further reduction in net wealth and 
amplify the initial effect. This effect can start with a fall in economic activity, which 
reduces cash flows, asset prices and profits, reducing net worth. Bernanke, Gertler, 
                                                 
54 The empirical literature generally finds that high government debt levels are associated with small 
or negative multipliers (Huidrom et al. 2016; Nickel and Tudyka 2014). 
55 Studies that do not take into account financial sector dynamics find that the threshold level varies 
between 70 and 90 per cent on average, depending on the sample of countries studied with 
developing countries likely to have lower threshold levels (Caner, Grennes, and Koehler-Geib 2010; 
Elmeskov and Sutherland 2012; Reinhart and Rogoff 2010).   
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and Gilchrist (1999) illustrate the impact of a government expenditure shock in their 
model. The presence of the financial accelerator mechanism magnifies the impact 
of an increase in government expenditure, mainly through its impact on asset prices 
and the related increase in firms’ net worth.   
A number of studies employ the financial accelerator model in a DSGE framework 
to study the impact of fiscal expansion on output. Fernández-Villaverde (2010) and 
Carrillo and Poilly (2010) find that the size of the fiscal multiplier increases in the 
presence of financial frictions, which work through the balance sheet of a 
representative firm.56 Higher government expenditure increases inflation, which 
reduces the real value of debt stock of firms.  
The mechanism is similar to Eggertsson and Krugman (2012). This improves net 
worth and through the financial accelerator mechanism magnifies the positive 
impact of the fiscal expansion. Merola (2012) also employs the financial accelerator 
framework, which amplifies the transmission mechanism identified by Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011). The combination of nominal interest rates at the 
zero lower bound and a financial accelerator mechanism increases the fiscal 
multipliers.57 The presence of financial frictions and zero lower bound conditions 
generates fiscal multipliers of similar size to those generated by Fernández-
Villaverde (2010) and Carrillo and Poilly (2010) and significantly lower that the 
multipliers produced by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) and 
Eggertsson (2009). Counterintuitively, it appears that the presence of financial 
frictions reduces the size of fiscal multipliers.    
Kollmann et al. (2013) extend the financial accelerator model to the financial sector. 
In their framework the impact works through the link between net worth of the 
representative bank and the spread between the mortgage rate and the deposit rate. 
A loan default lowers bank capital, increases the spread and reduces output.58 This 
                                                 
56 While the presence of financial sector dynamics increases the size of the fiscal multiplier, these 
effects are small and the multipliers are significantly lower than those found by Christiano, 
Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011) and Eggertsson (2009). The multiplier moves from just below 1 to 
just above 1 in the presence of financial frictions and zero lower bound conditions.  
57 If nominal interest rates are not at the zero bound, then the size of the multipliers decreases 
significantly as the real interest rate channel identified by Merola is no longer operational.   
58 The financial accelerator mechanism embedded in the balance sheet of banks is also used to study 
unconventional monetary policy questions in DSGE models (Gertler and Karadi 2011; Gertler, 
Kiyotaki, and Queralto 2012). 
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assumes that the financial accelerator mechanism applied to banks is similar to 
firms. The financial sector, however, has the important role of intermediation and 
money creation. A fall in the net worth of the financial sector has much broader 
implications than a fall in the net worth of other agents in the economy, both by 
increasing lending spreads but also by reducing the supply of intermediation 
services and the money multiplier (Woodford 2010). The decline in intermediation 
services exacerbates credit constraints in the economy and leads to a further decline 
in asset prices and the net worth of banks. Continuous deterioration in the balance 
sheet of the financial sector leads eventually to insolvency and a banking crisis. 
The challenge with the financial accelerator mechanism is that it appears that only 
the net worth of one sector’s balance sheet is important to economic activity. The 
balance sheets of different sectors of the economy and their interlinkages are not 
captured. These interlinkages can strengthen or weaken the transmission of shocks 
through the financial sector. In the absence of stock consistency, the mechanism 
cannot capture the distribution of debt, which is important to determine the 
sustainability of expansionary fiscal policy and the likely fiscal multiplier. More 
importantly, the financial accelerator mechanism is not able to capture the dynamics 
of risk-taking as it ignores the time varying pricing of risk and effective risk 
tolerance (Borio and Zhu 2012).  
The omission of the foreign sector in the financial accelerator mechanism implies 
that the impacts of increased global liquidity are not captured. In models without 
financial sector dynamics, higher inflows will translate into an appreciation in the 
currency and a contraction in domestic activity. However, in models with financial 
dynamics and a foreign sector, increased global liquidity and higher inflow of 
foreign savings can reduce the domestic savings constraint, increase credit 
extension and asset prices, and support a fiscal expansion.59 In the theoretical 
framework of Blanchard et al. (2016),  higher inflows of foreign savings appreciate 
the currency but also reduce the cost of financial intermediation. If the latter effect 
dominates the former effect, the inflow of foreign capital can be expansionary. 
                                                 
59 The importance of global liquidity and capital flows relates the current discussion to the literature 
on monetary policy independence and the global financial cycle. For more information see Rey 
(2015).   
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Their framework, however, does not capture financial accelerator mechanisms and 
thus it may underestimate the impacts.   
Since current New Keynesian models of fiscal policy omit other sectors’ balance 
sheets, compositional issues are ignored and there is no consistent representation of 
flow of funds information between institutions. This generates results which can be 
misleading. For example, Fernández-Villaverde (2010) and  Carrillo and Poilly 
(2010) argue that a cut in labour taxes will reduce inflation in the economy by 
increasing the supply of labour and hence reduce the fiscal multipliers. But lower 
labour taxes can increase the cash flow of households, improve their balance sheets 
and reduce their credit constraints, which can increase the size of the multipliers. 
This channel is missing in their analysis. There is general equilibrium on the real 
side of the economy but only partial dynamics on the financial side.  
We argue that these are significant limitations of the current New Keynesian 
framework and the associated DSGE models as the presence of financial sector 
dynamics, which satisfy stock and flow consistency, can have a significant impact 
on the size of the fiscal multipliers. That this is so is indicated by empirical findings 
of a strong relationship between risk premia and asset prices on the one side and the 
impact of fiscal policy on the other (Afonso, Baxa, and Slavik 2011; Afonso and 
Sousa 2012; Agnello and Sousa 2013; Proaño, Schoder, and Semmler 2014). 
Fiscal decisions can affect the balance sheets and net worth of all institutions in the 
economy. The financial sector will affect the real economy through the borrower 
balance sheet channel, the bank balance sheet channel and the liquidity channel as 
identified by BCBS (2011). The financial accelerator effect will work not only 
through the net worth of non-financial firms but through the net worth of all 
institutions in the economy and the complex inter-relationships that exist between 
the assets and liabilities of different institutions. The impacts will also work through 
the theoretical models of Borio and Zhu (2012) and Woodford (2010).  
In the model developed by Woodford (2010), the lending spread is a function of the 
financial sector capital. Raising the level of capital is costly and leverage is limited 
by regulatory requirements. Shocks that impair the capital of the intermediary or 
higher leverage ratio regulatory requirements translate into higher lending spreads, 
lower volumes of lending and economic activity.  Borio and Zhu (2012) also link 
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capital of the financial sector to bank behaviour. In their framework, the behaviour 
is driven by the capital threshold effect and the capital framework effect. The 
capital threshold effect arises because breaching the minimum threshold is costly 
for a bank. In the face of a possible breach banks will take defensive action to avoid 
the high costs, which will affect the availability and pricing of funding extended to 
customers. The capital framework effect influences the way the banks measure, 
manage and price risk, which affects their behaviour. The economic cycle changes 
the strength of the capital threshold effect as probabilities of default, valuations and 
the perception of risk change.  In turn, this shifts the relative position of the banks’ 
capital to the regulatory threshold and affects bank behaviour. The accelerator 
effects in both models are driven by the relationship between capital and economic 
activity. Higher economic activity reduces the probabilities of default and the 
perception of risk, and improves valuations. This reduces lending spreads and 
encourages further improvements in economic activity.   
The implications of these mechanisms for fiscal policy is that expansionary fiscal 
policy which is perceived as sustainable may have a much stronger impact on the 
economy than the current estimates in the economic literature through its impact on 
economic activity directly and indirectly through its impact on bank capital. At the 
same time, unsustainable expansion can have a much more negative impact than 
currently anticipated.    
In addition, balance sheet dynamics play an important role in understanding how 
funding of government expenditure affects the economy. For example, the financial 
sector facilitates the movement of funds from non-government institutions to 
government. If funders disinvest from other asset classes, this will affect the price 
of these assets and possibly the net worth of some individuals and companies.60 
These will have broader implications for the economy. Raising funds to purchase 
government bonds will depend on the health of balance sheets in the economy. 
Similarly, fiscal decisions to fund expenditure through direct taxes can affect the 
after-tax income and profits and the ability of households to service their debt and 
for companies to provide dividends. This can also have implications for the 
institutional balance sheets and the net worth of market participants. If no other 
                                                 
60 In addition to issues of net worth, if for example equity prices fall, market values will fall and 
investment can decline through a Tobin’s Q process. 
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institutions are willing to purchase government bonds due to the health of their 
balance sheets, it will be left to the Central Bank to purchase them and  then the 
fiscal expansion will be reduced to unconventional monetary policy  (Borio and 
Disyatat 2010). Capturing these relationships requires stocks and flow consistency.  
Recent studies on fiscal multipliers in South Africa do not incorporate financial 
sector dynamics. Jooste, Liu, and Naraidoo (2013), employing a DSGE model, a 
structural vector error correction model and a time-varying parameter vector 
autoregressive model, find that countercyclical fiscal policy has been effective in 
South Africa; however, the impact has been often less than unity in the short term 
and there is no impact on GDP in the long term. The largest multiplier is reached 
after five quarters and is equivalent to 0.6.  These authors argue that the small 
multiplier reflects high imports leakage, which is common for open economies.  
Mabugu et al. (2013), employing an intertemporal CGE model, find that 
government expenditure can have a positive impact if it is on investment and this 
translates into higher productivity. Other types of expenditure tend to have very 
small multipliers close to zero.61 Akanbi (2013) uses a macro econometric model 
to study the impacts of fiscal policy in South Africa and finds that multipliers 
associated with demand side interventions tend to be smaller if the economy is 
supply side constrained. The multipliers are just below one even in conditions 
characterised by a negative output gap and decline to zero within 3 years of the 
shock.  
Our framework is also different to other studies looking at emerging markets. These 
also have no financial dynamics and the multipliers tend to be small. Such studies 
do not identify specific periods or conditions which affect the size of the multipliers. 
The results are based on time-series analysis, dominated by vector autoregressive 
techniques, which average the impact of fiscal decisions on the economies over a 
fairly long period of time in order to satisfy requirements regarding the number of 
observations. Thus, they provide limited insights whether, under recessionary 
conditions with falling asset prices, fiscal multipliers are large or small, and what 
drives their magnitude.  
                                                 
61 The model seems to be supply constrained and only interventions that increase the supply side of 
the economy lead to positive multipliers with a significant lag.  
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Jha et al. (2014) employ a Structural Vector Autoregressive (SVAR) model to study 
the impacts of tax cuts and government expenditure in ten Asian economies. They 
find that on average tax cuts have a greater countercyclical impact on output than 
government expenditure. They argue that tax cuts stimulate investment unlike 
higher government consumption expenditure, which crowds out investment. They 
show the present values of cumulative spending multipliers, which vary from 
negative 3.3 in Thailand after nine quarters to positive 1.3 in India. The tax 
multipliers vary between negative 1.5 in Thailand and positive 2.2 in India.  This 
result is somewhat contradicted by Hur, Mallick, and Park (2014). They find, 
employing both a panel data model and a SVAR model for the same ten Asian 
economies, that there is no significant relationship between fiscal expenditure and 
consumption and investment.  
Jawadi, Mallick, and Sousa (2014) employ a similar methodology along with a 
smooth transition regression model to study fiscal policy in Brazil, Russia, India 
and China. Their results indicate that government spending tends to have a stronger 
impact than a reduction in taxes in all countries except India. A decline in taxes led 
to an increase in output in Brazil and China, a contraction in Russia and had no 
impact in India.   
Our structural model allows us to capture the specific conditions around the 2008 
crisis, the strong fiscal response and some unique features of the South African 
economy, such as a very well developed financial sector and high tax compliance. 
This is in contrast to emerging markets, which are generally characterised by large 
informal sectors and fairly low levels of financial development (Batini, Eyraud, and 
Weber 2014).     
5.3 Model Changes and Simulations 
There are small changes to the model to reflect the conditions immediately post the 
2008 crisis. We increase the responsiveness of price expectations in equation 16 to 
the output gap. This implies that under a large negative output gap and with interest 
rates close to the lower effective bound, expectations are likely to be more 
responsive to changes in the output gap. This strengthens the mechanism identified 
by Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo (2011).  
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Prices and the repo rate in equations 11 and 34 respond only once the output gap 
turns positive. However, once the output gap becomes positive, the responses of 
prices and the repo rate in the model are stronger. This brings asymmetry into the 
model framework and creates dynamics which resemble zero lower bound 
conditions. Monetary policy accommodates expansionary fiscal policy as long as 
the output gap is negative. Equation 11 becomes 
𝑃𝑄𝑡 = (1 + 𝑖𝑛𝑓) ∙ 𝑃𝑄𝑡−1 + 𝜃1
𝑝𝑞_𝑞 ∙ (𝑦𝑡−1
𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑝,𝑙) + 𝜃2
𝑝𝑞 ∙ ∆𝑃𝑀𝑡 
where 𝜃1
𝑝𝑞_𝑞
 is larger than 𝜃1
𝑝𝑞
 and 𝑦𝑡−1
𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑝,𝑙
 is zero and becomes positive as the proxy 
output gap variable becomes positive. 
Equation 34 is now 
𝑟𝑡
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜 = 𝜌𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜 ∙ 𝑟𝑡−1
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜 + (1 − 𝜌𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜) ∙ (𝑖𝑛𝑓 + 𝛽2
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜 ∙ (𝜋𝑡 − 𝑖𝑛𝑓) + 𝛽3
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑝
∙ (𝑦𝑡−1
𝑔𝑎𝑝𝑝,𝑙)) 
where 𝛽3
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜𝑝  is larger than 𝛽3
𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜
 .Given that the repo rate and prices respond only 
to a positive output gap, these changes to the model amplify the positive impact on 
expected real rates because of an improvement in the output gap.   
Also, we introduce an additional term in the reserve ratio equation. The growth rate 
of savings affects the financial sector perceptions of risks. Higher growth compared 
to the baseline increases the ratio and thus reduces the money multiplier. 
We impose a negative output gap on the model to reflect the conditions post the 
2008 financial crisis. Using different methodologies for South Africa, Klein (2011) 
reports an output gap of negative 2.4 per cent and negative 1.4 per cent for 2009 
and 2010 respectively. Ehlers, Mboji, and Smal (2013) calculate similar size output 
gaps, while  Anvari, Ehlers, and Rudi (2014) estimate slightly more negative output 
gaps. We present two simulations: 
a. A government expenditure shock of one per cent, which lasts over the entire 
period. In the first simulation, foreign savings is kept constant.  
b. A government expenditure shock of one per cent, which lasts over the entire 
period plus an increase in foreign savings inflows equivalent to one per cent 
of domestic savings. 
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All taxes are kept constant with government savings adjusting, which translates into 
an increased issuance of bonds. 
5.4 Results 
The results indicate the impact of government consumption expenditure under 
conditions of a large negative output gap, which persists over the period, a financial 
sector which remains sound and low government debt levels. Figure 5.1 shows the 
size of the multipliers under the two simulations and compares them against the 
multiplier if the output gap is less negative and is closed more rapidly. We show 
the impact multipliers as defined by Batini, Eyraud, and Weber (2014).62 Sim1 
refers to the first shock with no increase in foreign savings, while in Sim2 foreign 
savings also increase. 
Figure 5.1: Fiscal multipliers 
 
Source: Model simulations 
                                                 
62 The impact multiplier is defined as the change in GDP at time t divided by the change in 
government consumption expenditure at time t. Other ways to compute the fiscal multiplier include 
the output change in a specific period relative to the fiscal shock in the base period, the peak 
multiplier measuring the largest change in output relative to the initial fiscal shock and the 
cumulative multiplier (Spilimbergo, Schindler, and Symansky 2009).The impact approach  and the 
specific period approach are the most commonly used. They tend to generate marginally different 
results over short periods of time. In our case, we are interested in whether the multipliers are 
significantly larger in the presence of financial sector dynamics and thus these marginal differences 
are not material and we can compare the multipliers using the two approaches.    
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The results show that for every R1 increase in government consumption 
expenditure, real GDP increases by up to R2.5 as the financial sector dynamics in 
our framework amplify the impact of the initial stimulus. The effect increases to 3.5 
if the domestic savings constraint is released. This impact persists as long as there 
are idled resources. If the output gap is smaller and households expect that it will 
turn positive soon, the multiplier is significantly smaller.    
Our multipliers are much larger than those generated for South Africa  by Akanbi 
(2013), Jooste, Liu, and Naraidoo (2013) and Mabugu et al. (2013). The differences 
are driven by the absence of Ricardian households in our framework, the lack of 
supply side constraints over the period, the accommodation of monetary authorities 
of the fiscal stimulus and, most importantly, the presence of financial sector 
dynamics, which amplify the impact of the fiscal expansion. Our emphasis is on the 
short term and under conditions of significant economic weakness rather than 
longer-term analysis as in Jooste, Liu, and Naraidoo (2013) and Mabugu et al. 
(2013). The size of our multipliers is more in line with studies which look at 
multipliers under zero lower bound conditions, such as Christiano, Eichenbaum, 
and Rebelo (2011) and Eggertsson (2009). However, our mechanism of achieving 
these high multipliers is different. 
The transmission mechanism operates as follows. Higher government expenditure 
increases aggregate demand and demand for factors of production. This pushes 
inflation expectations up, as identified by as Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Rebelo 
(2011). The higher inflation expectations reduce real rates and stimulate investment 
and the demand for loans. Figure 5.2 panel 1 shows the impact on inflation 
expectations, which increase by 0.1 percentage point. 
While inflation expectations increase, inflation and the repo rate remain unchanged 
as the output gap remains negative over the period (Figure 5.2 panels 1 and 3). This 
is in line with our specification, which assumes that the Taylor rule as well as 
inflation respond only once the output gap turns positive.  If the monetary policy 
within the model framework responded as the output gap was becoming less 
negative, the fiscal multipliers would have been smaller. Monetary accommodation 
is key in generating the large impacts.  
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The higher inflation expectations lead to higher equity prices as shown in Figure 
5.2 panel 2. The equity price also benefits from higher levels of economic activity 
as well as a greater supply of money as the economy expands at a faster rate.  
Figure 5.2: Impacts on rates and prices 
 
 Source: Model simulations 
An important part of our mechanism is how banks perceive risks and how this 
affects their willingness to hold reserves, which changes the reserve ratio and the 
money multiplier. In our specification, we linked the reserve ratio to the level of 
financial sector savings. Higher savings imply a higher ratio and a smaller money 
multiplier. The decrease in government savings due to the fiscal expansion requires 
that other institutions save more if foreign savings are fixed. While the higher 
financial sector savings increase the reserve ratio, some of the impact is offset by 
the higher value of bank assets and better economic activity. The net impact is a 
marginally higher lending spread driven by the higher reserve ratio but also by the 
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more rapid expansion in the demand for loans (Figure 5.3). The reserve ratio impact 
dissipates as the economy accelerates.  
On the one side the reserve ratio is affected by the higher asset prices and stronger 
economic activity, which change the net worth of economic agents and risk taking, 
supporting a decline in lending spreads through the theoretical model of Borio and 
Zhu (2012) and Woodford (2010). On the other side, maintaining the regulatory 
capital ratios is expensive and is hindered by South Africa’s savings constraint.  The 
net impact is a marginally higher lending spread driven by the higher reserve ratio. 
The reserve ratio impact dissipates as the economy accelerates and the positive 
effect starts to dominate the negative effect.    
Figure 5.3: Impacts on the reserve ratio and interest rate spread 
 
Source: Model simulations 
The greater supply of bonds needs to be absorbed by the various agents in the 
economy. As equity prices rise, the bond rate must rise to encourage the absorption 
of bonds, particularly by the financial and foreign sectors. These two sectors follow 
Tobin asset demand functions. The bond rate increases marginally by 30 basis 
points. These impacts reflect some crowding out effects due to the presence of a 
domestic savings constraint.  
We now look at the real economy results, which are summarised in Table 5.1 below. 
We present the deviation from baseline at two points in time: at point t+1, which is 
the period after the shock and point t+10, which is ten periods after the shock.  
In the first simulation, where foreign savings remains unchanged, the results are 
primarily driven by a strong response from household consumption.  
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Table 5.1: Impacts on real expenditure 
 
Source: Model simulations 
Households see an increase in equity prices, higher flow of factor income, increase 
in the extension of loans and somewhat lower dividend income due to higher levels 
of retained earnings by the financial and non-financial sectors. The increase in 
factor income from capital is driven by higher utilisation leading to a higher capital 
rate.  In the case of labour, employment increases, reducing the wage rate slightly. 
Based on their view of the economy, going ten periods ahead, households can afford 
to save less and consume more and still achieve their targeted level of wealth. This 
exacerbates the savings constraint more. Households effectively foresee the 
recovery in period t+10 at period t. The increase in the supply of loans is not driven 
by a lower reserve ratio but by a higher level of cash and deposits into the banking 
system as economic activity picks up.  This allows for the supply of loans to 
increase.    
The household consumption optimisation behaviour is shown in Figure 5.4. We 
show the optimisation paths in period t, period t+10 and period t+15. In period t, 
the household foresees that the economy will be expanding at a higher pace and it 
will be easier to achieve the household wealth target (the dotted black line showing 
growth rates in consumption lies above the solid line). However, as the economy 
recovers and in the absence of a reversal in the fiscal stimulus, the household 
foresees that the output gap will become positive and that monetary policy will 
become contractionary. The economy will slow down and it will become more 
difficult to achieve the household real wealth target. The growth rate slows down 
in the outer years compared to the baseline. The household in period t+15 has to 
per cent deviation from baseline
t+1 t+10 t+1 t+10
Household expenditure 0,08 0,49 0,35 0,90
Investment
  Non-financial firms -0,08 -0,01 0,37 0,51
  Other-institutions -0,10 -0,11 0,03 0,58
Exports 0,14 0,57 0,04 0,70
Imports 0,32 0,49 0,73 1,01
GDP 0,19 0,55 0,20 0,77
sim1 sim2
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decrease consumption growth relative to the baseline as it foresees the monetary 
policy contraction as inflationary pressures build up. This highlights the importance 
of timely and temporary fiscal stimulus. This explains also the shape of the 
multiplier trajectory, which peaks at period 11 and then starts to moderate. 
Figure 5.4: Household consumption path 
 
Source: Model simulations 
Investment by non-financial institutions, which generates most of the investment in 
the economy, is affected positively by higher levels of production and negatively 
by slightly higher real rates, which leads to a small negative change in the level of 
investment compared to the baseline. This reflects the crowding out which is taking 
place in the economy. The effect is slightly stronger for other institutions. The 
investment results are highly dependent on the size of coefficients. Stronger 
response to equity prices can lead to higher investment. However, this higher 
investment must be matched by higher savings. Increasing the level of savings will 
require that the financial and non-financial sector increase the level of retained 
earnings and decrease the dividend payments. This also increases the loan spread, 
reflecting the shortages of savings in the domestic economy. There will be a short-
term trade-off between household consumption and investment. However, a 
stronger response by investment changes the multiplier trajectory, as it expands 
production capacity. The recovery may be slower in the short run but the multiplier 
may be larger in the medium to long run. 
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Exports increase marginally in Table 5.1, which reflects the expansion in output. 
The exchange rate adjusts, given that foreign savings are fixed.  Exports are fairly 
price inelastic. Imports increase as the currency is stronger in the short run and 
domestic demand increases. As the economy accelerates and dividend outflows 
increase, the currency depreciates. The depreciation supports export growth and 
makes imports more expensive.   
In our framework, improvements to the net wealth of one sector can take place only 
through the deterioration of net wealth of another sector. Table 5.2 shows how, in 
the first and second simulations, the deterioration in the balance sheet of 
government is met by improvements in the balance sheets of other institutions. 
Eggertsson and Krugman (2012) argue that the distribution of debt is important as 
the constraints faced by agents with high debt are different from those faced with 
low debt. Deterioration in the net worth of agents with low debt at a time of 
economic slowdown improves the net worth of agents with excess borrowing, and 
reduces their credit constraints. In this case, the healthy balance sheet of 
government before the crisis allowed it to expand expenditure when other agents 
were constrained.  
The deterioration in the net wealth of government is largely offset through 
improvements in the net wealth of non-financial enterprises. This reflects the 
increase in domestic savings generated by the non-financial sector. This is also in 
line with the situation in South Africa post the 2008 period, as enterprises increased 
their savings. The household also records some deterioration in net wealth, which 
reflects their increased holding of loans.   
Table 5.2: Changes to net financial wealth 
 
Source: Model simulations 
Net Financial Wealth
change as percent of GDP t+1 t+10 t+1 t+10
Reserve Bank 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Financial sector 0,1 -0,1 0,0 -0,3
Non-financial sector 0,4 1,4 0,0 -0,5
Households -0,2 -0,1 -0,2 -0,6
Government -0,3 -1,1 -0,3 -0,8
ROW 0,0 -0,1 0,5 2,1
sim1 sim2
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Table 5.3 and Table 5.4 below show the changes to financial assets and liabilities 
in period t+10 (ten periods after the shock). As expected, government issuance of 
bonds is 3.5 per cent higher compared to the baseline. This increase is absorbed by 
the financial sector and the foreign sector as the rate of return on bonds increases in 
order to attract financial flows. The purchases by the Reserve Bank are linked to 
our specification where expansion of money supply is offset through an increase in 
the bond holding of the Reserve Bank. An alternative approach is to have the 
Reserve Bank purchase foreign reserves, which will increase the sources of funds 
for the foreign sector and its purchases of bonds.63 If the bank also increases its 
purchases of bonds, this will absorb a greater share of the newly issued bonds, 
putting less pressure on bond yields while also increasing cash and deposits in 
circulation. This mechanism, which is considered unconventional monetary policy, 
will further amplify the positive effects associated with the fiscal expansion. The 
higher cash and deposit will increase the supply of loans and reduce the loan spread. 
At the same time, the financial and foreign sectors will invest more in assets other 
than government bonds, supporting asset prices and deposits with the financial 
sector. This will further strengthen the financial accelerator mechanism in our 
framework.  
The increase in the equity holding of the Reserve Bank as an asset and liability 
reflects the higher equity price. We keep the quantity of equities held by the Reserve 
Bank constant. The Reserve Bank also increases money supply (cash and deposits) 
and its loan liability as economic activity accelerates.  
The financial sector decreases its holding of equities and cash and deposits as their 
relative return is lower than that of bonds. The growth in the liabilities of the 
financial sector reflect the higher levels of economic activity, which translate into 
higher levels of cash and deposits with the sectors as well as the higher equity prices 
and the increased holding of equities by the household sector. Our assumption is 
that the household equity assets are a liability of the financial sector balance sheet.64  
                                                 
63 As indicated in Chapter 2, The South African Reserve Bank uses mostly currency swaps in its 
management of money supply so the current specification is a departure from the actual process. 
However, this is unlikely to change our overall result.  
64 Most of the household equity holding is made of interests in retirement and life funds, which we 
have classified as equities. 
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Table 5.3: Changes to the holding of financial assets 
 
Source: Model simulations 
Table 5.4: Changes to holding of financial liabilities 
 
Source: Model simulations 
Similarly, the foreign sector decreases its holding of cash and deposits relative to 
the baseline. The higher financial wealth of the foreign sector is not driven by an 
increase in net savings, but by the higher equity prices and an increase in the value 
of equity and loan liabilities as the economy is growing faster and domestic 
residents invest abroad.  
The household, whose asset demand is linked to its level of nominal income, 
increases its holdings of equities and cash deposits. The increase in the equity 
holding also reflects the higher equity price. The household does not provide loans, 
and our assumption is that it does not demand bonds due to its small holding in the 
underlying data. Some of the increase in the household financial wealth is financed 
through an increase in the holding of loans and some reflects the higher equity price. 
The equity liability of the non-financial sector declines relative to the baseline, 
which reflects the fall in demand for equities by the financial sector. The non-
financial sector provides equities to ensure that the balance between supply and 
demand is satisfied. Despite the fall in its ability to fund financial wealth through 
equity sales, financial wealth for the sector increases. This is due to an increase in 
deviation from baseline
t+10 sim1 sim2 sim1 sim2 sim1 sim2 sim1 sim2
Reserve Bank 0,6 0,7 1,3 2,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Financial sector -0,4 -0,2 3,4 1,8 -0,5 -0,4 0,1 0,6
Non-financial sector 0,6 0,7 0,0 0,0 0,6 0,8 0,5 0,7
Households 0,2 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,6 0,8 0,0 0,0
Government 0,6 0,7 0,0 0,0 0,6 0,8 0,5 0,7
ROW 0,4 4,0 5,3 6,7 -1,0 2,8 0,8 4,1
Equities Loans
Assets
Bonds Cash and dep
deviation from baseline
t+10 sim1 sim2 sim1 sim2 sim1 sim2 sim1 sim2
Reserve Bank 0,6 0,7 0,0 0,0 0,6 0,8 0,6 0,8
Financial sector 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,5 0,3 0,7
Non-financial sector -1,7 1,7 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,7
Households 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,1 0,7
Government 0,6 0,7 3,5 2,8 0,0 0,0 0,2 0,7
ROW 1,1 1,5 0,1 -0,4 0,1 -0,4 0,6 0,8
Loans
Liabilities
Equities Bonds Cash and dep
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equity prices, loans taken by the sector and net savings. The holdings of assets in 
the form of equities, loans and cash and deposits are around 0.6 percent higher than 
in the baseline. The provision of loans by the financial sector is linked to the level 
of financial wealth: the higher the wealth, the more loans are extended. These are 
generally in the form of trade loans. We assume that non-financial institutions do 
not demand government bonds as they have a very small holding in the data used 
for the calibration.   
In our second simulation, the fiscal shock is accompanied by an increase in the 
inflow of foreign savings, equivalent to roughly 1 per cent of domestic savings.  
This aims to capture the likely impact of the higher global liquidity post the 2008 
financial crisis and South Africa’s higher interest rate environment vis-à-vis the rest 
of the world.  
This leads to a significant increase in the multiplier, which jumps from 2.5 to 3.5 
(Figure 5.1). The increase in net foreign savings leads to a rise in the sources funds. 
The increase in foreign savings effectively reduces the credit constraint on the 
domestic economy and increases liquidity.   
Higher foreign savings reduce the need for domestic institutions to increase savings 
in order to offset the higher levels of dissaving by the government. This leads to 
higher dividend payments as well as a decrease in the reserve ratio of the financial 
sector (Figure 5.3). The impact on the loan spread is significantly smaller and the 
impact on inflation expectations is larger (Figure 5.2). Real rates in the economy 
are lower than in the first simulation and lower than in the baseline.  
This decline in real borrowing rates along with higher levels of economic activity 
supports investment by non-financial and other institutions, which increases in the 
second simulation (Table 5.1). The household now sees even higher equity prices, 
which makes it easier for it to achieve its level of targeted real wealth. In addition, 
household consumption is supported by higher dividend payments, higher factor 
payments and more extension of loans.  
Net exports, however, decline compared to simulation one as the higher net foreign 
savings translate into a stronger currency. The net impact on domestic demand and 
production is positive overall and larger than in simulation one, as the GDP in the 
second simulation is 0.77 percent higher within ten periods of the fiscal shock.   
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The increase in net foreign savings leads to a deterioration in the net financial 
wealth of the domestic economy vis-à-vis the foreign sector (Table 5.2). 
Government’s net financial wealth declines by less compared to the first simulation, 
driven by stronger revenue growth in the second simulation.  
All institutions increase their holdings of loans by more than in the first simulation, 
driven by the lower real rates and growth in the domestic economy. 
The higher bond supply is now absorbed mainly by the foreign sector, while the 
financial sector absorbs less compared to the first simulation, as the relative return 
of bonds is smaller. The Reserve Bank’s increase in bond holdings is related to the 
increased supply of money.  
The reduction in the reserve ratio leads to a greater share of the financial sector’s 
wealth being allocated to loans. This, along with the increase in the cash and 
deposits liability, leads to an increase in the loans being issued by the financial 
sector. Equities and cash and deposit assets of the financial sector still decline 
marginally as the relative return of bonds is still more favourable and more financial 
wealth goes to loans. 
The asset accumulation of the foreign sector increases across asset classes as now 
the sector also benefits from an increase in net savings as a source of funding 
relative to the first simulation. The bond and cash and deposit liability of the foreign 
sector falls, which reflects the stronger currency. We assume that bond and cash 
liabilities for the foreign sector are fixed in foreign currency units. The equity and 
loan liabilities increase as the stronger domestic growth and currency encourage 
domestic residence to diversify their portfolio and invest abroad.65   
The higher demand for equities and the higher price lead to a larger increase in the 
equity liability of the foreign sector.  
Our result, that the fiscal multiplier increases substantially with an increase in net 
foreign savings, contradicts somewhat studies that argue that the fiscal multiplier 
tends to be lower in more open economies due to import leakage (Ilzetzki, 
Mendoza, and Vegh 2013; Jooste, Liu, and Naraidoo 2013). While imports subtract 
                                                 
65 In our specification, equity and bond liabilities of the foreign sector are driven by the domestic 
GDP expressed in foreign currency units. 
143 
 
from GDP, foreign savings can reduce domestic credit constraints and support the 
financial accelerator mechanism in the presence of spare capacity in the domestic 
economy. Our results support the findings of Blanchard et al. (2016) that inflows 
can be expansionary. In our framework, however, the mechanism works through 
the impact on equity prices, spreads and the balance sheets of all institutions in the 
economy, particularly the household and financial sectors. These work together to 
amplify the effects of the original fiscal shock. 
Finally, in Figure 5.1 above, we show the impact on the fiscal multiplier if the 
output gap is less negative. The red and black lines move together initially. The 
household foresees now that the output gap will be closed faster and inflation will 
start rising, leading to an increase in the policy rate.  It will be more difficult to 
achieve its real level of targeted wealth. The household needs to save more and 
consume less.   
In the absence of a negative output gap, the multiplier would have been negative, 
as monetary policy responds immediately to reduce inflation by increasing the repo 
rate. The effect depends on the parameters in Tylor rule (eq. 34), but also on the 
parameters in the equation for the financial sector reserve ratio (eq. 25). Lower 
value of 𝛽𝑟𝑒𝑝𝑜  will reduce the impact of monetary policy on the financial sector 
and reduce the negative impact.  
South Africa’s fiscal expansion could be financed easily because government 
finances were perceived as sustainable due to the low debt-to-GDP ratio at the time 
of the fiscal expansion, and the financial sector could intermediate between the 
purchasers of bonds and the government. If the financial sector was under stress 
and unable to intermediate, even in the presence of sustainable government 
finances, the state would have not been able to fund its expenditure and the financial 
accelerator effect would not have been operational. The reserve ratio in our model 
would be very high and the financial sector would transform its financial wealth not 
into loans but into cash and deposits. Under extreme financial stress, the financial 
sector inability to purchase government bonds would require the Reserve Bank to 
intervene and purchase the bonds. In this case, the fiscal expansion would be 
reduced to unconventional monetary policy (Borio and Disyatat 2010). 
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5.5 Conclusion 
Our main conclusion is that financial sector dynamics have an important role to 
play in amplifying the impact of fiscal expansion under conditions characterised by 
large negative output gaps. The transmission mechanism works through the real 
lending spread over the deposit rate, asset prices and the balance sheets of all 
institutions in the economy, which amplify the initial fiscal shock. The sources and 
uses of funds are interlinked in our framework and work together to generate a 
financial accelerator mechanism. The balance sheet of households and the financial 
sector play particularly important roles. Household consumption depends on the 
ability of households to achieve their level of target wealth. An important part of 
our mechanism is the willingness of banks to hold reserves in order to manage 
regulatory requirements, but also risk. Following the theoretical models of Borio 
and Zhu (2012) and Woodford (2010), improvements in economic activity reduce 
risk perception and improve valuations, making it easier for banks to achieve their 
capital requirements, which translates into higher lending. This in turn supports 
further expansion in output, creating a feedback mechanism. Our results indicate 
that South Africa’s savings constraint limits the operations of this mechanism.  
Improvements in the net worth of agents with high levels of debt can increase the 
money multiplier and reduce credit constraints. This requires, however, a fall in the 
net worth of agents with low debt. Our framework allows us to trace precisely 
changes in flows and stocks and identify the impact of policy decisions on the 
balance sheets of all agents in the economy.  
In terms of policy, our results indicate that policy makers need to have knowledge 
not only of the size of the output gap but also the health of the financial sector, its 
perceptions of risk and the likely impact of its decisions on economic agents, 
particularly those with high debt levels. The Reserve Bank has an important role to 
play, particularly if the ability of the financial sector to intermediate is being 
hindered. It can also reduce the impact on bond rates and improve the sustainability 
of the fiscal expansion if it purchases more bonds, increasing the supply of money 
and reducing bond yields. This constitutes unconventional monetary policy.   
The results also indicate that the impacts of fiscal policy are linked to global 
economic policy developments, which affect the flows of foreign savings as well 
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as domestic policies which serve to attract or discourage these flows. This 
highlights the need for policy coordination both on international and domestic level. 
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Chapter 6 The Impact of Higher Leverage Ratio 
6.1 Introduction 
In this chapter, we analyse how changes in banks’ required leverage ratio affect the 
economy through their impact on the financial sector. The emphasis is on 
understanding the interaction between real and financial variables. In particular, we 
are interested in the impact on lending spreads, equity prices, the demand for assets 
and liabilities, and how the combination of these effects affect the real economy.  
The stock and flow consistency of our framework allows us to study how the 
financial sector affects the real economy but also how in second-round effects the 
developments in the real economy may affect the financial sector. This mechanism 
has important implications for monetary policy decisions, and we highlight these.  
The emphasis is on the short run and thus our aim is not to evaluate whether the 
higher levels of leverage requirements reduce the risk of crisis and default in the 
long run.66  
The leverage ratio is equal to tier 1 capital over a measure of exposure. In the text 
below we use capital ratio to refer to the leverage ratio rather than the risk-adjusted 
capital ratio. The exposure measure generally consists of on-balance sheet 
exposures, derivative exposures, securities financing transaction exposures and off-
balance sheet (OBS) items.   
Our results indicate that the transmission of the shock and its impact depend on how 
the banks choose to achieve the higher leverage ratio requirements. Initially, we 
model the impact of an adjustment through a reduction of the banks’ asset value, 
which takes place through all financial instruments. In a second simulation, this is 
accompanied by higher levels of retained earnings. The results from the first set of 
simulations is compared to the impact of an alternative adjustment mechanism 
                                                 
66 Our interest is in the short-run transition to higher capital requirements. FSB (2010) provides 
estimates of the long-run net benefits. They find that the net benefit of the proposed capital 
requirements in Basel III is around 2 per cent of GDP on average across countries. The main channel 
is that a well-capitalised banking system will lead to a reduction in the risk and cost of financial 
crises and macroeconomic volatility. Caggiano and Calice (2011) find similar results for African 
economies. 
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which assumes that the banks can raise equity capital either at no cost or at a high 
cost.  
If banks can raise equity capital at low or no cost, the negative impacts on economic 
activity are small. Increasing the level of retained earnings also generates less 
negative results compared to achieving the ratio entirely by reducing the value of 
assets.  This, however, negatively affects those institutions, which rely more heavily 
on dividend income. Shrinking the asset value of the financial sector or raising 
equity capital, which translates into high lending spreads, generates significant 
negative results. 
We argue that our framework is better suited to capture capital requirements shocks 
than previous models used for this type of analysis internationally and in South 
Africa. The presence of more detailed financial behaviour, lending spreads, asset 
prices, and stock and flow consistency, allows for better, but not perfect, 
representation of the risk-taking channel of Borio and Zhu (2012) and the links 
between financial behaviour, economic activity and lending spreads identified by 
Woodford (2010).  
We proceed with a review of the relevant literature. This is followed by a 
description of the changes to the core model to make it suitable to handle capital 
requirements shocks. In Section 6.4, we present our results and we compare them 
to those generated by South African and international studies. The conclusion 
follows and highlights the implications of our analysis for policy makers. 
6.2 Literature Review 
Higher capital tends to increase the probability of survival through rising the 
incentives for banks to monitor borrowers, attenuating asset-substitution moral 
hazard and reducing the appeal of risky products (Acharya, Mehran, and Thakor 
2015; Allen, Carletti, and Marquez 2011; Holmstrom and Tirole 1997; Mehran and 
Thakor 2011; Thakor 2012). Empirically, a number of papers provide support for 
the positive relationship between bank capital and bank performance (Beltratti and 
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Stulz 2012; Berger and Bouwman 2013; Berger, Imbierowicz, and Rauch 2012; 
Cole and White 2012; Estrella, Park, and Peristiani 2000).67  
However, they do not assess how the movement to higher capital affects bank 
behaviour, the economy and the feedback mechanism back to the financial sector. 
A critical channel in this mechanism is how the movement to higher credit 
requirements affects credit extension in the short run. In the theoretical framework 
developed by Covas and Fujita (2009), which is based on the work of Holmstrom 
and Tirole (1997), the mechanism works through the dependence of capital good 
production on bank funding. During a downturn, agency costs increase due to 
higher moral hazard on behalf of entrepreneurs; this is accompanied by higher 
equity issuance costs and higher capital requirements for the financial sector, which 
exacerbate the credit constraint faced by entrepreneurs and generates a new lower 
steady state equilibrium.  
The effect of a capital requirements shock is not necessarily negative if banks are 
characterised by different initial leverage ratios. Zhu (2008) develops a model 
where the capital requirements of banks depend on their risk profile with riskier 
banks having larger requirements. The decline in the capital requirements of less 
risky banks can offset the increase for more risky banks, reducing the negative 
impacts on the credit cycle. The presence of capital buffers also reduces the size of 
any procyclical effects. The capital buffers, however, can increase, even for well 
capitalised banks, in response to anticipating difficulties with raising equity in the 
future. This is part of the underlying mechanism in the model of Repullo and Suarez 
(2013). In their framework, capital buffers increase as a precaution against shocks 
that may hinder their future lending. The increase is larger if the regulatory regime 
requires higher capital during recessionary periods and for high social costs of bank 
failure.  The model generates significant credit rationing of borrowers under 
recessionary conditions.  
Similarly, Meh and Moran (2010) present a model where negative economic shocks 
reduce the profitability of the banking sector and its ability to attract funders. Since 
                                                 
67 Barth, Caprio, and Levine (2004) find that a higher capital requirement is associated with a decline 
in the non-performing loans; however, they argue that their results do not support a robust positive 
relationship between higher capital requirements and bank development or efficiency. 
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banks cannot adjust immediately, lending declines. The negative economic 
outcomes in the model developed by Van den Heuvel (2008) are driven by the 
decline in liquidity due to capital requirements. Households have high preference 
for liquidity and their welfare declines as banks face a reduced ability to increase 
liquidity through taking deposits. Besanko and Kanatas (1996) argue that higher 
capital requirements may have a perverse impact on insiders and increase rather 
than reduce risk taking. As the value of their portfolio is diluted, they generate less 
value from the performance of the loan book. This decreases their oversight on 
loans and increases risk taking.    
These models, however, do not provide a comprehensive framework to study the 
impact of higher capital requirements on the economy. They fall short in addressing 
how capital requirements affect the transmission of other policies, particularly 
monetary policy, and how they affect the measurement and distribution of risk. 
They provide no explanation as to how changes to capital requirements affect the 
balance sheets of various institutions in a general equilibrium framework and how 
these balance sheet effects interact and affect economic activity. There is only a 
limited representation of financial instruments, and thus the frameworks are highly 
stylised and unable to illustrate distributional impacts through changes in portfolios.  
More importantly, the theoretical models do not internalise the financial accelerator 
and risk-taking channel, which characterise the operations of the financial sector, 
or the linkages between bank capital, the level of intermediation and the lending 
spread (Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist 1999; Borio and Zhu 2012; Woodford 
2010).      
The model developed by Borio and Zhu (2012) presents a framework which 
explains how regulatory capital requirements affect the behaviour of the financial 
sector. In their model, the impact of higher capital requirements affects the financial 
sector directly through the capital threshold effect and the capital framework effect. 
The capital threshold effect arises because breaching the minimum threshold is 
costly for a bank. In the face of a possible breach, banks will take defensive action 
to avoid the high costs. These high costs are driven by restrictive supervisory 
actions and reputational costs.  In turn, this will affect the availability and pricing 
of funding extended to customers. This can translate into an increase in lending 
spreads. The effect is particularly strong and can affect the ability of the financial 
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sector to extend credit when increasing the capital base is more costly than 
alternative funding sources at the margin.68 Even in the absence of an immediate 
threat of breaching the minimum requirement, the capital threshold effect maybe 
operational. Borio and Zhu (2012) argue that in this case the effect is a cost or a tax 
which varies with the size of the cushion over the minimum and with its volatility. 
At the same time, the size of the cushion is a function of the business cycle and 
idiosyncratic shocks to the bank’s balance sheet. In our framework, we assume that 
the banks always achieve and operate at the minimum requirement.  A shift in the 
leverage ratio triggers the capital threshold effect.   
The Capital framework effect influences the way banks measure, manage and price 
risk, which affects their behaviour. The economic cycle changes the strength of the 
capital threshold effect as probabilities of default, valuations and the perception of 
risk change.  In turn, this shifts the relative position of the banks’ capital to the 
regulatory threshold and affects bank behaviour. This can increase lending, improve 
net worth of agents across the economy and support economic activity further, 
creating a multiplier effect.  
The mechanism is affected by the response of monetary authorities as interest rates 
affect cash flows, net interest rate margins, earnings and the valuation of assets, 
which again affect the relative position of the bank capital relative to the regulatory 
threshold. Reductions in the policy rate can decrease the returns from certain assets 
and encourage risk taking in order to achieve target rates of return. Monetary policy 
can also affect risk behaviour through communication policies and the central bank 
reaction function. Through its communication, the central bank can increase 
transparency, reduce uncertainty and compress risk premia. The perception that the 
central bank reaction function is effective in reducing downside risks can increase 
risk taking. The impact depends on the composition of balance sheets and the 
financing constraints faced by agents in the economy.  This mechanism also 
operationalises the risk-taking channel in the framework, which is defined as the 
impact of changes in policy rates on either risk perceptions or risk-tolerance. 69 
                                                 
68 Borio and Zhu (2012) provide reasons why increasing the capital base is more costly than 
alternative funding sources at the margin. These include, for example, cutting dividends may signal 
relatively poor performance; or, taxation may favour debt over equity.   
69 The presence of the risk taking channel is supported by empirical studies such as Adrian and Shin 
(2010). 
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Liquidity and risk-taking are tightly interconnected and can reinforce each other. 
Lower perceptions of risks and higher risk tolerance weaken external funding and 
transferability constraints and hence increase liquidity. At the same time, weaker 
liquidity constraints can support higher risk-taking.   
The financial accelerator mechanism in the framework developed by Borio and Zhu 
(2012) works through the regulatory regime; the impact of the cycle on probabilities 
of default, valuations and the perception of risk; and the monetary policy decisions 
as explained above. In addition, the mechanism is supported by the mutually 
reinforcing relationship between risk-taking and liquidity. 
Woodford (2010) presents a theoretical framework which links the capital of the 
intermediaries, the supply of intermediation services and economic activity. The 
willingness of financial intermediaries to provide services depends on the lending 
spread, the margin that they can charge over the interest rate paid to savers.  
The lending spread reflects the marginal costs of intermediation. These costs are an 
increasing function of the volume of lending as intermediaries have limited capital. 
Increasing capital is likely to be costly and increasing leverage is limited by 
regulatory capital requirements. Raising funds through loans is constrained by the 
intermediaries’ collateral. This indicates that for a given quantity of capital, the 
supply schedule for intermediation services will be upward sloping, as XS in Figure 
6.1. The demand for intermediation is represented by the schedule XD, which 
shows the willingness of borrowers to pay to induce savers to supply funds. This is 
a profit opportunity for the intermediaries to the extent that the cost of 
intermediation is low. The schedule XD reflects a certain level of income. Changes 
to income shift the demand for intermediation. This establishes a relationship 
between interest rates, income and the level intermediation, which is represented as 
an IS curve in the second panel of Figure 6.1. 
Shocks that impair the capital of the intermediary or higher regulatory leverage ratio 
requirements will shift the XS curve up and to the left. The equilibrium credit spread 
increases and the volume of lending declines for any given level of economic 
activity (Y). This implies that the rate paid to savers declines while the rate paid by 
borrowers rises for the given level of Y. This is true for each possible value of Y, 
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which leads to a shift in the IS curve down and to the left.70 If the monetary policy 
reaction function (represented by MP) remains the same, the shift of the XS curve 
leads to a lower policy rate and a decline in economic activity. 
Figure 6.1: Graphical representation of the model (Woodford 2010) 
 
Source: adopted from Woodford (2010) 
The framework can generate financial accelerator effects. For example, the initial 
decline in economic activity is likely to reduce the net worth of financial 
intermediaries and the volumes of loans for any given credit spread. This will shift 
                                                 
70 The IS schedule plots the equilibrium value of the rate paid to savers (is) because the policy 
reaction function targets is rather than the rate paid by borrowers.   
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the XS curve further to left. The secondary effects if caused by changes to the 
capital of the intermediary are likely to be more persistent than the initial shock. If 
intermediaries are required to sell assets in a systemic manner, this can create a 
vicious spiral that reduces the capital of intermediaries and the loan supply. 
We view the two frameworks as complimentary and fundamental to our analysis. 
Woodford (2010) provides an explicit link between bank capital, level of 
intermediation, interest rate spreads and economic activity. The analysis of Borio 
and Zhu (2012) provides more support as to why intermediaries may be facing an 
upward sloping supply curve for intermediation services, and links the risk-taking 
behaviour of the financial sector, which is a source of financial accelerator effects, 
to how it measures, manages and prices risk. This is not only a function of the 
balance sheet of the financial sector, but rather of how the financial sector views 
the distribution of risk across the economy. 
Recent macroeconomic assessments of higher capital requirements are related to 
the introduction of BASEL III. The studies do not model risk-weighted assets, 
hence their results are more applicable to the likely impact of higher leverage ratio 
requirements on the economy than the impact of risk-weighted capital 
requirements. The short-term impacts are generally negative. MAG (2010b) finds 
small negative impacts in the short run with small variations, which are dependent 
on the tool used to assess the impacts, the response of monetary policy and the 
spillover effects across countries.  The impacts are largely driven by higher interest 
rate margins. The average impact on the annual GDP growth is around 0.03 per 
cent.71 Slovik and Cournède (2011) and EU (2011) find similar results. IIF (2011) 
finds significantly larger impacts,72 arguing that the return on equity must be 
maintained and increased, which will increase the lending spread by significantly 
more than estimated in the other studies.   
Several studies look at the interaction between monetary policy and higher capital 
requirements in a DSGE framework, considering the business cycle. The findings 
                                                 
71 MAG (2010b) finds that bringing the global common equity capital ratio to a level that would 
meet the agreed minimum and the capital conservation buffer would result in a maximum decline 
of 0.22 per cent of GDP after 35 quarters. The spillover effects across countries are estimated at 0.17 
per cent of GDP. 
72 Their estimate shows that the introduction of the Basel III requirements could total 3.2 per cent of 
GDP for the developed economies, which implies 7.5 million jobs forgone. 
154 
 
indicate that better coordination, particularly during financial shocks, tends to 
reduce economic costs (Angelini, Neri, and Panetta 2011; Angeloni and Faia 2009; 
Bean et al. 2010). 
Burgess et al. (2016) estimate the impacts of higher capital requirements for the 
United Kingdom in a stock and flow consistent model. They study the impacts of 
an increase in the required risk-weighted capital ratio achieved through raising 
equity capital. The results indicate a small impact. The lending rate increases by 15 
basis points and the level of GDP declines by 10 basis points.  
The outcomes in the different studies are highly dependent on the assumptions 
being made. For example, Zhu (2008) argues that many banks hold capital above 
the requirements and thus the impacts should be small. Banks with a higher than 
the required capital ratio may be perceived as better managed and safer, and likely 
to see a decline in funding costs (Noss and Toffano 2016).  It is also important how 
the new capital requirement is achieved (Cohen and Scatigna 2016; Zhu 2008). For 
example, achieving the new ratio through reducing dividends is unlikely to have the 
same impact on the credit cycle as reducing the loan portfolio. Banks can also issue 
equity or substitute riskier assets with safer ones, and they can also restructure their 
business models, reducing inefficiencies and compensation costs (Allen et al. 2012; 
MAG 2010a).73 
De Marco and Wieladek (2015) identify three conditions that need to be satisfied 
for higher capital requirements to affect loan supply: the cost of bank equity must 
exceed the cost of debt; capital requirements must be binding on a bank’s choice of 
capital; and the sources of funding of borrowers must be limited.  
Cohen and Scatigna (2016) provide empirical evidence on how banks in advanced 
and emerging economies have achieved their capital requirements. Looking at data 
from 2009 to 2012, they find most banks have achieved their capital requirements 
through an increase in retained earnings rather than a reduction in loans. The impact 
on lending spreads is small. However, they also find some differences across 
countries. For some banks in advanced economies, a reduction in risk-weighted 
assets has helped with the adjustment to higher capital ratios. For European Banks, 
                                                 
73 Cohen and Scatigna (2016) explain how the different options are operationalised, and the 
advantages associated with each.  
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some of this adjustment has taken place by reducing cross-border assets. There is 
also some evidence that banks with lower capital ratios at the beginning of the 
period were more likely to see an adjustment through a reduction in asset growth. 
This supports the argument put forward by Zhu (2008).  
Recent empirical studies, looking at UK data, find that the higher capital 
requirements have reduced lending domestically as well as cross-border lending 
(Aiyar et al. 2014; Bridges et al. 2014; Noss and Toffano 2016). The impact of a 1 
percentage point increase in the capital requirement on loan volumes is a reduction 
in the region of 3.5 to 8 per cent. This effect is not the same across firms. Firms 
with multiple bankers or alternative sources of funding or those that borrow from 
banks with better capital ratios are less affected by the higher capital requirements 
(Bridges et al. 2014; De Marco and Wieladek 2015).   
A fundamental problem with the macroeconomic impact studies is their inability to 
capture the channels identified by Borio and Zhu (2012) and Woodford (2010). 
Some of the estimates rely on econometric and DSGE models that have no financial 
sector dynamics. The impact on interest rate spreads is estimated outside the model 
and then the system is shocked accordingly. The most advanced tools used to 
estimate the likely impacts are DSGE models. These models assume rational 
expectations and dynamics based on a representative agent, implying almost perfect 
foresight of risk, and thus it is harder to incorporate cross-sectional and inter-
temporal coordination failures (Borio and Zhu 2012). The models are often linear 
and thus have no nonlinear dynamics and liquidity, which amplify the risk-taking 
channel. This makes it difficult to operationalise the risk-taking channel.  
The criticism of linear dynamics is addressed by either introducing the financial 
accelerator mechanism as defined by Bernanke, Gertler, and Gilchrist (1999) or the 
household collateral constraint mechanism following the approach by Iacoviello 
(2005). Borio and Zhu (2012), however, argue that the financial accelerator 
mechanism is not able to capture the dynamics of risk-taking as it ignores the time 
varying pricing of risk and effective risk tolerance. The financial accelerator 
mechanism works through the balance sheet of a representative firm, but it ignores 
how other balance sheets are affected and all balance sheets interact to determine 
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the impact on the economy.  The same criticism applies to the model developed by 
Iacoviello (2005).  
The absence of stock and flow consistency in DSGE models prevents them from 
capturing the distribution of risk in the economy, which is important for 
understanding the risk-taking channel and in capturing the interlinkages between 
the balance sheets of various agents in the economy. These interlinkages can 
generate significant multiplier effects as idiosyncratic risks become systemic.  
While the stock and flow model developed by Burgess et al. (2016) provides a 
richer representation of the financial sector, it also lacks a financial accelerator 
mechanism, which represents the dynamics identified by Borio and Zhu (2012).  
Recent studies looking at the impact of higher capital requirements on the South 
African economy also lack balance sheet dynamics. Havemann (2014) and Grobler 
and Smit (2014) modify large macroeconometric models (without microeconomic 
foundations) to include an interest rate spread which is driven by a number of 
factors including the capital adequacy ratio. Their results indicate a small impact 
on the economy from 1 per cent increase in the capital adequacy ratio, primarily 
driven by the increase in the interest rate spread.  
Our analysis aims to build on previous studies by studying the impact of higher 
leverage ratios in a model which explicitly models balance sheet dynamics of all 
economic agents in a stock and flow consistent way. We consider the multiplier 
effects which characterise the financial sector.  
6.3 Model Changes  
This section outlines changes to the base model in order to make it suitable to study 
the impact of higher leverage ratios on the economy. 
We introduce the equation: 
 𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡 =
(𝑠𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑒 + 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑡)
𝐹𝑊𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡
  
where 𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡 is the required leverage ratio, which is exogenously determined. 𝑠𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑒  
is the equity capital of the financial sector calculated at book value excluding 
retained earnings. 𝑆𝑆𝐴𝑉𝐹𝐼𝑁𝑡 is the value of retained earnings (the stock of savings) 
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and 𝐹𝑊𝐶𝑅𝑅𝑡 is the value of assets at book value. The use of book values rather than 
market values simplifies the model solution. The impact of market value dynamics 
on the overall results depends on the composition of assets and consequently on 
how changes in market prices affect the numerator of the leverage ratio vis-à-vis 
the denominator.  This is an item for further research. 
𝑠𝑙𝑓𝑖𝑛,𝑒 is fixed in the base model set out in Chapter 3. In the present version of the 
model, it can vary in some of the simulations, illustrating how raising equity capital 
to achieve the higher leverage ratio may affect the economy.  
In the base model the financial and non-financial sector savings adjust to ensure 
that total investment is equal to total savings. The model used in this chapter 
assumes that financial sector savings are a function of its after-tax income and 
interest, dividend, social contributions and other expenditure. Here the dividends 
paid by the financial sector are a fixed share of after-tax income calibrated to the 
average value over the period 2002 to 2012. Changes in this share represent the 
dividend policy of the financial sector and have a direct impact on retained earnings. 
The non-financial sector savings are a fixed share of its after-tax income. The 
foreign sector savings are not fixed as in the base model but adjust to ensure that 
the savings-investment balance is maintained. The external balance closure remains 
an adjustment through the exchange rate.   
There are number of changes that we make to the adjustment mechanism in the loan 
market. These are required as we assume that the loan liabilities of the financial 
sector are the adjustment mechanism in response to a contraction in the financial 
sector balance sheet.  We outline the changes below: 
• Demand for loans from the financial sector no longer depends on borrowing 
costs in the economy. The reduction in the value of assets requires an 
adjustment on the liability side. The adjustment takes place through cash 
and deposits, with loans (liability) being the balancing item.   
• The lending rate does not ensure equilibrium in the lending market. The loan 
rate is a function of the repo rate and a lending spread which fluctuates with 
the growth of the financial wealth of the financial sector. Deviations which 
exceed the steady state growth rate reduce the spread, whereas growth rates 
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below the steady state rate increase the lending spread. The steady state is 
calculated as the average over the period 2002 to 2012. 
• The supply of loans by the non-financial sector adjusts to ensure equilibrium 
in the loan market.   
6.4 Results 
There are different ways for banks to achieve the higher capital requirements as 
highlighted in the literature. The simulations aim to illustrate how these different 
approaches are transmitted in our framework and how they affect the economy.   
In the first simulation, we model the impact on the economy by assuming that banks 
cannot raise more equity and have to reduce the total value of their assets, while at 
the same time cutting the loans (debt) on the liability side. In the second simulation, 
we illustrate how increasing retained earnings can reduce the initial negative 
effects.  This, however, also leads to lower household consumption in the short run. 
The results from the two simulations are compared against two scenarios, which 
assume that banks can rise equity and thus they do not have to shrink their balance 
sheet. We illustrate the impact if it is costly to raise equity against a scenario where 
the higher equity issuance does not translate into higher loan spreads.   
Reducing the value of bank assets to achieve the higher capital ratio 
The required leverage ratio for South Africa is 4 per cent, higher than the Basel 
requirement of 3 per cent. The shock to the system is assumed to be a 25 basis points 
regulatory increase to the required leverage ratio, which is introduced gradually 
over a period of four quarters. In simulation 1, the loans on the liability side adjust 
to match the decline in the value of assets. In simulation 2, the loans adjust and the 
financial sector dividend payments are cut by ten per cent.  
The general response of the financial sector is driven by the capital threshold effect 
as identified by Borio and Zhu (2012). The financial sector responds to the new 
requirements because it is costly if it does not.  In order to achieve the higher 
leverage ratio, the financial sector reduces the value of all its assets, except the 
holding of bonds (Table 6.1). This effect is driven by the Tobin asset demand 
function. The relative increase of bond returns to other assets leads to an increase 
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in the financial sector holdings of bonds. This increase is required to ensure that the 
issued bonds are absorbed by the market. 
This mechanism links the bond rate to the contraction in the balance sheet of the 
financial sector. Higher capital requirements are likely to affect the demand for 
bonds and reduce the sustainability of fiscal policy in the short-run. The increase in 
the bond rate in Figure 6.2 (panel 4), far exceeds the increase in the loan rate. 
Burgess et al. (2016) find that the bond rates decline, but in their simulation the 
transition is done through increasing the equity capital of the financial sector 
Table 6.1: Changes to the holding of financial assets 
 
Source: Model simulations 
Table 6.2: Changes to the holding of financial liabilities 
 
Source: Model simulations 
The loans on the asset side decline for two reasons. Firstly, the deposits into the 
financial system decline across institutions as illustrated in Table 6.1 due to the 
slower pace of economic activity. The decline in the cash and deposit assets of the 
financial sector amplifies this effect.   
Secondly, the willingness of the financial sector to hold reserves increases, as 
illustrated in Figure 6.2, which decreases the money multiplier and the supply of 
loans. The reduction is driven by the fall in the value of financial assets, which in 
our framework translates into greater willingness by the financial sector to hold 
cash reserves. This increase in the willingness to hold reserves reflects higher risk 
deviation from baseline
t+10 sim1 sim2 sim1 sim2 sim1 sim2 sim1 sim2
Reserve Bank -0,3 -0,1 -0,1 -0,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Financial sector -1,8 0,0 1,8 2,1 -2,1 -0,1 -1,4 -0,5
Non-financial sector -0,3 -0,1 0,0 0,0 -0,2 -0,2 -1,3 0,9
Households -0,9 -0,7 0,0 0,0 -0,4 -0,3 0,0 0,0
Government -0,3 -0,1 0,0 0,0 -0,3 -0,3 -0,2 -0,2
ROW -2,8 -2,7 1,3 -0,5 -5,5 -4,0 -2,3 -2,5
Bonds Cash and dep
Assets
Equities Loans
deviation from baseline
t+10 sim1 sim2 sim1 sim2 sim1 sim2 sim1 sim2
Reserve Bank -0,3 -0,1 0,0 0,0 -0,3 -0,3 0,4 0,2
Financial sector -0,7 -0,5 0,0 0,0 -1,4 -0,4 -2,6 -0,1
Non-financial sector -3,3 -1,6 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,4 -0,1
Households 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,5 -0,2
Government -0,3 -0,1 1,5 1,2 0,0 0,0 -0,5 -0,1
ROW -0,6 -0,4 0,1 0,3 0,1 0,3 -0,4 -0,2
Equities Bonds Cash and dep
Liabilities
Loans
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perceptions of the economic environment. The impact on the reserve ratio aims to 
operationalise the capital framework effect in our model (see Borio and Zhu 
(2012)).    
Figure 6.2: Impacts on rates and prices 
Source: Model simulations 
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The combination of lower deposits and higher reserves translates into lower levels 
of intermediation. The bank decreases the growth rate of its assets relative to the 
baseline. The fall in the value of bank assets translates into a reduction in the supply 
of loans relative to the baseline and an increase in the lending spread by 0.3 
percentage points (Figure 6.2, panel 5). This mechanism captures the model 
presented by Woodford (2010).  Changes to the financial sector capital and 
perceptions of risk change the supply of intermediary services, impact the balance 
sheet of the financial sector, which affects the interest rate spread.  
The lower level of intermediation reduces the growth in money supply and affects 
the equity price through equitation 17. The initial fall is 0.35 per cent decline 
compared to the baseline. This affects the balance sheet of all institutions, 
particularly households.  
In Table 6.2 above, the fall in the financial assets of the financial sector is matched 
by a decline in all liabilities except bonds. We assume that the financial sector does 
not issue bonds. The adjustment item is the loan debt, which declines by 2.6 per 
cent relative to the baseline. The decline in equities is driven by both prices and 
quantity effects. The latter reflects a decline in the equity assets of households 
which are equity liabilities of the financial sector according to our model 
specification.  
The investment by the non-financial sector, which is the bulk of investment in the 
economy, declines (Table 6.3).  The decline in investment reflects the higher 
borrowing costs driven by the increase in the loan rate. For non-financial firms, the 
fall in investment also reflects the decline in equity prices which feed into the Tobin 
Q specification.  The initial decline is small, but it becomes significant as the equity 
prices are on a lower growth trajectory. By the 10th period investment is just over 
one percentage point lower in the first simulation compared to the baseline. 
The non-financial sector experiences a fall in the value of its assets and liabilities. 
The largest impact is on the equity liabilities. This impact reflects lower demand 
for equities as an asset across institutions as well as the lower equity price. The 
supply of equities by the non-financial sector is residual supply which aims to 
ensure equilibrium in the equity market.    
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The household, which has limited ability to forsee the future, experiences a fall in 
consumption. Similar to the fiscal and capital flow reversal shocks, the result is 
driven by the fall in equity prices and income as well as a fall in the flow of loans 
as a funding source relative to the baseline. The fall in the equity price reduces the 
value of current assets and makes it more difficult to achieve the target level of 
wealth.   
Table 6.3: Impacts on real expenditure 
 
Source: Model simulations 
Figure 6.3 shows the household optimisation behaviour. The graph presents the 
household optimisation behaviour at three points in time: the time the shock takes 
place (t), ten periods after the shock (t+10) and 15 periods (t+15) after the shock. It 
plots the difference in growth rates between the baseline and the two simulations.   
In order to achieve its level of targeted real wealth, household savings need to rise 
and consumption must fall.  This is reflected in Figure 6.3. The growth in household 
wealth falls intially and then it recovers relative to the baseline. In the right panel, 
the growth in household consumption follows a similar trend in the first 
optimisation period (the black line). Stronger growth in  household wealth is 
required in the second half of the first optimisation period in order to achieve the 
target level of wealth. This is supported by higher levels of domestic savings and 
the lower levels of inflation, which make it easier to achieve the target level of real 
wealth. The household also has expectations that economic conditions will 
per cent deviation from 
baseline
t+1 t+10 t+1 t+10
Household expenditure -0,04 -0,13 -0,11 -0,17
Investment
  Non-financial firms -0,16 -1,13 -0,67 -0,71
  Other-institutions -0,13 -1,18 -0,11 -0,72
Exports 0,03 -0,07 0,07 0,00
Imports -0,12 -0,33 -0,21 -0,35
GDP 0,00 -0,12 0,01 -0,07
only loans
loans plus retained 
earnings
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normalise based on their model consistent expectations, which allow them to 
accelerate consumption in the outer years of the first optimisation period.  
Looking at period t+10, the growth in household wealth is close to the baseline, 
whereas the household consumption growth rate is marginally below the baseline. 
The household expectation of recovery has not materialised. Consumption growth 
rates have to be lower in order for the real wealth target to be achieved. While 
households foresee some improvement in economic conditions in period t , they 
cannot foresee the subsequent shocks in the next optimisation periods t+1.  It is 
only by period t+15 that baseline and simulation growth rates are equal. 
In Table 6.1 above, household’s stock of equities falls due to the lower equity price 
and lower income relative to the baseline.  On the liability side, the stock of loans 
declines by 0.5 per cent as lending rates increase and household income falls 
relative to the baseline.  
Figure 6.3: Household consumption optimisation behaviour 
 
 Source: Model simulations  
Government consumption expenditure remains unchanged relative to the baseline 
as it is exogenously determined. On the financial side, government sees a decline 
in its stock of loans as a source of funding. This reflects lower income and higher 
real rates. The bond issuance increases in line with the slower pace of tax revenue 
collection and dividend income. This is a major driver behind the higher bond rates. 
Given the contraction in the balance sheet of the financial sector, higher supply of 
bonds requires even higher bond yields. We model exogensouly the volume of 
equities for the government sector and thus the declines on the asset and liability 
sides reflect the fall in the equity price relative to the baseline.  
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In line with the lower income and higher debt levels, the government reduces its 
extension of loans and demand for cash and deposits. This reenforces the multiplier 
effect decribed above, as it contributes to lower deposits with the financial sector. 
We assume that the level of government debt remains sustainable. In the presence 
of unsustainable levels of debt, government consumption would have to respond 
amplifying the real economy impacts. 
For the Reserve Bank, its debt liabilities increase marginally (Table 6.2). The 
Reserve Bank’s income increases marginally due to the higher interest rates, which 
drive interest income. Most of the income of the Reserve Bank is interest income. 
The higher levels of income lead to a higher demand for loans.74 The growth in 
money supply represented by the extension of cash and deposits declines as overall 
income in the economy falls.  For equities, the decline is driven by the fall in the 
equity price as the quantity of shares is assumed exogenous. On the asset side, the 
decline in the sources of funding relative to the baseline translates into lower 
demand for government bonds, which puts further pressure on the bond rate in order 
to encourage demand by the financial and foreign sectors. 
The impact on the foreign sector is driven by the fall in foreign savings and the 
depreciation of the currency. The two effects move in opposite directions. The fall 
in foreign savings reduces the levels of financial wealth, whereas the depreciation 
increases the value of the foreign sector liabilities and thus the sources of funding. 
The equity and loan liability decline as they are a function of the nominal level of 
domestic GDP expresssed in foreign currency units. This mechanism links stronger 
domestic growth and currency with greater purchases of financial assets by 
domestic residents from the rest of the world.  
The value of bonds and cash and deposit liabilities is kept constant in foreign 
currency units and thus the increase in the value reflects the weaker currency. 
The provision of loans by the foreign sector is a function of its total financial wealth 
and the repo rate. A lower repo rate encourages lending as economic conditions are 
likely to improve. However, in this case the decline in financial wealth dominates 
the impact, and the stock of loans provided by the foreign sector declines relative 
                                                 
74 The loan demand is function of real interest rates and nominal income.  
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to the baseline. The demand for other assets is modelled as a Tobin asset demand 
function. The fall in financial wealth avaiable for investment decreases the stock of 
equities and cash and deposits held by the foreign sector. The decline in cash and 
deposits contributes to the decline in lending by the financial sector. The stock of 
bonds increases, driven by the jump in the bond rate. This exercebates the retreat 
from equities and cash and deposits.     
The depreciation of the currency, driven by the fall in foreign savings causes net 
exports to rise.  The relatively low responsiveness of exports to the exchange 
depreciation is in line with recent South African experience. These responses are 
dependent on the elasticities of substitution in the Constant Elasticity of 
Transformation and Armington functions. 
Table 6.4 presents the impacts on net financial wealth, which is measured as the 
difference in value between the value of assets and liabilities divided by nominal 
GDP. It is assumed that the impact on the net wealth of the Reserve Bank is always 
neutral. For the financial sector, the initial impact is also neutral as the adjustment 
to the higher capital ratio reflects only changes in the balance sheet of the sector. 
However, as real economy effects start to feed in, the financial sector sees a 
marginal improvement in its net wealth. The improvement in the non-financial 
sector net wealth is driven by the fall in equities issued by the sector as well as the 
fall in the equity price. The non-financial sector provides equities on demand. For 
all other institutions, the net financial wealth declines in the first simulation relative 
to the baseline. This decline is more pronounced ten periods after the shocks.  
Table 6.4: Net financial wealth 
 
Source: Model simulations 
Net Financial Wealth
change as percent of GDP t+1 t+10 t+1 t+10
Reserve Bank 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Financial sector 0,0 0,6 0,2 1,6
Non-financial sector 0,5 2,9 0,5 2,0
Households -0,2 -0,4 -0,2 -0,4
Government 0,0 -1,2 0,0 -1,0
ROW -0,3 -1,9 -0,4 -2,3
only loans loans plus retained 
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The results reflect the operations of our accelerator mechanism. The negative 
impact on balance sheets, the lending spread and equity prices translate into real 
effects, which reinforce the financial effects. The continuous interaction between 
the real and financial sides of the economy and the interaction between institutions 
in the various markets lead to an amplifying mechanism. 
We now move to our second simulation. The empirical literature indicates that most 
of the adjustment to higher capital ratio has taken place through a reduction in 
dividends. We illustrate how an increase in retained earnings affect our results. We 
assume that the financial sector reduces the dividend payouts by ten per cent relative 
to the baseline. This is a permanent decline over the entire period. The results are 
labelled as sim2. The lower dividend payments increase the retained earnings of the 
financial sector and reduce the need for a reduction in the value of assets held by 
the financial sector. The contraction in the balance sheet of the financial sector is 
significantly smaller. In Table 6.1, the financial sector equity holding remains 
unchanged, the value of bond holdings increases by more compared to the first 
simulation, while the holding of cash and deposits and the supply of loans 
experience smaller contractions relative to simulation one. By period t+10, the 
loans as a source of funding in Table 6.2 decline by 0.1 per cent compared to 2.6 
per cent in the first simulation.  
This lower contraction in the balance sheet of the financial sector translates into 
lower economic impacts. The negative impacts on the lending spread, equity prices 
and the reserve ratio are significantly smaller as shown in Figure 6.2. Other balance 
sheets in the economy also experience smaller contractions compared to the first 
simulation (Table 6.1 and Table 6.2). The negative impacts on the economy are 
smaller, as the decline in investment relative to simulation one is significantly 
smaller. 
One exception is the impact on household consumption. Household income is 
highly dependent on dividend income. The fall in dividend pay-outs, shown in 
Figure 6.2, leads to a fall in household income, which makes it more difficult for 
the representative household to achieve its real wealth target. They need to save 
more as a share of their income in the short run, which translates into lower 
consumption. This channel highlights the importance of flow consistency and the 
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strength of our framework. While higher retained earnings reduce the negative 
impacts on the financial sector, they increase the adverse effects on institutions, 
which receive a high share of financial sector dividend payments.   
The optimisation behaviour shown in Figure 6.3 shows the sudden drop in 
household consumption in the second simulation. The drop is larger than in the first 
simulation. The growth rate recovers in the outer periods, however the level remains 
below the baseline and the first simulation.  
In terms of impacts on net wealth, only households and the rest of the world see no 
improvement in their positions. In the case of households, this is driven by the drop 
of income. In the case of the foreign sector, the decline is driven by a larger 
depreciation of the currency due to lower reliance on foreign savings compared to 
simulation one.  
Achieving the higher ratio through higher equity capital 
We provide additional two simulations which show the impact on the economy if 
the higher capital ratio is achieved by higher issuance of equity. In the first 
simulation, we assume that the conditions identified by De Marco and Wieladek 
(2015) are not satisfied. Banks can raise equity and there is no significant cost to it. 
In the second simulation, we introduce cost by exogenously shocking the spread 
(raising equity is expensive and the bank passes the cost onto its customers). The 
second simulation is similar to the simulations in most of the models used to study 
the impact on capital requirements, where the spread is shocked exogenously to 
account for the cost of equity. 
In Figure 6.4, we show the impact on the repo rate and bond and loan rates. Here 
sim1 refers to the first simulation with no impact on the spread and sim2 to the 
second simulation with a higher lending spread. The shock is implemented by 
releasing the equity constraint on the financial sector. Unlike the previous two 
simulations where we assumed that banks cannot raise equity, now we assume that 
the constraint is no longer in place.  
Instead of shrinking the value of their assets, banks can increase their capital. In 
sim1, banks experience a capital injection through an increase in equity capital, 
which is not accompanied by higher spreads. Table 6.6 shows the large increase in 
the equity debt of the financial sector.  While this leads to a rise in the leverage 
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ratio, it also increases the value of liabilities and it requires a corresponding increase 
in the value of assets (we assume that an increase in the equity capital is not 
accompanied by a decline in other liabilities). This increase in the value of the 
financial sector assets is expansionary. The increase in the equity liability of the 
financial sector increases the sources of funding and it allows for an increase in the 
financial wealth of the sector.  
Figure 6.4: The impact on interest rates following issuance of capital 
 
Source: Model simulations  
The increase in financial wealth available for investment leads to higher demand 
for cash and deposit, equities and bonds. The stronger growth in the value of assets 
compared to the baseline reduces the reserve ratio as the financial sector perceptions 
of risk are reduced. This increases lending and reduces the loan spread as shown in 
the second panel of Figure 6.4. This is despite an increase in the repo rate driven by 
the better economic conditions and higher inflation. The higher demand for bonds 
reduces the bond rate as shown in the second panel of Figure 6.4. 
The reduction in the lending spread driven by the stronger growth in the balance 
sheet of the financial sector leads to a lower real borrowing rate and higher 
investment relative to the baseline (Table 6.5). Equity prices benefit from an 
increase in money supply as the financial sector deposit creation accelerates, but 
also from higher levels of economic activity. The combination of cheaper loans and 
higher equity prices makes it easier for the household to achieve its level of target 
wealth, and thus it can increase its level of consumption (Table 6.5).  
The sources of funding for the foreign sector are negatively affected by an exchange 
rate appreciation. This is reflected in the marginal decline of the bond and cash and 
deposit liabilities for the sector. However, the higher domestic economic activity 
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encourages the purchases of foreign assets by domestic residents, which increases 
the equity and loan liability of the foreign sector. The sector decreases its holding 
of bonds as the relative return of bonds declines.  
Table 6.5: Real economy impacts of raising capital through equity issuance 
 
Source: Model simulations  
The impact on the non-financial sector serves as a constraint to the positive impact 
from the initial shock. The injection of equity in the financial sector reduces the 
equity purchases from the non-financial sector as shown in Table 6.6. Investors may 
believe that the banks are well run with good profit projections, and they take 
advantage of the opportunity to purchase new equity capital. This causes the 
financial wealth of the non-financial sector to fall and it translates into a reduction 
in the loans extended by the sector.  The fall in the sources of funding requires a 
decline in the uses of funding.  The reduction of loans extended by the non-financial 
sector provides a marginal offset against the higher supply by the financial sector. 
A stronger demand for equities by the financial sector and other institutions can 
reduce the negative impact of this channel and amplify further the accelerator 
mechanism in the model framework. Equity demand must be more elastic to 
changes in the return.  
The overall impact on GDP in Table 6.5 is marginally positive as stronger import 
growth offsets somewhat the positive effects from higher domestic aggregate 
demand. These effects are only likely if the banks are already well capitalised and 
managed, and there is high demand for their equities. 
per cent deviation from 
baseline
t+1 t+10 t+1 t+10
Household expenditure 0,05 0,27 -0,39 -0,47
Investment
  Non-financial firms 0,05 1,22 -1,29 -1,88
  Other-institutions 0,04 1,25 -0,11 -2,85
Exports -0,03 -0,03 0,22 -0,01
Imports 0,09 0,63 -0,68 -1,15
GDP -0,01 0,08 0,04 -0,21
equity equity plus spread
170 
 
In the next simulation, the higher equity flows are accompanied by an exogenous 
increase in the loan spread equivalent to 50 basis points. This is reflected in the 
higher loan rate in Figure 6.4. The real economic effects are significantly worse 
compared to the first simulation as the higher loan rate discourages demand for 
loans by institutions, which affects negatively consumption and investment (Table 
6.5). The extension of loans in Table 6.6 declines across institutions, except for the 
financial sector. 
Table 6.6: Changes to the holding of financial assets when equities are 
unconstrained 
 
Source: Model simulations  
Table 6.7: Changes to the holding of financial liabilities when equities are 
unconstrained 
 
Source: Model simulations  
The value of assets held by the financial sector increases following the mechanism 
outlined in the previous simulation, but the increases are smaller (Table 6.6). While 
the balance sheet of the financial sector does not contract, the cost of borrowing is 
higher relative to the baseline and sim1. This is despite a fall in the repo rate. The 
higher lending rates have negative effects on economic activity 
Investment by non-financial institutions declines, initially due to the higher 
lending rates and in the outer simulation periods due to lower equity prices and 
deviation from baseline
t+10 sim1 sim2 sim1 sim2 sim1 sim2 sim1 sim2
Central Bank 0,4 0,0 0,0 -1,5 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0
Financial sector 4,6 3,6 0,3 0,8 4,7 3,9 2,5 2,0
Non-financial sector 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 -0,6 -2,4 -4,6
Households 0,3 0,3 0,0 0,0 0,3 -0,8 0,0 0,0
Government 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 -0,6 0,1 -0,2
ROW 0,8 -2,9 -4,5 -6,3 2,1 -1,5 0,2 -2,9
Equities Loans
Assets
Bonds Cash and dep
deviation from baseline
t+10 sim1 sim2 sim1 sim2 sim1 sim2 sim1 sim2
Central Bank 0,4 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,3 -0,4 -0,8 -0,5
Financial sector 6,6 6,1 0,0 0,0 2,7 1,7 0,0 0,0
Non-financial sector -1,2 -3,9 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,9 -2,2
Households 0,0 1,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 0,0 1,1 -2,3
Government 0,4 0,0 -0,6 -0,6 0,0 0,0 1,1 -2,1
ROW 0,6 -0,5 -0,6 1,0 -0,6 1,0 0,2 -0,5
Loans
Liabilities
Equities Bonds Cash and dep
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economic activity.  The lower levels of economic activity along with the capital 
raising of the financial sector affects negatively the sale of non-financial sector 
equities. Like the previous simulation, the decline in the sources of funding is 
matched by a decline in the extension of loans.  The reduction in loans is larger than 
in the first simulation and offsets the stronger provision of loans by the financial 
sector. 
Household consumption also declines relative to the baseline and sim1. Lending to 
the representative household decreases as the lending rate is higher. Equity prices 
also decline relative to the baseline as the level of economic activity decelerates. 
The combination of a decrease in the sources of funding and lower equity prices 
requires that the household saves more to achieve the same level of target wealth. 
This leads to a decline in household consumption.    
The Reserve Bank sees an increase in its interest income relative to the previous 
simulation, which is still lower than in the baseline. This leads to a marginally 
smaller decline in loan liabilities. However, the lower overall income in the 
economy decreases the growth of cash and deposits liabilities for the Reserve Bank. 
This is matched by a decline in the holding of bonds.  
The rand depreciates, which cushions the impact on the sources of funding for the 
foreign sector: the value of bonds and cash and deposits increases. However, 
equities and loans decline as domestic GDP expressed in foreign currency units is 
lower and the inflows of foreign savings fall relative to the baseline. Overall, the 
financial wealth of the foreign sector declines, and the net wealth of the domestic 
economy vis-à-vis the foreign sector improves. 
The depreciation of the currency also improves net exports, which reduce the 
overall negative effects on GDP.  
The increase in the loan spread reduces the positive effects associated with the 
expansion of the balance sheet of the financial sector. In our framework, a small 
increase of 50 basis points is sufficient to offset the positive effects from the first 
simulation. The mechanism works through the reduction in the demand for loans 
and the impact on household consumption and investment. This in turn affects the 
demand for financial assets by institutions, which offsets the positive effects 
associated with the expansion of the financial sector balance sheet. The real and 
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financial elements of our framework interact to determine the net effect on the 
economy.  
The results also highlight how macroprudential policies may affect the transmission 
and effectiveness of monetary policy decisions. The introduction of higher leverage 
ratio requirements affects the lending spread, depending on how the higher ratio is 
achieved. In our framework, the monetary policy response is not sufficient to offset 
the impact of the higher lending spread on borrowing costs.  
There are three key challenges for monetary authorities. They need to understand 
how the financial sector will respond to the higher leverage ratio (the capital 
threshold effect) and how their risk behaviour will change (the capital framework 
effect) and then assess the likely impact on the lending spread. The change in 
macroprudential regulation affects the risk-taking channel identified by Borio and 
Zhu (2012) and thus the operations of monetary policy. In setting policy rates or 
introducing other monetary policy interventions, central bankers must consider 
these effects. Otherwise borrowing rates may be either too high or too low 
compared to the policy desired level, as the lending spread shifts, and this can lead 
to unintended impacts on economic activity.  
Current mainstream models, however, do not capture these channels and thus 
provide limited assistance to central bankers in setting policy rates optimally. Our 
framework builds on current models and it introduces some novelties. The first one 
is the stock and flow consistency, which shows the stock and flow adjustments 
across institutions. Changes in financial assets and liabilities can be due to quantity 
but also price changes, particularly equity prices. The presence of stock and flow 
dynamics implies that shocks to the capital ratio will have a very different impact 
depending on the starting point. A movement in the ratio from 5 to 6 per cent 
requires a significantly larger adjustment than a movement from 13 to 14 per cent 
even though the absolute increase is the same. Econometric models tend to 
internalise the direct impact of financial ratios on the lending spread, but do not 
model the actual stock changes that drive them. This assumes that the relative 
changes do not have a material impact if they lead to the same absolute change. 
173 
 
The second novelty is the mechanism, which drives the movements in the 
willingness to hold reserves by the financial sector. This proxies risk taking and 
affects loan extension, money creation and the lending spread. 
The third one is the presence of model-consistent expectations within period, which 
can change between periods. This allows us to introduce changes in risk perceptions 
and address some of the criticisms raised by Borio and Zhu (2012) against rational 
expectations models.  
The accelerator mechanism in our framework operates through the balance sheets 
of all institutions, the desire of the financial sector to hold reserves as a management 
strategy against risk and the interaction between the real and financial elements of 
our model economy.       
These properties also make the model significantly different from the models used 
by Grobler and Smit (2014) and Havemann (2014) as well as the models used in 
international studies such as MAG (2010b) and Slovik and Cournède (2011). The 
closest model to our framework used to evaluate the impact of higher capital 
requirements is the one developed by Burgess et al. (2016). These authors look at 
the economic impact of the risk-weighted capital ratio. While their framework is 
also stock and flow consistent, behaviour in the two models is significantly 
different. Amongst other differences, their framework does not have the same 
mechanism for banks to change their reserves in response to higher perceptions of 
risks, and households are not otimising intertemporally.75 
The results generated by Grobler and Smit (2014) and Havemann (2014) rely on a 
econometric equation which links the lending spread directly to the capital 
adequacy  ratio. There are no balance sheet dynamics and the capital ratio is not a 
function of the financial sector balance sheet. It is modelled exogensously. 
Havemann (2014) finds that a 100 basis points increase in the capital ratio leads to 
a decline of 0.07 percentage points in GDP growth. The lending rate increases by 
0.4 percentage points. Grobler and Smit (2014)  generate a stronger impact on GDP, 
which  declines by 0.2 to 0.3 percentage points relative to the baseline. Our results 
                                                 
75 We provide a more comprehensive comparison in the model description chapter. 
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are of similar magnitude but this is driven by a large adjustment in imports.76 The 
impact on domestic demand is a decline by more than 0.5 percentage points relative 
to the baseline.   
6.5 Conclusion 
Our results confirm that, depending on how the capital requirements are achieved, 
the impact on the economy can be significantly different with some institutions and 
some components of GDP being more affected than others. The worst-case 
scenarios seem to be when adjustment is achieved by a reduction in the value of 
assets held by the financial sector or when the increase in equity capital translates 
into a large increase in the lending spread.  
Our results also highlight again the importance of stock and flow consistency. 
Achieving the higher leverage ratio though higher retained earnings seemed less 
costly for the financial sector. However, this reduces the dividend income of 
households and has a negative impact on their balance sheet and consumption. 
The stock-flow consistency also highlights that if the financial sector increases its 
equity capital, the equity capital of another sector may fall. This will reduce the 
sources of funding for that sector and generate negative effects.  
Our analysis highlights that by changing the financial sector perceptions of risk 
through the capital framework effect, leverage ratios can affect the transmission of 
monetary policy decisions. This can cause lending rates to deviate from what a 
central bank may perceive as optimal levels, and have unintended consequences for 
the economy. The lending spread can offset policy rate interventions. Policy makers 
need to understand the impact of macroprudential interventions on risk taking by 
the financial sector, the impact on lending spreads and extension of loans and the 
feedback effects through the real and financial behaviour of other institutions. 
CGFS (2016) indicates that it is uncertain how the introduction of the various 
                                                 
76 Our shock is to leverage ratio whereas the shocks by Grobler and Smit (2014) and Havemann 
(2014) are to the capital adequacy ratio. The shocks are the same in relative terms given the intial 
value of the respective ratios. Grobler and Smit (2014) and Havemann (2014) do not model risk 
weights, similar to us.  The absence of risk weights in the adjustment assumes that the compositional 
effects are less important and allows some comparison between the two sets of results. 
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BASEL III components will jointly affect the transmission mechanism of monetary 
policy. 
Current DSGE models are unable to capture these effects, as pointed out by Borio 
and Zhu (2012). We have provided an alternative framework that addresses some 
of the concerns, but not all. More research is required in understanding risk taking 
and incorporating it in a reasonably realistic way into macroeconomic models.    
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Chapter 7  Conclusion  
7.1 Introduction 
In this research, we develop a stock and flow consistent model for South Africa, 
which draws on the theoretical models developed by Borio and Zhu (2012) and 
Woodford (2010). Our framework addresses some of the criticisms raised against 
DSGE models regarding their ability to incorporate financial sector dynamics as 
well as their specification of expectations. Our approach assumes model-consistent 
expectations over a finite period of time. The household can change its expectation 
formation behaviour between solution periods. We argue that our approach 
resembles bounded rationality, and it is more in line with recent empirical evidence 
on how individuals form expectations (Hommes 2011; Roos and Luhan 2013).  
The model framework is calibrated to South African data and it is used to study: the 
impact of higher government consumption expenditure on the economy under 
conditions characterised by significant spare capacity, low government debt and 
sound financial sector; the impact of capital flow reversal; and the transmission of 
higher leverage ratio shock.   
7.2 Main Findings 
The main objective of the study was to evaluate the impact of the three 
macroeconomic shocks and identify the role of the financial sector in the 
transmission mechanism. We first outline the general findings: 
• The financial sector plays an important role in transmitting and amplifying 
economic shocks. We argue that a stock and flow- consistent framework is 
required to capture the financial sector dynamics and the distribution of 
risk. There are strong feedback loops between the real and financial 
economy and they operate through the balance sheets of all institutions. 
• The transmission effects identified by Borio and Zhu (2012) and Woodford 
(2010) are fundamental to generating the financial accelerator mechanism 
that characterises the financial sector behaviour.  
Chapter 4 presents the capital flow reversal shock results. We argue that the level 
of financial development plays an important part in the transmission process and 
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that capital flow reversal shocks can cause discontinuities in economic behaviour. 
Our main findings are: 
• Even in the absence of large stocks of short-term foreign currency 
denominated debt, the reversal in capital flows can cause a sizable impact 
on economic activity through its effect on the financial sector. This effect 
can be particularly large for saving-constrained economies such as South 
Africa. Demand for domestic assets decreases, which affects negatively 
equity prices. Liquidity also declines. Financial sector perceptions of risk 
increase, leading to higher lending spreads. This affects economic activity 
negatively, leading to further feedback effects. 
• The discontinuities, which may characterise capital flow reversal shocks, 
can significantly exacerbate the impacts. Such discontinuities can emerge 
if the capital flow reversal shock causes, for example, the bursting of an 
asset price bubble.  
Chapter 5 presents the fiscal shock. We argued that the impact is highly dependent 
on the economic and financial conditions and the distribution of government debt. 
The main findings are: 
• The fiscal multipliers were larger than 2 in the period 2008 to 2012 as the 
output gap was large and negative, government debt was low, monetary 
policy was accommodating and the financial sector was sound. This 
allowed for the government expenditure shock to be amplified through 
the financial accelerator mechanism outlined in our framework. 
• This effect was strengthened by the large capital inflows, which released 
the domestic savings constraint. 
In Chapter 6, we present the results from the shock to the leverage ratio. We argue 
that the capital framework effect and the capital threshold effect identified by Borio 
and Zhu (2012) are key to the transmission mechanism. Our main findings are: 
• The transition to a higher leverage ratio can affect the economy significantly 
if the banks choose to shrink their balance sheet in order to achieve the 
higher ratio. Achieving the higher ratio through retained earnings reduces 
the negative impact on lending spreads but it affects negatively those agents 
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that rely on dividend income. Our results tend to be more negative than 
previous studies on South Africa; we argue that this is because of the 
financial dynamics incorporated in our framework. 
• Raising new capital by the financial sector may crowd out the non-financial 
sector and affect their ability to fund real and financial investment. 
7.3 Implications 
The implications of our research affect future model building and the conduct of 
macroeconomic policy. In terms of future development of macroeconomic 
frameworks, the current research illustrates the application and importance of stock 
and flow dynamics and financial sector behaviour in general. These should be 
incorporated more widely if current models are to be more relevant to policy 
analysis.  The improvements to the quality of financial data and availability of flow 
of funds and balance sheet information by the G20 Data Gap Initiative should 
facilitate the inclusion of financial behaviour into macroeconomic models.  We 
need to guard against creating very complex models, which generate results but 
provide no insights into the transmission mechanism of shocks. There is a trade-off 
between being more realistic and having simple models that can inform our 
understanding of the economy.    
In the terms of fiscal policy, our results indicate that the fiscal multipliers can be 
large, but policy makers must have knowledge of the spare capacity in the economy, 
the financial sector environment and the feedback effects between fiscal policy and 
financial sector behaviour. There are strong feedback effects between fiscal policy 
and the financial sector. BIS (2016) provides a list of the different links. For 
example, unsustainable fiscal policy weakens banks’ balance sheets, tightens credit 
constraints and it can increase funding costs indirectly as yields increase. At the 
same time, fiscal policy can reduce the build-up of financial risk by being more 
contractionary in periods of excessive risk taking. Sovereign and bank credit default 
swap spreads tend to co-move and influence each other, which also indicates a 
strong relationship between fiscal and financial sector developments. The 
relationship is also a function of recent macroprudential regulations, which 
prescribe the risk profile of government debt and its use in the calculation of capital 
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and liquidity ratios. These regulations can also change the shape of the yield curve 
as demand and liquidity for certain debt instruments changes (CGFS 2016). 
The large fiscal multipliers were also a function of the monetary policy 
accommodation as the repo rate remained unchanged. This highlights again the 
importance of monetary and fiscal policy coordination. However, we argue that this 
is not sufficient. Monetary policy can have a significant impact on risk-taking by 
the financial sector and hence affect its behaviour (Borio and Zhu 2012). At the 
same time, the introduction of BASEL III is likely to change the transmission 
mechanism of monetary policy and there is uncertainty as to how this will take place 
(CGFS 2016). Our results on the introduction of higher leverage ratios indicate that 
monetary policy decisions must consider the higher lending spread, otherwise 
monetary conditions are likely to be different from those intended by policy makers.   
There are feedback loops between fiscal policy, monetary policy, macroprudential 
policy and the behaviour of the financial sector. This indicates that the old model 
of monetary and fiscal coordination is outdated. A new model of macro policy 
coordination is required, which considers these feedback loops. 
Finally, our results for the capital flow shock indicate larger contractionary impacts 
than previously estimated by other studies on South Africa. The effects operate 
through the financial sector and translate into higher lending spreads. A decline in 
the repo rate to reduce lending rates and stimulate economic activity may translate 
into larger outflows and further increases in the lending spread. If the impact on the 
lending spread is larger than the decline in the repo rate and the real rates rise, 
economic activity will decline further. This is an area, which requires more 
academic research to assess the right policy response for economies which have 
high reliance on foreign savings.   
7.4 Limitations and Further Extensions 
As for any model, our framework is simplified version of reality and is subject to 
limitations. The first one is our ability to capture heterogeneity amongst agents in 
the same sector. For example, we have only one household. The implication of this 
is that we cannot capture all the elements of risk-taking as identified by Borio and 
Zhu (2012); and our framework, while building on current DSGE and CGE models, 
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is also subject to some of the same criticisms. The time profile of financial 
instruments is also missing from our framework. For example, we do not 
distinguish between short- and long-term bond instruments.  
Heterogeneity can be introduced, for example, by distinguishing between credit 
constraint and non-credit constraint households or by introducing tradable and non-
tradable goods in the capital flow reversal shock analysis. However, heterogeneity 
also introduces complexity and we need to guard against making the model very 
realistic, but at the same time not useful for economic research as shocks are 
difficult to trace. 
The challenges with data quality and the lack of economic research analysing some 
of the relationships that we model impose limitations on our results. As indicated 
before, the flow of funds data and the available balance sheet data for South Africa 
require some improvements, which are currently being implemented as part of 
South Africa’s commitments to the G20 Data Gap Initiative. This should provide 
for better quality and availability of data. Improvements to the data will also allow 
for use of more advanced techniques in calibrating the coefficients, such as the 
maximum entropy approach.77  More micro research into understanding bank 
behaviour and the interactions between the balance sheets of different institutions 
in South Africa can greatly enhance the robustness of our framework and the results. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
                                                 
77 See, for example, Arndt, Robinson, and Tarp (2002). They use the maximum entropy approach to 
estimate the parameters of a CGE model for Mozambique. 
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